EVALUATION DEPARTMENT

REPORT 5/2017 COUNTRY EVALUATION BRIEF

Palestine

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The purpose of this **Country Evaluation Brief** is to present relevant knowledge about donors’ development efforts in Palestine. The brief systematises relevant findings from existing evaluations of development interventions in the country. The idea is to present the findings to the reader in a succinct and easily accessible format.

Readers who want to explore key issues in depth can access the underlying reports through the reference list. At our website, you can also find a set of short “Evaluation Portraits” summarising the key contents of those documents.

The Country Evaluation Brief was researched and produced by the Chr. Michelsen Institute.

Oslo, June 2017
Per Øyvind Bastøe, Evaluation Director
Main findings

**Despite some limited successes**, multiple constraints made it impossible to meet the stated objectives (lasting peace, effective and accountable Palestinian institutions, and sustainable socio-economic development) of international aid to the occupied Palestinian Territories (oPT) in the period under review (2010–16).

**The current cooperation** and international aid paradigm has reached its limits in the absence of a parallel constructive political track that addresses the key constraints of Israeli occupation, settlement policies and the political division of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

**Continued Israeli military occupation** in the West Bank and Gaza Strip remains the primary reason for the failure of international aid to achieve goals related to peace, human development and economic prosperity.

**The Palestinian Authority (PA)** adopted donor-driven security sector reform (SSR) as the lynchpin of its post-2007 state-building project. The development process became highly securitized as nearly one third of the aid was allocated to the security sector.

**Due to the absence** of effective accountability mechanisms in the international aid framework for Palestine, donors are not committed to the principles of aid effectiveness (Paris, Accra and Busan declarations) and the Do No Harm principles.

**Aid fatigue in the OPT** is acknowledged in the donor community, but most donors are unwilling to revise the overall aid system or alter the economic framework of the Oslo Accords (Paris Economic Protocol arrangements).

**The failure to reconstruct Gaza** in the aftermath of the three Israeli assaults illustrates the limitations of the existing aid framework and development model.

**International aid** enabled short term sectoral improvements in the health and infrastructure sectors. Yet the fundamental structural deficiencies in the Palestinian economy and aid structures and systems prevented such improvements from serving as drivers of sustainable economic growth.

**Humanitarian aid** was indispensable in addressing basic humanitarian needs.

**The annual losses** to the Palestine economy due to the occupation are greater than current ODA aid volumes.

**International aid** improved the effectiveness of several PA institutions, but the reform process did not address the roots of corruption. Enhanced institutional functionality nevertheless enabled the Palestinian leadership to seek international political recognition.

**Development aid** had limited impact on socio-economic conditions and failed to achieve positive and lasting outcomes.
PALESTINE

**Estimated population:** 4.75 mill. (PCBS 2015)

**Per Capita GDP – Current Prices:**
USD 2863 (PCBS 2015)

**Per Capita GNI – Current Prices:** USD 3178 (UNCTAD 2016a)

**Aid per capita:** USD 530 (last ten-year average)

**Population age structure:**
39.4% under 15 years (PCBS 2015)

**Urban population/urbanization:** 75.3% of population, 2.81% annual rate of change (CIA 2015)

**Registered refugees – UNRWA:** 3.38 mill. (Lebanon, Jordan, Syria), 1.39 mill. (Gaza) 0.97 mill. (West Bank)

**Internally Displaced Persons (Gaza):**
75,000 (OCHA 2016)

**Human Development Index (HDI) ranking:**
113 (of 188 countries)

**Gender Inequality Index Ranking:**
0.860 (Arab states average: 0.849)

**National Poverty Rate:** 25.8%, poverty line USD 637/month (PCBS 2015)

**Mean years of schooling:** 9.33 years (UNDP 2015, data from 2013)

**Adult literacy rate:** 95.3% (UNDP 2015)

**Life expectancy at birth:** 73 years (UNDP 2015)

**Child Mortality Rate:** 21.7 per 1000 live births (PCBS 2015)

**Control of Corruption Index**
26.92/100 (WGI 2015)
Area A (Exclusively administered by the Palestinian Authority)

Area B (Administered by both the Palestinian Authority and Israel)

Area C and Nature Reserves (Is administered by Israel. Contains the Israeli settlements)

Israeli Unilaterally Declared Municipal Area of Jerusalem

International Border

Green Line
TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS

1948: Palestinian Nakba and establishment of the State of Israel

1967: Six-Day War, Israel occupies the West Bank and Gaza Strip

1973: October/Yom Kippur War

1987: First Palestinian uprising (intifada) breaks out

1993: Oslo Accords signed, Declaration of Principles (Oslo), new aid coordination body created (AHLC)

1994: Palestinian Authority (PA) created in Gaza and Jericho

1995: Oslo II, self-rule extended to most West Bank cities

1996: Yassir Arafat elected president, first elections to Palestine Legislative Council (PLC)

1999: Mahmoud Abbas elected president, Israel disengages

2000: Camp David summit fails to reach final agreement, second intifada breaks out

2002: Israel begins construction of the Separation Wall

2003: The Roadmap to Peace launched by the Quartet

2004: Mecca (Unity) Accord; Hamas takeover of Gaza; West Bank and Gaza divided and under separate government

2005: Mahmoud Abbas elected president

2006: Hamas gains majority in Legislative Elections (PLC); EU launches the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) of international aid

2007: Palestine voted new non-member state of the United Nations

2008-2009: Israeli Operation Cast Lead in Gaza; Sharm el-Sheik conference on Gaza Reconstruction

2009: Operation Pillar of Defense in Gaza; Palestine joins International Criminal Court (ICC)

2010: Operation Cast Lead in Gaza

2012: Operation Pillar of Defense in Gaza; Palestine votes to join UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 2334) condemns Israeli settlement policies (US abstains)

2013: Prime Minister Salam Fayyad resigns; Kerry initiative to revive peace negotiations launched

2015: Palestine joins International Criminal Court (ICC)

2016: UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 2334) condemns Israeli settlement policies (US abstains)
1. Introduction

The Occupied Palestinian Territories (oPT) is one of the world’s most aid-dependent countries. Despite overall levels of aid falling since 2009, the Territories remain one of the world’s largest per capita recipients of foreign aid.
Since the signing of the Oslo Accords (1993), the main objectives of donor support have been to support the peace-process, build the infrastructure of a future Palestinian state and help realise a “two-state solution”. Yet as successive peace initiatives and plans have been tried and failed – Oslo Process (1993), Camp David (2000), Arab Peace Initiative (2002), Roadmap for Peace (2003), Annapolis Process (2007), Direct Palestinian-Israeli talks (2010), Kerry initiative (2013) – donors continue to face an extremely difficult political environment. Demands for good governance, accountability and anti-corruption cannot be fully enforced given the vital importance of aid for the cash-strapped Palestinian Authority (PA) and the dire consequences for the resident population if aid conditionality cuts are imposed.

The PA is the executive branch of the Palestinian self-rule government but has no control of large swaths of the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip has since 2007 been ruled by the Hamas government. Despite the massive aid flows since the signing of the Oslo Accords – more than USD 30 billion in aid has been spent on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (1993–2014) – the absence of statehood and the continuation of the Israeli occupation are fundamental obstacles to development. Moreover, the high volume of aid has not been followed by a parallel, meaningful peace process. While sustaining the vision of an eventual political solution, aid therefore has failed to buy peace as originally envisaged in the Oslo Accords. This has left Palestinian statehood in limbo, the population impoverished and the economy dependent on foreign aid and captive to the Israeli economy. Several studies reviewed for this report consider the Israeli occupation the principal reason for these problems and the related failure of development aid to reach its stated objectives.

### DONOR AND NGO SELECTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF ACTOR</th>
<th>SELECTION CRITERIA</th>
<th>DONOR/NGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral donor</td>
<td>ODA &gt; USD 100 million per year between 2010-15</td>
<td>USA, Saudi Arabia, Germany, UK, and Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Top 2 emerging donors reporting to the OECD DAC</td>
<td>UAE and Turkey; Qatar to Gaza but reporting to OECD DAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral donor</td>
<td>Top 3 donors based on gross disbursements between 2010 and 2015</td>
<td>EU Institutions and mechanisms, The World Bank, UNRWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pooled fund manager</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Estimates show that around 10% of overall aid is allocated to NGOs</td>
<td>Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network (PNGON), The NGO Development Centre (NDC), The Welfare Association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The absence of statehood and the continuation of the Israeli occupation are fundamental obstacles to development.
With more than one hundred donors in the occupied Palestinian Territories (oPT), aid is highly fragmented.

The evaluations, assessments and reports reviewed for this country brief differ in their scope, aims and sectors under study. More than 100 documents were assessed for inclusion in the CEB covering the period under review (2010–16), as well as an additional 20 policy briefs and articles. A total of 33 studies were selected based on the following criteria: a) the relative importance of donors in terms of ODA (ODA > USD 100 million/year); b) the major aid channels: bilateral, multilateral and NGO support; and c) relevance of thematic sectors: humanitarian aid, governance, multi-sector programmes, human rights and cross-cutting issues (gender and corruption).

With more than one hundred donors in the oPT, aid is highly fragmented and many studies evaluate single donor interventions that are limited in time, scope and potential impact. Studies selected for this review are those evaluating or reviewing sectors (country programmes, portfolios), ideally over the period under review. Independent and external evaluations are preferred to in-house reviews and assessments. Both donor specific and sector specific evaluations of aid programmes in the oPT have been included. The reports cover the main West Bank under PA administration (Area A and B) as well as Area C under Israeli jurisdiction and the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem (Map).

Academic literature, policy briefs and research articles provide important sector and aid policy analyses that complement those found in reports and assessments, as do in-depth studies of aid volumes.
2. Country context

The signing of the Oslo Accords (1993) and Declaration of Principles (DoP) established the Oslo Peace Process. The Accords stipulated large sums of aid to support the state-building process and new institutions, notably the Palestinian Authority (PA). Since 2007, the Fatah-Hamas split, the fragmented West Bank and isolated Gaza Strip have, in addition to the Israeli occupation, defined the oPT.
The Oslo Accords left major parts of the conflict to be settled in final-status negotiations (Jerusalem, borders and refugees). From its highpoint in 1995, the original timetable faltered, and led to renewed conflict and a second Palestinian uprising (intifada) from 2000–05. This in turn made Israel erect the Separation Wall (“West Bank Barrier”) – illegal according to international law – that further halted progress towards peace, sub-divided the West Bank, and isolated East Jerusalem. The barrier also trapped additional communities between the 1949 armistice line (Green line) and the wall.

In an attempt to get the peace process back on track, the Roadmap for Peace (2003–05) aimed to reach a final settlement under the aegis of the US and the Quartet (UN, USA, EU and Russia and establish a viable, sovereign Palestinian state). The 2005 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza dismantled the settlements, but left Israel in control of the borders, seaports and air space. The surprise win by Hamas in the 2006 legislative elections led to a full split between Fatah and Hamas, an international boycott of the Hamas government and was followed by a violent Hamas takeover of Gaza. The US and the World Bank suspended aid for a brief period and Israel withheld taxes, but donor support to the PA was reinstated under a temporary aid mechanism that bypassed the Hamas government and redirected aid to the office of the president (Table 1). In effect, donors bypassed the very institutions they have helped in building and reforming over the years preceding the 2006 elections.

The West Bank and Gaza have since mid-2007 remained under separate and opposing administrations.

Palestinians remove a cement block, part of an Israeli army road block at the main road into the West Bank village of Assera Shamaleya near Nablus, 2005.

PHOTO: MUHAMMED MUHEISEN / AP PHOTO
The West Bank and Gaza have since mid-2007 remained under separate and opposing administrations. The international response to the democratic elections was a political and economic boycott of the newly elected Hamas government that served to weaken democratic developments and cemented internal Palestinian divisions. These divisions remain an obstacle to realising a two-state solution. The Hamas government in Gaza is weak, isolated and the population is dependent on humanitarian aid. Conditions are not much better in the West Bank. Data from the Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI), as well as other international and local bodies, underline the combined insecurity, deteriorating rule of law and corruption problems (U4 2012).

Israel’s three wars against Gaza (2008–14), as well as several incursions and cross-border attacks, have left the economy in shambles and thousands of homes yet to be reconstructed. This accounts for the negative human development indicators in Gaza with growing poverty, food insecurity and record unemployment (UNDP 2015).

With progress towards statehood seemingly stalled, Palestinian negotiators pursued a new strategy of seeking full membership in the UN and other international organisations. In 2011, Palestine joined UNESCO and became a non-member observer state of the United Nations in 2012. In January 2015, Palestine acceded to the Rome statute and became a state party to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Because of this, international sanctions followed as the United States and the World Bank in 2012 and again in 2015, temporarily stopped transfers to the PA.

The oPT fits the OECD definition of a “fragile state”, characterized by weak governance and vulnerability to conflict. In this sense, the OECD Fragile States Principles should apply. Yet as the oPT is not an internationally recognized state (in the sense of full UN membership), applying the aid principles of the Paris Declaration is problematic (Ibrahim and Beaudet 2012). The lack of statehood is both formally and substantively a major obstacle to development and, together with Israeli occupation, a major reason why “the many attempts to make aid more ‘effective’, in the spirit of the aid effectiveness principles of the OECD, have failed” (ibid.: 481). Donor-dependence is very high and contributes to strong variations in economic growth (UNDP 2015: 45).

Numerous UN Security Council resolutions have addressed the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as the illegal occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, but the construction of new settlements and outposts has continued. In late December 2016, the UN Security Council passed resolution 2334 demanding a complete halt to all settlement activity, and rejected unilateral change of borders or the status of Jerusalem as a breach of international law.
3. Donor engagement in Palestine

**International aid** to the oPT is critically important for the survival of the Palestinian Authority (PA). The main goal of donor assistance is to sustain the peace process towards Palestinian statehood, build the institutions of the PA, promote economic growth and provide sustenance and security to the Palestinian population. Overall aid volumes are declining, as are key human development indicators.
From 1993 to 2009, the volume of international aid to the oPT increased seventeen times to reach almost three billion dollars (Wildeman and Tartir 2014: 433). The second intifada (especially between 2000 and 2003) led to a major shift towards humanitarian aid and more than tripled overall aid volumes, followed by a return to development aid from 2004–05 when the political fall-out of the uprising subsided (De Voir and Tartir 2009: 9). The 2006 election victory for Hamas caused a temporary loss of revenues to the PA, with Israel withholding taxes and major international donors imposing sanctions and boycotts. During 2007–09, the donors re-engaged aid transfers using new budget support mechanisms (Table 1) that aligned donor priorities with that of the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP, 2008–10). However, from its highpoint in 2008–09, aid to Palestine has been significantly reduced. In 2016, the total foreign aid to the PA reached a new low of about USD 780 million, a staggering 81 percent reduction from 2008. Both Western countries and Arab states have reduced their aid, creating a financing gap of more than USD 650 million by the end of 2016 (PA 2016).

**Table 1 // POOLED AID MECHANISMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME (ACRONYM)</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>OPERATED BY</th>
<th>MAIN CHARACTERISTICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temporary International Mechanism (TIM)</td>
<td>Trust fund</td>
<td>EU/EC</td>
<td>TIM was instituted in 2006 to provide direct budget support the PA, and bypass the Hamas government. Planned as a temporary measure, the timeframe was later extended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion de l’Aide Socio-Economique (PEGASE)</td>
<td>Trust fund</td>
<td>EU/EC</td>
<td>In 2008, PEGASE replaced TIM as the main mechanism for aid delivery to the PA and covers salaries (60%), social protection (25%) with the remainder to hospitals and other public services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF)</td>
<td>Trust fund</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Established by the World Bank to help donors support the PA’s Palestinian National Development Plan (2014–16) by channelling budget support for its implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP)</td>
<td>Trust fund</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>CAP is the humanitarian sector’s main tool for coordination, strategic planning and programming. It includes all funds channelled via the UN to address humanitarian needs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Due to the high volume of aid and political nature of the aid context, donor coordination is particularly difficult. A complex structure for donor coordination has been put in place in an effort to balance different American and European positions and foreign policies, facilitate agenda-setting, reduce duplication and foster synergies (Table 1). Since 1993, the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) has served as the principal policy-level coordination mechanism for development assistance to the Palestinian people and for facilitating dialogue between the donors, the PA and Israel.
As shown in Figure 1, the United States is the single largest donor followed by the European Union (EU), but the combined European aid represent around 50 per cent of all aid to the oPT. Between 2007 and 2015, the EU allocated more than EUR 2.5 billion to the oPT, mainly as direct budget support (43 per cent). Norway is the sixth biggest donor, leading the group of donors whose average aid volumes exceed USD 100 million. The OECD database does not include the large sums of money provided by Saudi Arabia, totalling about USD 1.47 billion over the period 2009–16.

Norway is the sixth biggest donor, leading the group of donors whose average aid volumes exceed USD 100 million.
During the period 2010–15, the main ODA sectors were: social infrastructure including direct budget support (44 per cent), humanitarian aid (20 per cent), education (14 per cent) and health (4 per cent) (Figure 2). The second largest category is humanitarian aid and during 2012–15, a total of USD 2.52 billion was allocated to the oPT (UN and non-UN appeals). In the same period, humanitarian aid allocated to UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) totalled USD 1.19 billion, with an annual average of USD 297 mill. approx.
The OECD data show a significant reduction in multilateral and public sector allocations, both halved since 2011 and 2013 respectively (Figure 3). This is a reflection of the overall reduction in aid over the period 2010–15.
4. Evaluations of aid

**Two decades of aid** to the Palestinian Authority has been unable to stem the trend of declining human development indicators. A significant part of aid bolsters the Israeli economy, while the Israeli occupation reduces the potential economic output from the Palestinian economy.
The current aid architecture is hampered by parallel structures, lack of reliable data and coordination or accountability mechanisms that compromise the PA’s ability to plan according to the priorities of the Palestinian National Development Plan (PNDP, 2011–13). The PA is not accountable to the Palestinian people in the form of electoral censure due to the absence of regular elections. Ineffective or absent political institutions that could provide checks and balances, and the lack of a culture of transparency and accountability, compound the problem (MMA 2013). In Gaza, providing aid while observing a no-contact policy vis-à-vis the Hamas government, contravenes key OECD principles for aid effectiveness.

A recent study estimates that 72 per cent of international aid ends up in the Israeli economy, through practices that divert the flows (monopoly on goods and services) and subvert (customs union, taxes and levies) the aid (Hever 2015). Other studies estimate that the Palestinian economy would be twice as large without the Israeli occupation (UNCTAD 2016b). A World Bank study found that the annual loss from the Israeli occupation of Area C (Map), which constitutes about 60 per cent of the West Bank and most of the arable land, amounts to one third of the Palestinian GDP. In 2011, USD 3.4 billion was lost in direct and indirect benefits (WBS 2014).

Another study estimated that the total loss to the Palestinian economy in 2014 was almost USD 10 billion, the equivalent of 75 per cent of the GDP (ARIJ 2015: 3). These findings underpin the claim that aid correlates with processes of “de-development” in the West Bank (Le More 2008) and the Gaza strip (Roy 2016).

Instead of targeting the costs incurred by the Israeli occupation, new policy initiatives like the Kerry investment plan (2013) aimed to increase the Palestinian GDP by 50 per cent within three years (Wildeman and Tartir 2014: 445). Even the most conservative estimate of the annual loss to the Palestinian economy (USD 3.4 billion in 2011), exceeds the average annual ODA disbursed (USD 2.2 billion, 2006–14). In addition, there is the wilful Israeli destruction of infrastructure built with aid money, estimated at EUR 65 million during 2001–15 (E-MM 2015). Underlining the importance of these issues, the UN General Assembly has asked UNCTAD to conduct its own assessment of the cost of occupation to the Palestinians (UNCTAD 2016b).
Donors have generally been reluctant to make aid conditional on Israel easing restrictions on the West Bank and Gaza (Wildeman and Tartir 2014). Donors are aware of their obligations vis-à-vis the Geneva and the Hague Conventions (Al-Shabaka 2014), but this is secondary to the need for maintaining relations to Israel. A report assessing the impact of democracy assistance to Palestine finds growing frustration among diplomats over that fact that “state-building has not been a catalyst for final settlement negotiations”. Instead, state-building “has become an end in itself” and “a substitute for the lack of progress in the peace process” (Youngs and Michou 2011: 18).

An evaluation of the Netherlands’s aid programme likewise found that occupation “significantly undermine[s] the effectiveness of [Dutch] development cooperation” (IOB 2016: 17). The extensive three-volume evaluation of the EU Commission’s policies (2008–12), the oPT’s largest donor, found that aid had little demonstrable impact on the main obstacles to a two-state solution. The evaluation concluded that the current cooperation paradigm has reached its limits in the absence of a parallel political track that addresses the key constraints of Israeli occupation, settlement policies and the political division of the West Bank and Gaza and establishes more effective implementation measures (DRN 2014: x).

**MULTI-SECTOR PROGRAMMING**

Assessments of multi-sector programmes concur that the underlying problem is the Israeli occupation and failure to make progress towards a statehood solution. The studies advocate a new aid paradigm addressing the obstacles to the peace process, as well as fewer projects and greater sector concentration. Economic growth is largely driven by donor subsidies, and funds should be redirected towards the least developed parts of the oPT.

The evaluation of the Dutch development cooperation (IOB 2016), finds that the Israeli occupation of the oPT and the weak position of the Palestinian Authority were the two main constraints on the effectiveness of the Dutch
development cooperation programme. Dutch aid contributed to laying the foundations for a Palestinian state, but did not substantially contribute to developing a viable Palestinian economy. The programme was relevant from the perspective of Dutch development policy, but the Netherlands should continue its critical dialogue with Israel to improve the conditions that now undermine the effectiveness of Dutch support to the oPT.

The evaluation of the Danish engagement in Palestine finds that the main political objective of the Danish engagement is to support a two-state solution (ECORYS 2015). From 2009 to 2013, Danish support to Palestinian development (about EUR 160 million) targeted humanitarian support and state-building. This strengthened Palestinian organisations and institutions providing services to the population, but the Israeli occupation and the limitations on the Palestinian side prevented progress towards statehood. The evaluation report finds no evidence of an overall progress towards improved accountability, transparency or a two-state solution. It recommends greater emphasis on the least developed and most conflictual parts of the oPT – Area C, East Jerusalem and Gaza – as well as a reduction in the number of bilateral projects in favour of multilateral and co-funding engagements. To this end, the report recommends drafting a comprehensive country policy paper that includes a new framework for measuring results.

The comprehensive evaluation of the EU Commission’s Palestine engagement (DRN 2014), finds that EU has pursued a norm-based resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the development of a democratic, viable and contiguous Palestinian state. The EU is the largest contributor to Palestinian welfare, thereby supporting the broader European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) goal of stability. The evaluation notes, however, that little has been done to remove the most significant obstacles to sustainable cooperation outcomes, i.e. the Israeli occupation and settlement policy and the political division between the Palestinian authorities in the West Bank and Gaza. To this end, the evaluation recommends a fundamental rethink of the structural limitations of current approaches and a new aid architecture better suited to the local context, EU norms and criteria for effective implementation.

A recent assessment of the EU’s PEGASE Direct Financial Support mechanism found that it had contributed to building institutional capacities within the two-state framework and recommended that the support should continue due to its positive impact (ICE 2016).

The World Bank Group’s assistance to Palestine has covered four broad areas with an emphasis on institutional capacity building (IEG 2010). The overarching objectives – investing in peace
and building the institutions necessary for future statehood – were found to be relevant to the needs of the client (the PA), but, the internal evaluation concluded, the results depended on a political solution to the conflict, which was beyond the control of the Bank. Institutional development was highly uneven, with serious gaps at the sector and municipal levels. Most infrastructure sectors were subject to technical and political constraints. Recent economic growth was driven almost exclusively by donor subsidies, and the private sector was extremely weak. An economic peace dividend had not materialized, and the key constraints to peace and prosperity were never seriously addressed (Box: Reports to the AHLC, 2010–16).

The 2014 Palestine Human Development Report (UNDP 2015), argues that the Israeli occupation serves as a dis-empowerment trap. The population has become more impoverished in recent years, especially in the Gaza Strip, with more than 700,000 people currently living in poverty. In East Jerusalem, two-thirds are poor (ibid.: 54). In 2013, about one-third of the population in the oPT were food insecure, with numbers increasing since 2011. The report calls for fundamental changes to redress the imbalance of power between the occupied population and the occupying power.

GOVERNANCE
Democratic standards are deteriorating in the West Bank and Gaza. In the security sector, there is an increased concentration of power and lack of public trust in the police force. However, aid projects aiming to increase service delivery have been successful, as has aid used for upgrading local infrastructure and monitor corruption. Evaluations advocate better aid coordination and aligning development goals with foreign policy objectives.

For the past decade, most indicators of democracy have been declining in the West Bank. The PA has lost credibility, democratic oversight is lacking and the Palestine Legislative Council (PLC) has not convened since 2006. Following the international boycott of the Hamas government, Salam Fayyad was appointed Prime Minister in 2007. He began a technocratic reform programme that made institution building a prerequisite for state building, and international aid priorities aligned (at least nominally) with the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP, 2008–10), and the Palestinian National Development Plan (PNDP, 2011–13). This particular approach to state building, development planning and governance (which was termed “Fayyadism”), continued to inform government policies also after 2013, as reflected in the PA’s National Policy Agenda (NPA, 2017–22). However, in contrast to the highpoint of Fayyadism (2008–10), recent years have witnessed an unprecedented decline in aid reflecting the lack of progress in peace talks and the ensuing donor fatigue.

The population has become more impoverished in recent years, especially in the Gaza Strip.
A comprehensive Norad assessment of Norwegian support to democratization and political legitimacy in Palestine (Norad 2016), finds that the main obstacles to democracy and human rights in Palestine are the Israeli occupation, lack of sovereignty and diverse and conflicting international interests in changing the present situation. This deprives the Palestinian authorities and the entire political system of legitimacy, authority and governing capacity. Development assistance by itself can neither solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict nor end the occupation. However, development assistance could improve the conditions for reaching a negotiated solution, strengthen democracy and protect human rights. To this end, the assessment report recommends improving aid coordination and the division of labour among donors, and prioritizing aid to UNRWA and reconstruction in Gaza. Further, Norwegian development aid should be linked to other policy measures to increase overall policy coherence in order to promote sustainable development.

A project report of donor assistance to democracy promotion (Youngs and Michou 2011) finds that democratic standards are faltering in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The aim of creating one democratic proto-state has given way to the emergence of two separate, authoritarian political systems, recourse to military courts, repression of the press, closing of civil society organisations, and prohibitions on Hamas operating in the West Bank. A multi-party system has not evolved. There have not been presidential elections since 2005 and local elections since 2010. Increased concentration of power in the security sector creates a risk that support to security sector reform (SSR) will boost militarized authoritarianism and further weaken democratic prospects.

SSR is a priority for all donors working in the field of governance, with the US being the largest actor. An EU police reform programme in the West Bank designed to strengthen civil policing started in 2006 and has trained 3,000 officers. A policy analysis identified many obstacles to successful implementation (Kristoff 2012). The mandatory institutional collaboration between the PA and the Israeli Defence Force (IDF), internal Palestinian political divisions (Hamas vs. Fatah), and lack of popular trust in the police meant that it failed to develop into a truly professional force. The analysis also found that donors were reluctant to fund police reform over their aid budgets.

The evaluation of two programme grants from the UK Department of International Development (DFID) (ODI 2015), one providing budget support to the PA and the other an institutional capacity-building programme, found that they had supported the Palestinian economy and government, but did not promote peace (ibid.: ix). The programmes were implemented as separate interventions, which reduced the potential synergies between them. Moreover, the evaluation found it difficult to determine whether the two programmes responded to the PA’s needs and, indeed, if they were appropriate responses to DFID’s fiduciary concerns.

The first multi-donor trust fund to be established for the West Bank and Gaza – Partnership for Infrastructure Development Multi-Donor Trust Fund (PID-MDTF) aimed to improve the coverage, quality and sustainability of the local water and sanitation infrastructure (AWARD 2016). An evaluation concludes that the fund has greatly improved aid coordination and harmonisation and is a valuable instrument for the
World Bank and participating donors to leverage their funding. The fund has also demonstrated its added value for the PA reform process, especially in water and urban development sectors, but continues to face major risks affecting long-term viability and sustainability. The Palestinian Authority Capacity Enhancement (PACE) project aimed to promote effective and responsive PA institutions and was designed to improve the delivery of government services in targeted ministries (USAID 2013). The USAID selected six government institutions to participate as partners in capacity building (mainly technical expertise, coaching and training) for improved service delivery. The assessment found significant improvement across all institutions, with two showing improvement on all performance indicators.

HUMAN RIGHTS

The NGO sector’s impact on human rights monitoring and violence against women (VAW) is substantial although constrained by local conditions, as is the empowerment of rural refugee communities. Human rights NGOs are underfunded, donor-dependent and rely on a large number of donors. New pooled NGO funding trials are promising and benefit donors and clients.

The human rights sector is dominated by Palestinian NGOs, which receive about 30 per cent of the external aid dedicated to the NGO sector (De Voir and Tartir 2009: x). The number of active Palestinian NGOs is uncertain – estimates range from 900 to 1800 – with many either co-opted or incorporated by the PA since 1993.

An evaluation of the provision of core funding to twenty-four Palestinian and Israeli human rights organisations found that the funding was extremely important regardless of the geographical context (SIDA 2015). It allowed for setting priorities and strengthened long-term viability and job security for staff. While receiving support from several donors, the NGOs remained underfunded and the evaluation recommended increasing core funding.

The importance of core funding is also reflected in the review of Al-Miftah, a Palestinian NGO...
The report finds that the project portfolio was too broad, but the combined impact on the gender sector, given the systemic constraints, was substantial (Knudsen and Selvik 2014). The organisation has influenced gender policy and legislation and mainstreamed UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325). However, the low core funding (less than 40 per cent of the total) constrains long-term planning, as does the medium-term duration of most projects.

The Palestine Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR) is recognized internationally as the national human rights institution of Palestine and is fully compliant with the Paris Principles (Sidoti et al. 2016). The evaluation of the ICHR’s performance (2013–16) finds that it has substantial impact on Palestinian institutions and society and contributes to progress towards governance reform. The Commission has succeeded in operating as a national institution in spite of the internal political divisions but depends on foreign donors for its entire budget.

Al-Haq is a Palestinian human rights organisation and West Bank affiliate of the International Commission of Justice in Geneva. It documents and monitors violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. A review of Al-Haq’s strategic plan (2011–13) finds that it is an important civil society actor that is able to hold the Palestinian Authority (PA) accountable (Selvik and Knudsen 2014). Al-Haq’s financial basis is solid. The organization receives funding from many donors (including Norway), and close to 90 per cent is core funding.

HUMANITARIAN AID
Since 2006, Israel has strictly limited the import of food and goods to Gaza. Humanitarian aid has not kept pace with local needs and UNRWA and World Food Programme (WFP) remain underfunded despite novel attempts at fundraising. While high volumes of humanitarian aid are reaching Gaza, official figures are missing and attempts to collect such data have failed. Overall capacity for third-party monitoring of aid transfers is limited. The refugee population in the West Bank (0.97 mill.), and even more so in Gaza (1.39 mill.) are critically dependent on support from UNRWA. Despite an average annual funding of USD 297 million (2012–15), the organisation is struggling to meet its obligations and is chronically underfunded. Many sources contribute funds for humanitarian assistance, which totalled USD 5.6 billion in recent years (2006–15), yet substantial humanitarian needs are not met. In the period 2009-2015, unmet needs were highest in Gaza (43 per cent) and only slightly lower in the West Bank (35 per cent). Despite the high volumes of aid targeting Gaza, official figures are missing and attempts to collect such data have failed.

An organisational review of UNRWA (MOPAN 2011) finds that, while chronically underfunded, the agency successfully delivers core food, health facilities and education services to refugees in the West Bank and Gaza who live in a volatile, politically sensitive and conflicted environment. Although having become more performance-oriented, the organisation still faces operational challenges. Promoting gender issues amidst a difficult economic outlook was noted as one such challenge.

An evaluation of UNRWA’s Resource Mobilization Strategy (RMS) during 2012–15 (UNRWA 2015) found that increased competition for scarce funds amidst an adverse funding environment threatened sustainability. A related report (PAI and ATOS 2015) found that DFID’s
support to UNRWA’s cash-for-work programme had not been successful. The programme had little impact on either food security or poverty reduction and had limited possibility for effective monitoring and evaluation.

DFID is UNRWA’s fourth largest donor, and other studies of its support programme have been undertaken as well. One review (ICAI 2013) finds that UNRWA delivers good quality, basic services that promote human development and regional security, but is unable to bridge the growing gap between demand and supply. As a result, services are declining. The sustainability of UNRWA is dependent on organisational reform, yet necessary change may not be feasible.

Residents of the West Bank and Gaza suffer from chronic food insecurity, with figures ranging from 47 per cent in Gaza to 16 percent in the West Bank. An internal evaluation of the WFP’s country strategy found that the agency successfully responded to chronic food insecurity and acute crises (WFP 2016). However, the difficult environment, the PAs institutional fragility and lack of adequate data compelled the WFP to prioritise immediate needs. By setting aside strategic and operational priorities, the WFP compromised its ability to promote sustainable livelihoods.

**CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES**

*Interventions in the gender sector have strengthened legal protection and access to justice, but sustainability remains an issue. Corruption is a key public issue, but the impact and sustainability of anti-corruption measures are uncertain despite a better legal framework.*

**Gender**

Donors give a great deal of attention to Palestine gender issues. However, the continuation of a wide gender gap raises questions about the impact and effectiveness of aid in this sector, although some programmes are successful. An end-of-programme evaluation of the DFID-funded “Support to Accountable Security and Justice in the OPT” implemented by UN Women in the
West Bank and East Jerusalem (Roseveare et al. 2015) found that it had supported the PA’s efforts to tackle violence against women (VAW) and ensuring women and girls’ access to security and justice. The long-term sustainability of specialist police services was nevertheless constrained by local factors, in particular, growing securitisation and the preference for traditional, non-formal justice mechanisms over the formal criminal justice system.

The evaluation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Programme (MDG-F 2013) implemented by six UN agencies to address gender-based violence, political participation of women and equal economic rights, found that the programme had helped address the MDGs at the national level, including the Violence Against Women Strategy (2011) and the Cross-Sectoral National Strategy on Gender (2011–13), the first of its kind seeking to mainstream gender across all sectors in oPT.

The mid-term evaluation of a programme targeting the protection and livelihood needs of rural refugee communities in the Jordan valley (UNTFHS 2012), jointly implemented by four UN agencies in close partnership with relevant PA institutions and local stakeholders, found that performance on most OECD-DAC criteria was adequate, but that the effectiveness was hampered by gendered perceptions of women’s social role and status.

**Corruption**

Palestine is not included in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), but the score of the Control of Corruption Index is 26.92 out of 100 (100 is the highest/best score). The problem of corruption has been documented in opinion polls, surveys and reports by the anti-corruption NGO AMAN. A recent report to the EU estimated that of the aid to the West Bank and Gaza (2008–12), about EUR 2 billion was lost due to financial corruption in the Palestinian Authority (MMA 2013: 1).

Four of five Palestinians rank the problem of corruption as second only to the occupation, and studies suggest that anti-corruption measures are constrained by poor regulatory frameworks (U4 2012). An organisational review of AMAN (COWI 2016), the national chapter of Transparency International (TI), finds that it has promoted a national framework for fighting corruption, including the adoption of anti-corruption legislation, a commission and a court. However, its ability to combat corruption is uncertain. AMAN has no local funding and depends on foreign donors. Sustainability is limited and the organisation suffers from institutional overstretch, but its presence in Gaza is important and should be strengthened, the review concludes.
5. Lessons learnt

The lack of progress towards statehood for Palestine has reduced the volume of aid, compromised aid effectiveness and made interventions miss their targets. This is most evident in projects that seek to change major development and state-building parameters – democracy, governance, security – as well as aid seeking to influence attitudes or behaviour (corruption, gender roles). Infrastructure and health interventions fare better.
Overall, the quality of evaluations and assessments is high, in particular those reviewing major sectors and donors. Due to their rigorous methodology, they point the way forward in reviewing the impact of aid in a complex conflict setting. The evaluations overall paint a dismal picture of developments despite some encouraging sector-level findings.

There is a growing tendency to locate failure of development aid to reach its stated objectives in the Israeli occupation, and attempts have been made to assess the costs of the occupation to the Palestinian economy. Perhaps most alarming are the worsening human development indicators, demonstrating that the current aid paradigm cannot offset the long-term impact of continued conflict and occupation. The overall reduction in aid since 2008-9 points not only to a critical financing gap, but also to reduced state-building efforts in support of future statehood. The growing aid fatigue underlines the importance of overhauling the existing aid system and framework.

Several lessons emerge from this review of evaluations and reports that should be considered by donors seeking to improve the effectiveness and impact of their aid programmes in the oPT.

1. **Current aid policies do not reach their objectives.** The Israeli occupation and lack of progress towards a two-state solution constrain longer-term outcomes. Insufficient aid coordination, coherence and transparency erode sustainability. In theory, the donors operate under the OECD principles for effective aid but, in the interest of delivery, typically fail to observe them.

2. **The lack of a parallel political track since the collapse of the peace process in 2009 has led to a gradual reduction in aid.** While diminished, aid remains an economic lifeline for the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian people. A critical financing gap that is not addressed could over time lead to renewed violence and cycles of confrontation.

3. **Despite large volumes of aid, reviews of country programmes do not find any positive effect on accountability, transparency or corruption.** Studies evaluating bilateral budget support to the Palestinian Authority conclude that it is mainly buying time (in a political sense) without changing local attitudes towards the conflict or promoting frameworks for resolving it.

4. **While formally aligned with national plans, policies and priorities, the overall aid agenda mainly caters to donor priorities and therefore compromises the PA’s ability to plan, implement and review programmes.** Ownership criteria are thereby violated. This applies in particular to the pooled mechanisms, which account for a significant part of the total aid budget.

5. **Annual losses to the Palestine economy due to the occupation are greater than current ODA aid volumes.** There are no details on the aid volumes to Gaza, and attempts to collect such data have had little or no success.

6. **By sidestepping Hamas when delivering humanitarian aid to Gaza, donors fail to observe the Paris principles for aid effectiveness that coordination should be Palestinian-led.** Bypassing the local Hamas authorities also makes it impossible to assess compliance with the principles for aid effectiveness.

7. **Deteriorating human development indicates that the oPT is caught in a disempowerment trap that current aid volumes and policies fail to counter.** Several studies cite the Israeli occupation as the major obstacle to reach programme goals and recommend instituting new aid policies and approaches that can overcome the impasse.
Palestinian NGOs deliver tangible results in the human rights and gender sector, in particular by mainstreaming gender policies and promoting UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Despite receiving a major part of the NGO-funding and having a large number of donors, they remain underfunded. Pooled core funding initiatives have proved useful for longer-term planning and sustainability of the NGO-sector.

Norway has not commissioned a major review of its donor role and project portfolio. This is in contrast to other key donors (Denmark, EU, and the Netherlands).

Humanitarian aid, in particular in-kind food aid provided by WFP and UNRWA, sustains a large food-insecure population, but the lack of data, organisational weaknesses and insecurity have forced the WFP to intervene on a case-by-case basis. This also applies to UNRWA. While proficient in aid delivery, the agency remains critically underfunded despite new attempts at fundraising and food-for-aid approaches. UNRWA is also in need of organisational reform.

Funding from Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries
The largest Arab donors are Saudi Arabia (USD 200 million), Qatar (USD 176 million) and the United Arab Emirates (USD 88 million).* Since 2005, Turkey donated close to USD 400 million on various projects, that is about 30 per cent of the regional total for Middle East and North Africa. These donors rarely, if at all, report to the OECD-DAC database and the disbursement versus pledges ratio is low. For the aid pledged for the reconstruction of Gaza (2014–present), the disbursement ratio was only 20 per cent (USD 2.1 billion pledged, USD 427 million disbursed).

*Yearly average (2012–16); UAE average (1995–2017)

LOOKING AHEAD
The reports examined for this brief show a combination of donor-driven development policies and donor fatigue, the latter due to the stalled peace process. During the eight-year period (2009–16), aid volumes have been reduced to about one fourth of the 2008 high point. This is not sustainable. Economic growth is fuelled almost exclusively by donor subsidies, and aid reductions will lead to economic decline. Moreover, the overall reductions in Western aid have not been matched by an increase from regional donors (Box: Funding from Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries).

The West Bank concentration of aid to towns like Ramallah, the administrative capital of the PA, have made studies recommend a greater emphasis on the least developed parts of the oPT. Most evaluations find that the number of bilateral projects is too high and should be reduced in favour of multilateral and co-funding arrangements. This is especially important as new regional crises absorb a greater share of humanitarian aid, and funds for the oPT are likely to decline further unless there is tangible progress towards a political solution. Finally, the uncertainty of the Trump administration’s policies in the US poses a challenge for the donors as well as for the Palestinian authorities.
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 Reviews, assessments and evaluations


SIDA. 2015. Effectiveness of core funding to CSOs in the field of human rights and international humanitarian law in occupied Palestine. Stockholm: Sida Decentralised Evaluation 2015:25, http://www.sida.se/contentassets/a5d256027bf74c5782b994a5af878a0/88e4658b192491c-8fb2-30a84a1f5b75.pdf


## Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AHLC</td>
<td>Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Appeals Process</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>FSPs</td>
<td>Fragile States Principles</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>National Policy Agenda</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>oPT</td>
<td>occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
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<td>PACE</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority Capacity Enhancement Project</td>
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<td>PCBS</td>
<td>Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<td>PEGASE</td>
<td>Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion de l’Aide Socio-Economique</td>
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<td>PID-MDTF</td>
<td>Partnership for Infrastructure Development Multi-Donor Trust Fund</td>
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<td>PLC</td>
<td>Palestine Legislative Council</td>
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<td>PNDP</td>
<td>Palestinian National Development Plan (2011–13)</td>
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<td>PRDP</td>
<td>Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (2008–10)</td>
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<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>TIM</td>
<td>Temporary International Mechanism</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
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<td>UNSCO</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>United Nations Trust Fund on Human Security</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>VAW</td>
<td>Violence Against Women</td>
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<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WGI</td>
<td>Worldwide Governance Indicator</td>
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