The purpose of this Country Evaluation Brief is to present relevant knowledge about donors’ development efforts in Somalia. The brief systematises relevant findings from existing evaluations of development interventions in the country. The idea is to present the findings to the reader in a succinct and easily accessible format.

Readers who want to explore key issues in depth can access the underlying reports through the reference list. At our website, you can also find a set of short “Evaluation Portraits” summarising the key contents of those documents.

The Country Evaluation Brief was researched and produced by the Chr. Michelsen Institute in cooperation with Overseas Development Institute.

Oslo, May 2017
Per Øyvind Bastøe, Evaluation Director
Main findings

Somalia is one of the world’s poorest countries having suffered from decades of acute political fragility, instability, violent conflict and lack of development. It is also ranked as the most corrupt country by Transparency International.

Progress on the political and security fronts since 2012 has led to substantial increases in development aid, exemplified by the adoption of the Somali Compact in 2013. Total aid flows are ten times the level of government’s own resources, three times higher than any other country. Yet Somalia still receives less development aid per person than many other post-conflict countries.

General lessons for donors from this review include:

- **THE CONSTRAINTS** imposed by continued insecurity
- **THE VALUE** of consultation and local participation
- **THE NEED** to continually adapt approaches to the evolving context
- **THE CHALLENGE** of tackling corruption
- **THE CASE** for greater investment in monitoring and evaluation
- **THE CASE** for additional– and better prioritised - funding
- **THE URGENCY** of tackling standard aid effectiveness challenges
- **THE SUCCESS** of some mechanisms developed for post-conflict situations
**SOMALIA**

**Estimated population:** 12,316,895  
UNFPA (2014)

**Per Capita GNI in USD:** $506, IMF (2017), World Bank 2015 data

**Population age structure:** 46% under 15, UNFPA, 2014

**Urban population/urbanization:** 40%, UN, 2015 data, 4.1% annual change, UN, 2010-2015 data

**Internally Displaced Persons (IDP):** 1,106,751, UNHCR, 2016 data

**Refugees:** 881,162, UNHCR, 2017 data

**Human Development Index ranking:** 165 (of 188), UNDP, 2010 data

**Gender Inequality index:** 0.773 (on a scale of 0 to 1; 1 being the worse score) UNDP (2012)

**Poverty Rate:** Population living below international poverty line: 51.6%, World Bank (2016b)

**Adult literacy rate:** 31.8%, UNDP

**Mean years of schooling:** 4.8 years, UNDP (2012), 2010 data

**Life expectancy at birth (females/males, years):** 56.5/53.3 years, UN, 2010-2015 data

**Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births):** 79, UN, 2010-2015 data

**Aid as a percentage of GNI:** 21.3% of GNI, World Bank, 2014 data

**Corruption Perception Index rank:** 176 (of 176)  
Transparency International (2017), 2016 data

Aerial view of a typical homestead on the outskirts of the southern Somali port city of Kismayo.  
PHOTO: STUART PRICE / AU-UN IST PHOTO
1. Introduction

Documentation reviewed is based on evaluations of selected key donors and sectors. The change in Somalia’s development and humanitarian assistance context since 2012 has meant this brief draws as much as possible on later publications.
This report reviews findings from evaluations of development interventions in Somalia. The material selected for review covers donor specific and sector specific evaluations as well as research reports and reviews. The list was compiled based on an online search using specific key words and consulting donor websites and country office staff. Some 30 evaluations and reports were selected.

The two main selection criteria were: (i) key donors, based on the most important in each channel of aid and ii) key sectors based on an assessment of the Somali context and the development challenges.

KEY DONORS
The team selected the largest bilateral and multilateral donors (in terms of assistance from 2010-2015) and the two main emerging donors that are not members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC). The World Bank was also added as it manages a major pooled fund. The team chose two non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that have published relevant evaluations and which work in both the development and the humanitarian sectors.

KEY SECTORS
The team identified three key sectors: humanitarian aid, education (as an example of basic services) and security. These are all highly relevant to the country context and reflect the priorities of development partners working in Somalia. The team also reviewed pooled funds given the significant amount of aid channelled through them. The team also focused on gender equality and corruption as the two most important cross-cutting sectors in Somalia.

CONSTRAINTS
This assessment of evaluations is subject to several constraints. Evaluations for some of the most prominent donors were not publicly available. Many evaluations were carried out without sending evaluators to Somalia. Evaluations relied heavily on donor agencies’ evidence and qualitative information as there is little collection of general statistics. The change in the political and security context over the last ten years means that some of the evaluation findings are no longer relevant. The evaluations mostly measure immediate outputs and sometimes outcomes, but rarely capture longer-term impact. Given the limited availability of relevant evaluations this review has also examined annual reports and progress statements. While this broadens the scope, it is important to bear in mind that such reports can be less rigorous as they are often written with a view to securing additional funding.
Somalia has suffered from prolonged periods of political instability and insecurity. While there has been clear progress in recent years – exemplified by the recent elections – it still faces severe political, security and corruption challenges.
STATE FORMATION AND COLLAPSE
Since its formation as a united republic in 1960, Somalia has suffered prolonged periods of political fragility and violent conflict. A military coup in 1969 brought Mohamed Siad Barre to power. Contradictions between a centralised state authority and a fractious kinship system resulted in the ousting of President Barre by clan-based militia, in 1991, sparking a decades-long civil war (Healy and Bradbury, 2010). Central authority disintegrated and an independent Republic of Somaliland was declared in 1991 (Lewis and Janzen, 2016), but has yet to gain international recognition. Puntland declared its autonomy in 1998.

From 2004 to 2012, Somalia was governed by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The TFG had severe difficulties in enforcing its rule over the country and the Union of Islamic Courts (ICU) gained control over much of southern Somalia in 2006 (AWEPA, 2015). With the aid of Ethiopian intervention, the TFG was able to defeat the ICU but provoked resistance from a mix of clan militia and the remnants of the militant wing of the ICU – which later became the Islamist group Al-Shabaab (Healy and Bradbury, 2010). An African Union peacekeeping force (African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM)) was deployed in 2007 with the authorisation of the UN Security Council. Though weakened, Al-Shabaab still retains significant military capacity and continues to mount attacks in Mogadishu and other towns and localities. Since 2005 Somalia has also been associated with the rise in piracy off the Horn of Africa. While the number of attacks peaked in 2009-11, piracy still persists (EUNAVFOR, 2017; Bueger and Stockbruegger, 2016).

Political fragility, compounded by conflict and drought, caused large-scale famine between 2010 and 2012, leading to an estimated 260,000 deaths (BBC, 2013). In 2012, the Provisional Constitution established Somalia as a federal republic and provided for Federal Member States. This was followed by indirect parliamentary elections. Development partners and the government subsequently agreed on the Somali Compact in 2013 which determined the priorities of Somalia for the period covering 2014-2016 (BBC, 2016a). The UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) was deployed in 2013 to support statebuilding and peacebuilding. After some delay indirect parliamentary elections were held in late 2016, with a larger number involved in the selection process than in 2012. The President was appointed in 2017.

IMPACT OF PAST FRAGILITY AND LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Decades of violent conflict have destroyed Somalia’s infrastructure. Somalia remains one of the world’s poorest countries with half of the population living below the international poverty line (World Bank, 2015; 2016). Two thirds of youth are unemployed, and literacy rates, especially among women are low. Only 30 per cent of school-age children are enrolled in primary schools, of which only 40 per cent are girls (UNICEF, 2016). Access to other basic services is limited, especially for health. Gender inequality is the fourth highest in the world (UNDP, 2015). Decades of fighting has resulted in nearly 1 million refugees in neighbouring countries and over 1 million internally displaced persons in Somalia (UNHCR, 2016) and insecurity remains key issue (UNSG 2017). Somalia is also now experiencing a severe drought with over 6 million people at risk of famine (BBC, 2017).
Somalia is exceptionally dependent on aid when compared to the government’s own resources. Aid volumes have remained constant since 2011-12 but the share of development aid has increased, surpassing humanitarian assistance. Progress on the political and security fronts since 2012 has led to an increase in development aid with the adoption of the Somali Compact in 2013. Continued insecurity constrains donor presence in Somalia.

Mogadishu's luxury hotel the Al-Uruba lays in ruins after two decades of civil war. Though building work in Mogadishu is on the rise, it may still be several years before many of the city's buildings will be restored.
AID FLOWS

During the Cold War, Somalia received large sums in military and economic aid. It was among the largest recipients of aid in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s (OECD, 2016; Menkhaus, 2008). Following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, aid levels were steadily reduced with only a few aid agencies operating on the ground by 1997 (Achilles et al., 2015).

After 2001, fears that Somalia could become a breeding ground for terrorism revived external interest (Menkhaus, 2008; Achilles et al., 2015). Over the last fifteen years, Somalia has witnessed a significant growth in aid, increasing six times in real terms since early 2000s (ODI, 2017). Aid flows, representing more than 20 per cent of GDP, are currently ten times greater than the central government’s own revenues – less than 2 per cent of GDP. Remittances also play a key role in the economy amounting to over 20 per cent of GDP.

Humanitarian aid has increased sharply since the turn of the century and spiked in 2011 in response to the drought and famine. The severe drought at the time of writing suggests humanitarian aid will again increase in 2017.

Development assistance disbursed in-country (as measured by the OECD’s country programmable aid data1) has increased particularly after the formation of the new government in 2012. But Somalia still receives less development aid per person than many other post-conflict countries (ODI, 2017).

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1. This excludes humanitarian aid and any other ODA disbursed outside of Somalia e.g. debt relief, donor administration costs and support for refugees in donor country.
The main donors present in Somalia and reviewed in this brief are represented in Figure 2. What is striking is that Turkey – an emerging donor – is already one of the largest donors. As Somalia is in arrears with the international financial institutions, it has not been able to access direct funding from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank or African Development Bank. Due to security concerns most donors have their main office in Nairobi, which constrains engagement with Somali authorities.

**Figure 2 // Top 12 Donors of Gross Annual Average ODA to Somalia by Donor (2010-2015)**

- United States
- European Union Institutions
- United Kingdom
- Turkey
- Sweden
- Denmark
- Canada
- Global Fund
- Japan
- Germany
- Norway
- Australia

SOURCE: OECD CRS DATA
Donors have focused on humanitarian aid – especially on food security, nutrition and health. Spending on infrastructure and economic development remains low despite being one of the key priorities in the Somali Compact.

**FIGURE 3** // TOTAL ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS TO SOMALIA BY SECTOR (2010-2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Social Infrastructure &amp; Services</th>
<th>Production Sectors</th>
<th>Multi-Sector / Cross-Cutting</th>
<th>Action Relating to Debt</th>
<th>Commodity Aid / General Programme Assistance</th>
<th>Administrative Costs of Donors</th>
<th>Humanitarian Aid</th>
<th>Economic Infrastructure &amp; Services</th>
<th>Unallocated / Unspecified</th>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
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<td>2012</td>
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<td>2013</td>
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<td>2014</td>
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<td>2015</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** OECD CRS DATA
MAJOR FUNDING CHANNELS

Channels of disbursement vary across actors (see Figure 4). Bilateral donors that are members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and multilateral donors tend to favour channelling their aid through multilateral and civil society organisations, while non-DAC donors largely driven by emerging donors like Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) channel the vast majority of their aid through their own government systems.

![FIGURE 4 // TOTAL ODA GROSS DISBURSEMENTS TO SOMALIA BY CHANNEL OF DISBURSEMENT (2010-2015)](source: OECD CRS DATA)
Non-DAC donors in Somalia – the cases of Turkey and the United Arab Emirates

The major non-DAC donors in Somalia are Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Turkish aid to Somalia in 2015 was nearly four times greater than Turkish assistance to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. An independent study reviewing Turkey’s involvement in Somalia attributes its initial engagement to the 2010–2012 famine. Aid has since broadened to other areas: hosting international and regional conferences, mediating among various parties, engaging in capacity-building efforts, encouraging bilateral trade and delivering development assistance. Unlike other donors, Turkish staff are stationed in the field despite security risks, and Turkey provides budget support to the Somali government. The study also identifies critical tensions in the Turkish engagement, asking whether its respect for sovereignty and support to security institutions will clash with norms of human rights and the inclusion of other parts of society in peace-building, and whether Turkey’s multi-pronged approach to aid will be channelled toward a coherent and comprehensive peacebuilding strategy (SAIIA, 2016).

The involvement of the UAE is focused on rebuilding state institutions, including the army, in order to guarantee stability and peace. The UAE also aims to share its successful economic experience particularly in the areas of clean energy. It contributes to the economy by investing in infrastructure and health in particular (Abdi, 2015).
The Somali Compact was a bold experiment in a difficult country context. The Compact has led to some clear achievements and a transparent framework. But it has also highlighted key challenges including slow progress on supporting private sector recovery, tackling core governance issues and linking humanitarian and development aid.
One of the innovative features of aid architecture in Somalia is the attempt to frame all development efforts within the Somali Compact (FRS, 2013). The Compact is entirely organised around the five peace and statebuilding goals of the Busan New Deal – legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenues and services. The Compact Progress Report (FRS, 2015) noted progress in many areas but that significant challenges remain – especially on security, jobs and access to basic services. A review of the Compact (ODI 2017) noted the key achievements of the Compact include its comprehensive approach and transparent framework that has helped to build trust between all parties and mobilise long-term development funding. The review also identified four areas for future attention: (i) stronger focus on private sector issues; (ii) renewed focus on ensuring all efforts are integrated and coherent (especially on humanitarian and development efforts and security); (iii) faster progress on core financial and governance issues (especially on tackling corruption and prioritising across all sources of finance) and (iv) improved consultation processes (enhanced by stronger monitoring and evaluation systems).

**HUMANITARIAN AID**

Over the past fifteen years, humanitarian aid has been the major source of aid to Somalia. The US, the UK and EU institutions have been the leading donors. Since the adoption of the Somali Compact in 2013, there has been a gradual shift with an increase in the share of long-term development aid compared to humanitarian aid.

Evaluating the impact of humanitarian aid in Somalia is complicated. Persistent high levels of insecurity and repeated drought have inevitably limited its impact. It is hard to distinguish between the impact of humanitarian and development efforts. Many donors have continued to use humanitarian funding mechanisms to manage the risks of operating in Somalia, while at the same time encouraging agencies to pursue longer term development issues.

The latest Humanitarian Response Plan 2017 (UNOCHA, 2016a) and Humanitarian strategy (2016-2018) (UNOCHA, 2016b) note that despite many years of humanitarian effort, nearly half the population still requires humanitarian support. Drought, combined with insecurity, continue to be the most significant drivers of demand. Widespread poverty, the absence of basic services and a continued displacement crisis affecting 10 per cent of the population have further compounded the humanitarian challenge. While the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (UNOCHA) earlier humanitarian strategy included resilience, the current strategy notes that “it was difficult for the humanitarian community to measure the impact of the

Despite many years of humanitarian effort, nearly half the population still requires humanitarian support.
results”. The Compact progress report (FRS, 2015) concluded that while Somalia has made modest gains, high levels of humanitarian needs persist. Delivering humanitarian assistance continues to face many difficulties, including attacks on humanitarian staff (ECHO, 2016).

The World Food Programme (WFP) is by far the single largest provider of humanitarian assistance in the UN system accounting for over 80 per cent of the total disbursed by UN agencies in humanitarian aid between 2010 and 2015 (OECD CRS data). An evaluation of the WFP portfolio in Somalia between 2006 and mid-2011 (WFP, 2012) – just before the major famine – identified weak coherence with state authorities and other humanitarian actors as a key element contributing to WFP’s loss of credibility in 2009–2010. A later evaluation (WFP, 2015), covering WFP activities between 2012 and 2015, suggests that this weakness has been tackled. WFP then operated in a more favourable political and security context. Another improvement in that time was the introduction of a flexible approach that allowed for a smoother transition between emergency response and longer-term development activities (WFP, 2015). The 2015 evaluation also points to a series of weaknesses, including pipeline issues (e.g. delayed distribution or substitution of specialised nutrition commodities), which had negative impacts on the efficiency and effectiveness of WFP programmes; and funding constraints which meant the planned use of cash transfers was not possible and had to be replaced by vouchers, a modality that is not considered well-suited to Somalia.

The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has attempted to address funding constraints by using multi-year funding (DFID, 2015a). The evaluation found this type of funding allowed implementing partners to spend more time on planning, designing programmes and strategies. As a result, they saw greater staff attraction and retention, reduced time spent raising funds each year thus allowing more focus on programme implementation.

The operational environment for humanitarian work in Somalia remains demanding. Access is limited by a complex social context, insecurity and consecutive seasons of drought. Internation-
al organisations have been pushing for increased presence on the ground, moving away from remote management since 2011, but, in practice many continue to support and work through national partners and local NGOs (Achilles et al., 2015; DFID, 2011; UNOCHA, 2012).

The need to strengthen the capacity of local NGOs has been particularly stressed by donor agencies (see e.g. Sida, 2010). Evaluations also outline how the war economy has hampered humanitarian assistance efforts, with instances of humanitarian aid, notably food aid, diverted to military uses (Sida, 2010).

Development actors on the ground have identified the following areas as requiring improvements: improving monitoring and evaluation (including moving from output-based to outcome-based approaches, increasing the focus on results and improving third party remote monitoring), cooperating more closely on the ground, increasing predictability and transparency of aid commitments, enhancing flexibility to respond to emergency needs while building resilience for the longer-term, providing multi-year funding allowing for longer-term and better designed projects, increasing use of cash transfers, improving the coherence of humanitarian and development efforts and ensuring humanitarian agencies deliver public services in ways that could be sustained by the government without donor funding (see e.g. Norad, 2013a; Hedlund et al, 2013; WFP, 2015; DFID, 2015b; ODI, 2017; Polastro et al, 2011; Slim, 2012; Save the Children, 2012).

**EDUCATION**

The education sector receives considerable development assistance in Somalia. The main donors are the EU institutions, Norway and the USA. Donor support has focused on primary, secondary and vocational education and on building the capacity of government and local authorities in charge of education. Project implementation is mostly done by NGOs in cooperation with government officials, local authorities and communities.

More than three quarters of public schools were either destroyed or closed in South and Central Somalia during years of violence and civil war. With donor help, the authorities have recently started to build the education system in Puntland and Somaliland, while the Federal Government is still taking direct responsibility in the rest of the country (GPE, 2015 and 2017).

Education project evaluations point to improvements in school enrolments for both girls and boys, increased literacy rates, better infrastructure (e.g. construction/rehabilitation of schools), better quality of teaching, enhanced community support and strengthened capacity of authorities in charge of education. With regard to vocational training, evaluations call for better adjustment of training to market needs in order to facilitate employment or other means of generating sustainable livelihoods (USAID, 2012; NCA, 2016).

The evaluations reviewed highlighted major obstacles to accessing education. School enrolment is one of the lowest in the world. of schools), better quality of teaching, enhanced community support and strengthened capacity of authorities in charge of education. With regard to vocational training, evaluations call for better adjustment of training to market needs in order to facilitate employment or other means of generating sustainable livelihoods (USAID, 2012; NCA, 2016).
rather than in cash, as with the ‘one goat for one child’ innovation introduced in a United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund-funded project (UNICEF, 2012). These steps have had some success. Teacher training and staff retention require further attention.

A number of external factors have had a negative impact on the education sector. Droughts affect the capacity of schools to function (e.g. no water), and the number of children attending class tends to drop. Insecurity has limited the presence of implementing actors on the ground, restricting activities such as monitoring and evaluation of aid programmes from which lessons can be drawn and improvements made (UNICEF, 2012). Insecurity has also reduced the willingness or ability of families to send children to school.

Success factors highlighted in the evaluations include a participatory and inclusive approach from the planning stage to the implementation of the project. This means implementing partners are working together with the government, local authorities and the local community, taking their priorities on board, giving all of them ownership over what is being achieved. The process is an important condition for sustainable change (UNICEF, 2012; UNICEF, 2013; USAID, 2014).

### SECURITY

Security has been a major focus of international support with external assistance exceeding total aid flows for development and humanitarian purposes. The US and the EU are the main sources of this assistance, with Turkey, UAE and the UK providing smaller levels of support. Security is one of the key five priorities of the Somalia Compact (FRS, 2013). While there has been progress on the security front since 2012 there is still a long way to go (UNOCHA, 2015; FRS, 2015; ODI, 2017). Over half of all international assistance covers the costs of operating African Union-backed AMISOM, with much
smaller amounts for capacity building for the army and police. The total security assistance of $1.5 billion a year in 2014-2015 is more than the total of humanitarian and development aid combined. Most of this does not qualify as Official Development Assistance as defined by the DAC. Very little has been dedicated to developing Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) institutions, and even less has been under the direction of FGS (World Bank, 2017). Other donor concerns with support to security include: support for police receives less attention than other security institutions, there is limited coordination between security efforts and work on economic recovery and stabilisation, and the affordability of the government’s plans for the army and the police is questionable (World Bank, 2017; ODI, 2017).

Evaluations and reports reviewed suggest security has often not been treated as a stand-alone theme but has been integrated into programmes and activities focused on humanitarian and development assistance. This may have diverted attention away from a concerted focus on security. For example, an evaluation of the work of EU institutions reports security and peacebuilding to be part of the overarching goals of achieving resilience, food security and improving livelihoods, but without a direct focus on security issues (ECHO, 2014). The EU dedicates substantial funding to AMISOM. There is little evidence that activities in the security sector were coherent and complementary in their approach, or reflected a common understanding of principles such as stabilisation or governance (ODI, 2017). For example, an overall evaluation of the stabilisation impact of all the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) activities in Somalia found there was a positive impact in some respects, but coherent and comprehensive approaches informed by the requirements of implementing stabilisation programmes in Somalia was lacking. The evaluation also found that measures to assess programmes’ outcomes and impacts were inadequate (USAID, 2015). One interesting new state-building approach has been the support for the formation of the new Federal Member States and reconstruction in districts newly recovered from Al-Shabaab, in part funded by the multi-donor Somalia Stability Fund (DFID, 2012 and 2016, NORAD, 2013). Two others are UNDP’s work on justice and institutional development, with good examples of strong local participation and priority-setting (NORAD 2013) and Mercy Corps’ investigation of the linkages between education and violence (Mercy Corps, 2016).
POOLED FUNDS

Pooled funds in Somalia have some important strengths, but also display weaknesses commonly found in such mechanisms. These are, in particular, the slow process from the creation of the fund to project implementation, long and bureaucratic processes slowing down the availability of funds to beneficiaries, unpredictability of donor contributions in the medium-term or delayed transfers reducing the capacity for rapid reaction, and limited involvement of national institutions and stakeholders that limits sustainable change.

Almost one-third of development aid to Somalia in 2015 was provided through a pooled fund, although only 11 per cent of the humanitarian assistance was pooled (World Bank, 2016; UNOCHA FTS). Two humanitarian pooled funds have been in existence in Somalia for several years and have been evaluated. The Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) is a more recent creation and project implementation only started in 2015.

The Somalia Humanitarian Fund (SHF) was known until 2015 as the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF). An evaluation found that the CHF is an important and appreciated funding mechanism, particularly for its work with smaller indigenous NGOs that access areas other donors cannot reach. Its complementarity with other humanitarian aid instruments as well as its inclusiveness, transparency and open processes also count among the Fund’s strengths. The evaluation highlighted areas for improvement, including the need for quicker disbursement procedures. Yet low predictability of donor contributions and insufficient measures in place to avoid fraud were recognised as having significantly slowed down disbursement. The evaluators also found a lack of strategic prioritisation of resources. Despite a decrease in resources over the years, the Fund continues to engage in many sectors, spreading its contributions thinly and potentially jeopardising its impact. There were also concerns over the high level of funding going to UN agencies (48 per cent in 2015) as opposed to NGOs (40 per cent for INGOs and 12 per cent for national NGOs in 2015), especially local NGOs. Similar concerns had been expressed in an earlier evaluation (Common Humanitarian Fund, 2015; SIDA, 2010).

3 Characteristics of a good pooled fund according to Coppin et al., 2011: ‘pooled funds must get the money flowing quickly to get results on the ground, but this is neither beneficial nor sustainable in the long term without capacity-building’.
The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) is a global fund managed by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) with a double objective: to provide immediate and timely assistance to save the lives of people in crises through a Rapid Response Window, and to boost support for underfunded emergencies via an Underfunded Emergencies Window. Somalia has been among the top recipients of CERF over recent years. While the most comprehensive review of the CERF in Somalia dates back to 2012, it offers valuable lessons for the current drought and famine. The CERF is commended for its rapid reaction in 2011 at a time when most of the humanitarian community was slow to respond to the unfolding famine. The use of the Underfunded Emergencies Window at the beginning of the year effectively offset a critical funding shortfall. Funds from the Rapid Response Window arrived marginally, but critically, ahead of a general upswing in funding, largely due to responsive and quick processing by the CERF Secretariat (Taylor, 2012).

The Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), the development pooled fund for Somalia, is both a coordination framework and a financing instrument for implementing the Somali Compact (Operations Manual for SDRF Funding Windows, 2015). It has three windows: the Somalia Infrastructure Trust Fund (SITF) administered by the African Development Bank⁴, the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) administered by UNDP and the Multi Partner Fund (MPF) administered by the World Bank. The review of the Somali Compact (ODI, 2017) noted that the SDRF is becoming an effective new funding mechanism, despite donors not using it to the fullest extent possible. The review criticises donors for not drawing on lessons from previous experiences in other post-conflict countries and for the SDRF’s lengthy start-up phase. The delays can be explained by the slowness of international partners to adapt their procedures to conditions in Somalia as well as security constraints on international staff working in the country. The need to incorporate pre-existing legacy projects, the continued limited access to direct funding from international financial institutions, and the reluctance of some donors (e.g. the USA) to use the SDRF, have also limited the fund’s effectiveness.

The key strengths of the pooled structures to date are information sharing, bringing international support under a single framework, and encouraging development partners’ dialogue with both the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMS). A number of improvements common in similar country operational contexts are needed, most importantly appropriate engagement of FGS, FMS and civil society representatives with development partners to ensure trust, engagement and understanding of the interventions taking place.

**CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES – GENDER EQUALITY AND CORRUPTION**

Despite the recognition of the importance of addressing gender equality and corruption, progress on gender has been patchy at best and there is little evidence of substantive progress on tackling corruption.

**Gender**

In the majority of evaluations reviewed, gender is a cross-cutting theme with particular attention to include women and girls in donor operations.
programmes and service delivery in line with a political engagement to promote gender equality. Interestingly, the proposed Somali National Development Plan does not make gender a cross-cutting issue. The deliberate choice is justified in two ways: ‘First, because we believe these issues are core development challenges and deserve their place in the NDP in their own right. Secondly, because often the cross-cutting issues do not get the attention they deserve as it is not clear what actually is intended to be realized, who is responsible, how budgets are allocated and how results will be monitored’ (FGS, 2016).

The Somali Compact pushed for the inclusion of a gender focus and some progress was reported in terms of establishing and strengthening institutions, improving policies and legal and regulatory frameworks as well as improving the participation of women in politics and public life (FRS, 2015). Yet evidence of significant impact on gender outcomes has been characterised as being “patchy” at best (ODI, 2017). The ODI review notes that quotas were pledged, yet disregarded, and over time female participants in political engagements were replaced by male clan members.

One UN-funded assessment goes as far as saying that gender coverage in the Somali Compact is insufficient to be considered a standard for the development of compacts in other g7+ countries (Odih Kumuyi, 2015). The latest progress report of the Somali Compact recognises that women’s participation remains low. A large number of women and girls are displaced, with limited and unsafe access to resources and services contributing to further inequalities. Gender-specific insecurity and violence are also particularly high (FRS, 2015). The same report identifies dominant traditional views and beliefs of gender roles shared by the population, clan-based political structures dominated by male clan-elders, and limited investment in gender equality by major donors as principal impediments. Most project designs address gender equality, but follow-up during the implementation phase is uneven (CHF, 2015). Donors show commitment to including and ensuring the participation of women in various programmes, activities and trainings, yet evaluations note that such commitments are not always upheld in terms of ensuring and pushing for the active participation and engagement of women. For example, evaluations of DFID programmes stressed that gender equality lacked a clear and coherent definition in their work, affecting the way it was approached and implemented on the ground (DFID, 2015a). This was also reported in relation to how partner organisations are to address the issue of gender equality (e.g. WFP and Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). Evaluations of the work of EU institutions and ECHO partners stressed that gender issues were included and reflected in project designs,
but lack of clarity about how best to approach and address specific needs of women and ensure gender equality led to limited results. One evaluation proposed specific Disaster Risk Reduction actions for women for better implementation and results (ECHO, 2014). There are some examples of progress such as the UNDP’s work (NORAD 2013) and the National Democratic Institute’s (NDI) support for the Somalia Women Parliamentarians Association. NDI was able to bring women MPs together to discuss their issues in Parliament; it should be noted that Parliament now includes at least one woman in each of the international delegations and meetings (USAID, 2013). This was perceived positively as a concrete manifestation of supporting women in political processes. However, cuts in USAID’s funding resulted in inconsistency and a lack of continuity in those efforts, ultimately reducing the impact. These types of challenges were also reported in other donors’ activities and programmes.

Corruption
Somalia ranks last in Transparency International’s (TI) 2016 Corruption Index (TI, 2017). TI describes Somalia as a country with rampant corruption and a deeply entrenched patronage system and identifies the management of aid money to be a major area of concern (TI, 2012).

These observations are confirmed by the regular reports of the UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (UN Security Council, 2017). Evaluations cite corruption as a challenge to be addressed, especially in promoting good governance, and call for stronger anti-corruption measures. One report finds that corruption is “a symptom of how Somali politics function today” (Achilles et. al., 2015).

There is little reference in the evaluations reviewed to measures or actions to be taken by major stakeholders to combat corruption. A report prepared by Transparency International, which looks at corruption in the implementation of humanitarian aid, provides part of the answer as to why this is the case (TI, 2016). Interviews with donors revealed that information regarding corruption presented to donors at field level
would have to be communicated back to headquarters with potentially severe consequences for donor operations and aid beneficiaries. Such disincentives prevent the sharing of information and threats related to corruption. It also leads to missed opportunities in sharing lessons on how to mitigate corruption across agencies, and instead encourages hiding, disguising or playing down corrupt practices. Evaluations further noted that corruption in some cases jeopardised the integrity of programmes/projects.

Several donors have instituted measures to tackle corruption within their own projects. For example, DFID in Somalia resorts to remote monitoring of programmes carried out by third party contractors (ICAI, 2016). However, the evaluation of this practice found that DFID’s remote monitoring was too narrowly focused to monitor the full range of risks it was trying to capture. The Norwegian Refugee Council acknowledges that its operations are generally vulnerable to corruption, which the agency combats through developing guidelines on finance and logistics (Norad, 2013a). The effectiveness of these measures in Somalia have not been evaluated.

An important focus for anti-corruption work at the national level is public financial management reform. The progress of reform has been assessed as slow, however (FRS, 2015; ODI, 2017). One innovative approach to anti-corruption was the creation of a Financial Governance Committee. This provides a forum for frank and confidential discussions and a source of independent advice on critical areas such as asset recovery and procurement and revenue. Yet the implementation of its recommendations is variable (FRS, 2015).

Another innovative approach to building public financial management capacity was the Somalia Special Financing Facility (SFF), initiated by Norway in 2013. The facility provided rapid funding in support of the new Federal Government of Somalia to make regular payment of civil service salaries and direct government delivery of development projects of value to local communities. The g7+ review of the facility was positive: by delivering and overseeing funds through the government while limiting exposure to fiduciary risk, the SFF demonstrated that it is possible – albeit difficult – to use Somalia’s administrative institutions. This had lasting effects such as helping to develop procedures and policies that were taken up by successor funding instruments (g7+, 2016).
5. Lessons learnt

Despite the data limitations of this review, some clear lessons still emerge including the constraints imposed by continuing insecurity, the value of consultation and local participation, the need to continually adapt approaches to the evolving context and the case for greater investment in monitoring and evaluation.
As noted earlier, this review is limited by data availability. Despite this there are some clear common findings of interest to donors.

1. **THE CONSTRAINTS** imposed by continued insecurity. One of the most consistent themes of all the reports reviewed here is how insecurity continues to undermine and constrain the impact of all aid efforts. The reports include recommendations for security to be given a higher profile and for a more comprehensive approach to be adopted.

2. **THE VALUE** of consultation and local participation. The reports highlight the benefits of consultation and participatory approaches already happening as well as the potential for this to be increased (e.g. in greater use of local NGOs).

3. **THE NEED** to continually adapt approaches to the evolving context. The reports repeatedly point to this as being a challenge for donor interventions.

4. **THE CASE** for greater investment in monitoring and evaluation. Many reports highlight this as an issue, noting the need for greater focus on outcomes and for example a better understanding of what kinds of education investments work best in the Somalia context.

5. **THE CHALLENGE** of insufficient progress on tackling corruption. This issue is rarely explicitly mentioned in project reviews but is identified as a major challenge noted in the overarching reviews with progress reported as being very slow.

6. **THE CASE** for additional - and better prioritised - funding. As reports note, after decades of little development in Somalia, the needs are clear. Yet Somalia receives less development aid per person than many other post-conflict countries. Reports highlight that effective humanitarian response is affected by insufficient funding. Experience with pooled funds and multi-year humanitarian funding is showing the potential benefits of better prioritisation.

7. **THE URGENCY** of tackling standard aid effectiveness challenges. The overarching reviews note the need for more effective integration of humanitarian, development and government efforts with half the population still dependent on humanitarian support. Finding a way to engage with government systems, while also managing the risks of corruption, remains the key challenge. Progress here will also encourage the private sector to increase their tax contributions.

8. **THE SUCCESS** of some mechanisms developed for post-conflict situations. The Compact – and the Somali Development and Reconstruction Facility in particular – have proved useful. But there is scope to fully exploit the potential of these approaches.
References


UN Data Somalia [webpage]

UN Security Council (2017) Somalia annual reports of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea. [webpage]

UNDP Somalia Country Information. [webpage]


## Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALNAP</td>
<td>Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund</td>
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<td>CHF</td>
<td>Common Humanitarian Fund</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Creditor Reporting System</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee of the OECD</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Civil protection and Humanitarian aid Operations</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>Federal Member State</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>ICAI</td>
<td>Independent Commission for Aid Impact</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Courts Union</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>MPTF</td>
<td>Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UN-managed)</td>
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<td>MPF</td>
<td>Multi Partner Fund (World Bank-managed)</td>
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<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<td>SAIIA</td>
<td>South African Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
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<td>SITF</td>
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<td>TFG</td>
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<td>TI</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund</td>
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<td>UNSOM</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WB</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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