



# **Evaluation of the Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in Guatemala**

**Evaluation Report 5/2007**



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# **Evaluation of the Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in Guatemala**

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## Preface

The Rattsø Commission report on new roles for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Norwegian development co-operation, presented in June 2006, pointed at weaknesses in the evaluation of the development work of civil society organisations. The Commission urged Government authorities to take more responsibility for overall evaluation of non-governmental organisations.

Following up on the Commission's recommendations, the Evaluation Department decided to initiate country evaluations of support through Norwegian NGOs. Particular emphasis was to be on outcomes and results of the work of the organisations. Guatemala was chosen as the first country for such a study, and after an international bidding process the Norwegian Institute of Urban and Regional Research in co-operation with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs was commissioned to carry out the evaluation with the researcher Axel Borchgrevink as team leader. The report, which you have now started reading, is in our view a well-documented study where critical questions have been asked, and to a large degree been answered. The conclusions hold even if the challenges associated with evaluating outcome and impact of developing co-operation, particularly in rights-based activities, are in no way underestimated.


The report will be heart-warming reading for managers and supporters of the organisations studied as well as for the funders. Although the aid channelled through Norwegian NGOs is relatively limited, the outcomes identified are significant in their contexts, positive, and highly relevant. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the implementation of projects is efficient and in accordance with plans.

It should be noted that the results are concentrated in what the team has termed *democratisation, human rights and participation*. An interesting finding is that the programs studied show sufficient awareness of gender issues, which runs counter to the rather dismal general findings in a broad evaluation of the gender orientation of Norwegian aid a couple of years ago. In sum, Norwegian support strengthens a wide variety of organisations, but with an emphasis on those that work with and represent marginalised group.

There is a caveat, however. At least in the short term, Norwegian support through civil society organisations is not particularly effective at reducing the distance between civil society elites and the grassroots, or at resolving problems of lack of democracy. This is a major challenge that can only be met through long term efforts with the organisations concerned, with a constant eye at the people in the villages and in the streets.

Our hope is that this report will be a valuable input to the ongoing process of debating and improving the work of non-governmental organisations.

Oslo, December 2008



Asbjørn Eidhammer, Director of Evaluation



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## List of Organizations

Ajchmol	<i>Organización Cultural Maya Mam</i> , Maya Mam Cultural Organization, supported by NPA
ASD	<i>Asambleas de Dios</i> . Assembly of God (Guatemalan Pentecostal Church), supported by PYM
CNEM	<i>Coordinación Nacional de Educación Maya</i> . National Council of Maya Education, supported by SCN
CIEDEG	<i>Conferencia de Iglesias Evangélicas de Guatemala</i> . Council of Evangelical Churches of Guatemala, supported by NCA
COCODE	<i>Consejo Comunitario de Desarrollo</i> . Community Development Council
Codeca	<i>Asociación de Comités de Campesinos</i> , Association of Peasant Committees, supported by NPA
Conavigua	<i>Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala</i> . National coordinator of widows in Guatemala, supported by FOKUS/LAG
FEPAZ	<i>Foro Ecueménico para la Paz y la Reconciliación</i> . The Ecumenical Forum for Peace and Reconciliation, organization that has separated from CIEDEG. Supported by NCA
FOKUS	<i>Forum for kvinner og utviklingspørsmål</i> . Forum for Women and Development
Fundación Deborah	Deborah Foundation, supported by FOKUS/White Ribbon
FUNDESCO	<i>Fundación de Desarrollo Comunitario</i> . Foundation for Community Development, supported by NCA
Group de Calidad Educativa	Quality Education Group, supported by SCN
ICCPG	<i>Instituto de Ciencias Comparativas Penales de Guatemala</i> . Institute of Compared Studies in Penal Sciences in Guatemala, supported by FOKUS/JURK
JURK	<i>Juridisk Rådgivning for Kvinner</i> : Legal Assistance for Women, member of of FOKUS
Kabawil	<i>Coordinación Campesina</i> . The Peasant Coordination, supported by NPA
LAG	<i>Latinamerikagruppene</i> . Norwegian Solidarity Committee for Latin America – The Women’s Commission is a member of FOKUS
LO	<i>Landsorganisasjonen</i> . The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions
Madre Selva	Mother Forest, supported by NCA
NCA	<i>Norwegian Church Aid</i> . Kirkens nødhjelp
NPA	<i>Norwegian People’s Aid</i> . Norsk folkehjelp
PDH	<i>Procurador de Derechos Humanos</i> . Human Rights Ombudsman, supported by SCN
PENNAT	<i>Programa Educativo del Niño, Niña y Adolescente Trabajador</i> . Working Children’s and Adolescent’s Educational Program, supported by SCN
PMH/CEG	<i>Pastoral de Movilidad Humana/Conferencia Episcopal de Guatemala</i> . Pastoral of Human Mobility/Guatemalan Bishop Conference (Catholic Church), supported by NCA
PYM	<i>Pinsemenighetens ytremisjon</i> . Norwegian Pentecostal Mission, member of Norwegian Missions in Development (Bistandsnemda)
SCG	<i>Save the Children Guatemala</i> , supported by SCN
SCN	<i>Save the Children Norway</i> . Redd Barna Norge
Unsitragua	<i>Unión Sindical de Trabajadores de Guatemala</i> . The Trade Union of Guatemalan Workers, supported by LO
Utz K’aslemal	Good awakening/life, supported by SCN
White Ribbon	<i>Hvite Bånd</i> , member of FOKUS



# 1 Executive Summary

Norad has commissioned this evaluation in order to increase the knowledge of the effects of development cooperation through NGOs, in particular of the aggregate effects at national level. A number of Norwegian NGOs have been working in Guatemala since the earthquake in 1976. In connection with the process leading up to the Peace Accords in 1996, Norwegian NGO aid to Guatemala increased, both in total amounts and in the number of organizations involved. This process also resulted in official Norwegian development cooperation with Guatemala, with the objective of supporting the implementation of the Peace Accords. The Norwegian strategy for aid to Guatemala focuses on democratization, the justice sector, and indigenous rights.

The Terms of Reference (Appendix 1) for the evaluation are comprehensive. The emphasis is placed on assessing the *outcomes of the Norwegian NGO aid at the national level*, as well as on analyzing the *mediating and contextual factors* that influence the implementation and outcomes of the development programs carried out by Norwegian NGOs and their partners. The ToR further asks for an analysis of a number of process factors, from the underlying program theory of interventions, through development inputs, to implementation and outputs. The evaluation should focus on the NGOs' long term development cooperation with public Norwegian funding. The evaluation was carried out by a team of nine researchers, with the main part of fieldwork taking place between October 9<sup>th</sup> and November 1<sup>st</sup> 2007.

The following six Norwegian NGOs were selected for the evaluation:

- Save the Children Norway (SCN)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)
- Norwegian Pentecostal Mission (PYM)
- Forum for Women and Development (FOKUS)
- Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO)

All have been working in Guatemala for more than five years, and together they cover a wide range of different types of programs, sectors and partner organizations.

## Findings

### *Overall conclusion*

While the amount of aid channeled through Norwegian NGOs is relatively limited, and the outcomes at national level are consequently also limited in scope, we still conclude that the outcomes identified are significant in their contexts, positive, and highly relevant. The combined outcomes of increased knowledge of rights, better conditions for participation, strengthened democratizing potential of civil society, and improved quality and coverage of education, are important contributions towards the creation of a more just and democratic Guatemala.

### *Coherence*

Even though the Norwegian NGOs work with very different types of partner organizations, and support a wide variety of different projects, there is considerable coherence in terms of basic orientation, target groups, and types of outcomes. Five of the six organizations have a clear and explicit rights-based approach. All organizations target marginalized groups, with a focus on women, indigenous peoples, children, landless peasants, agricultural laborers and other organized workers. Outcomes are concentrated in the sector we have termed *Democratization, Human Rights and participation*, with the most important results at the individual and organizational levels.

This consistency in terms of approach, target groups and outcomes is very much in line with the Norwegian policy, as expressed in the guidelines for civil society support, the guidelines for development cooperation with indigenous peoples, and the strategy for development cooperation with Guatemala.

#### *Value added*

In addition to the funding, there are elements of ‘value added’ by the Norwegian NGO in all the partnership relations. Perhaps most clearly, this is found in the focused and systematic capacity and alliance building that SCN contributes to its partners, or the complementary and sometimes indirect political support that LO gives to the work of Unsitragua. In the majority of cases, the Norwegian NGO also facilitates links and contacts to other organizations, national or international. Advice, technical inputs and critical dialogue on program development are other common elements in the partner relations. In a few, but crucial cases, the link to an international donor organization has provided protection to organizations working in repressive contexts. The Norwegian NGOs have generally been quite careful not to impose their own agendas on their partners.

#### *Indigenous rights orientation*

In general the Norwegian NGOs and their partners show an awareness of the special requirements of working in a country with a large and marginalized indigenous population. Many of the projects are focused specifically on addressing the problem of exclusion of indigenous peoples. Still, in some cases there is room for improvements in taking into account the indigenous dimension of the social context of the projects, and in at least one case, awareness of the issue is clearly deficient.

#### *Gender awareness*

In the majority of cases, the programs show sufficient awareness of gender issues – this applies to projects specifically oriented towards women, as well as a number of other projects. In some cases, the programs would have benefited from a clearer gender orientation.

#### *Implementation*

In the overwhelming majority of cases, the implementation of projects is efficient and in accordance with plans.

#### *Effects on Guatemalan civil society and state-society relations*

In monetary terms, the aid channeled through Norwegian NGOs is modest, and national level outcomes are consequently limited.

In sum, Norwegian support strengthens a wide variety of different types of organizations, but with an emphasis on those that work with and represent marginalized groups, with a rights-based approach. The Norwegian support promotes cooperation between civil society organizations in different ways, thereby counteracting the tendency towards fragmentation identified by many observers as a weakness of Guatemalan civil society.

In the short term, Norwegian support is not particularly effective at reducing the distance between civil society elites and the grassroots, or at resolving problems of lack of internal democracy, two other characteristics frequently mentioned as weaknesses of Guatemala’s organizational sphere. However, in the long run, the work that Norwegian NGOs and their Guatemalan partners do to foment local participation and citizenship among marginalized groups has the potential to contribute to reduce these problems.

The Norwegian aid is supporting Guatemalan civil society organizations in engaging with the state through the new spaces for dialogue that have opened after the Peace Accords, and enabled the organizations to make better use of these spaces. In practical terms, the outcomes of these dialogues have often been limited, as agreements are not implemented, mostly due to lack of capacity or political will in state institutions. In some instances, experiences of cooperating with state institutions are more positive at the municipal level.

There are no indications that the outcomes in terms of increased participation and strengthened organizations have so far succeeded in influencing the state to redistribute

economic resources. Effects in terms of ensuring the implementation of the Peace Accords have also been limited.

*Other outcomes*

Within the educational sector, there are considerable outcomes, in particular of the work of SCN's partner organizations in developing appropriate pedagogical methodologies and improving access to education for marginalized groups (indigenous, poor, working and handicapped children).

There are some, but fairly limited outcomes in terms of improving income and promoting economic development.

**Recommendations**

The evaluation team makes the following recommendations:

- Norwegian NGO aid to Guatemala should not be reduced
- Maintain strategic focus on promoting participation and democratization
- Consider more systematic use of core funding
- Increase attention to indigenous rights
- Consider the integration of components for economic development
- Establish meeting points for Norwegian NGOs and their partners
- Develop more systematic monitoring of results

## 2 Introduction

### 2.1 The Evaluation

Among the OECD countries, Norway channels the largest share of its aid through civil society organizations. Yet, the government-appointed Commission to study the role of civil society organizations in development cooperation – the Rattsø Commission – which submitted its report in 2006, concluded that too little is known about the impacts of this aid, particularly at aggregate, national levels (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006). On this background, Norad's evaluation department will be commissioning several country evaluations of the national level impact of the work of Norwegian NGOs. The first country selected was Guatemala.

A number of Norwegian NGOs have been working in Guatemala since the earthquake in 1976. In connection with the process leading up to the Peace Accords in 1996, Norwegian NGO aid to Guatemala increased, both in total amounts and in the number of organizations involved. This process also resulted in official Norwegian development cooperation with Guatemala, with the objective of supporting the implementation of the Peace Accords. The Norwegian strategy for aid to Guatemala focuses on democratization, the justice sector, and indigenous rights. There has not been any direct state to state aid; Norwegian support has been channeled either through UN organizations or civil society organizations. Aid through Norwegian NGOs has constituted around 30% of the aid to Guatemala, largely funded through the global civil society budget line.<sup>1</sup>

The Terms of Reference (Appendix 1) for the evaluation are comprehensive. The emphasis is placed on assessing the *outcomes of the Norwegian NGO aid at the national level*, as well as on analyzing the *mediating and contextual factors* that influence the implementation and outcomes of the development programs carried out by Norwegian NGOs and their partners. The ToR further asks for an analysis of a number of process factors, from the underlying program theory of interventions, through development inputs, to implementation and outputs. Five to seven of the major Norwegian organizations, with at least five years of working in Guatemala, should be selected for the study, with a view to covering the whole spectrum in terms of geographical and thematic focus, as well as different ways of working. Due to the large number of national partner organizations, a selection should be made among them along the same criteria. The evaluation should focus on the NGOs' long term development cooperation with public Norwegian funding.

In order to realize this considerable task within the allotted timeframe, a large team was put together, composed of six Norwegian and three Guatemalan researchers. For practical purposes, the team was divided into three sub-teams, with responsibility for two Norwegian organizations each. Fieldwork was initiated in September 2007, through interviews in Oslo with the Norwegian NGOs as well as with Norad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Written and quantitative material on the organizations and their programs in Guatemala was also collected. The most intensive period of data collection took place in Guatemala between October 9th and November 1st. This consisted mainly of interviews and focus group discussions with a broad range of persons: Representatives of the Norwegian NGOs; of the partner organizations and of project staff; beneficiaries; authorities at local and national level; other stakeholders of programs and interventions; other donors; the Norwegian Embassy; as well as a number of resource persons from different institutions and positions who shared their knowledge about Guatemala (see Appendix 2 for a list of persons interviewed). In order to ensure a common approach among researchers and sub-teams, and to discuss and socialize findings and emerging understandings, several internal workshops were held during the process. On the basis of this fieldwork, background reports were written on the program of

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<sup>1</sup> During some of the years, emergency relief aid has also been significant.

each of the Norwegian NGOs. These were distributed to the organizations, and adjusted according to the feedback received. On October 30th a feedback seminar was arranged in Guatemala City, where all the Norwegian NGOs and their Guatemalan partners were invited. In the seminar, preliminary findings and conclusions were presented, and responses from the organizations were received through group and plenary discussions. The evaluation has also benefited from professional inputs from Bergljot Baklien of the Norwegian research institute SIRUS, who took part in the team during field work as a resource person on evaluation methodology, and from Stener Ekern of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, with long experience of working with Guatemala, who has read and commented upon both the inception report and the final report. Berit Aasen of NIBR has also read and commented upon the draft report.

The limitations to the evaluation should be pointed out. Firstly, in terms of time, the total time available to the evaluation team, including preparation and the writing of the inception report before fieldwork, and the writing of the final report afterwards, was two months and nine days. This short time frame set clear limitations to data collection. Furthermore, the development cooperation to be evaluated was highly diverse and complex, involving great variation with regard to types of organizations, thematic sectors and geographical areas, as well as approaches and project types. The challenges regarding data collection and establishing general findings are correspondingly greater. We have addressed this problem by combining information from a broad range of sources. Thus, what we find in reports and are told in interviews with program staff is compared with observations in the field, discussions with beneficiaries and with different forms of stakeholders and external observers, as well as with relevant information from other written sources. By having a large team, and by spending a considerable amount of time in the field, we have amassed a huge amount of data, much of it primary data. Still, given the very wide scope of this evaluation, we have only been able to visit a few sample project sites or community groups for each program. Finally, when seeking to establish the effects of development projects, a fundamental difficulty lies in the issue of attribution – how to establish whether an observed change is due to the intervention, or to other factors (or to a combination). This problem becomes greater the more the focus moves towards identifying long term impacts rather than immediate results. Similarly, as one moves up in scale, seeking to establish outcomes at national level, the difficulties of attribution increase greatly. For these reasons, firm and quantifiable conclusions on the exact outcomes of the work of the Norwegian NGOs cannot be made. We have limited ourselves to concluding in terms of the direction of changes brought about by the organizations, rather than their absolute magnitude. Thus, the outcomes we present should be considered ‘assessed’ or ‘imputed’ outcomes. Still, these reservations notwithstanding, we believe that the conclusions we do offer are well founded. Furthermore, there is considerable value in the broad scope that such a study offers, as it allows large questions to be addressed. Thus, what is lost in precision may be gained in the relevance of the findings.

Identifying outcomes, at the national level, of the overall and combined efforts of Norwegian NGOs and their Guatemalan counterparts, can only be done on the basis of some form of a social theory. We have chosen to base the central parts of our analysis on a theoretical framework with civil society as a key concept. One central dimension of the question of outcomes at the national level is thus framed as ‘what are the effects of the Norwegian aid on Guatemalan civil society?’ This has the advantage of being a terminology that is also used within the field studied. Unfortunately, however, in development circles, the concept is often used loosely, and in normative ways that reduces its usefulness for analytical purposes. It is therefore necessary to state here how we choose to use the term civil society in this analysis. Two quotes from Norad’s guidelines for support to civil society form a useful starting point:

For the purpose of these guidelines, “civil society” means the formal and informal networks that are active in the public sphere between the state and the family...


A country’s civil society reflects the divisions and lines of conflict in that country, at both local and national level.

The definition is sufficient for the purpose of this study. But the quotes bring out two additional points. Firstly, civil society comprises a range of different organizational types that are not limited to only NGOs, or to formal organizations organized according to Western

principles of bureaucratic rationality. And secondly, the organizations and networks of civil society represent different interests and ideologies, and one cannot assume that civil society per se is pro-Human Rights, pro-democracy, pro-good governance and everything else that is considered good by development agents. Also authoritarian organizations belong to civil society. Thus, civil society is an arena of struggle. And the interesting question when investigating the effects of aid is not so much whether civil society is strengthened (whatever that might mean) but what tendencies and types of organizations within civil society are being strengthened.

A final point on terminology: The Terms of Reference state that the terms civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations are used interchangeably. In this report, we use the term NGO more restrictedly: to refer to organizations that do not work for or on behalf of its membership or constituency, but for the benefit of other people.<sup>2</sup>

The Terms of Reference specify that the evaluation should be grounded in ‘program theory’, that is to say, the theory or model of how the development actor understands the development intervention to produce its intended effects. In applying this perspective, we place the main emphasis on the Norwegian NGO.<sup>3</sup> The figure below presents a simplified depiction of the main elements of the program theory.



Put somewhat bluntly, one could say that if the outcome is in accordance with the goals, this indicates that the actions have been appropriate, and thereby giving a form of validation to the program theory.

In almost all the programs selected for this evaluation, projects are developed and implemented by the Guatemalan partner organization. The ‘actions’ (inputs, implementation) of the Norwegian NGO consists therefore largely in selecting its partner, approving the specific project to support, as well as the various forms of ‘value added’ in terms of contributing to strengthening partner, projects and implementation. For the Norwegian NGO, the selection of and relation with the partner organization is the implementation of its program theory. Therefore, in the following, the program theory analysis will largely focus on the partnership relation.

## 2.2 The Norwegian NGOs

The following six Norwegian organizations have been selected for the study: FOKUS, LO, NCA, PYM, NPA and SCN. A brief presentation of each, as well as of their activities and partner organizations is given in the following. Table 1 gives an overview of the amounts of aid channelled to Guatemala through these organizations over the last five years. Further quantitative data on the programs of the different organizations can be found in Appendix 3.

<sup>2</sup> According to this definition, LO (the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions) is not an NGO. However, in the specific context of channeling development assistance to Guatemala, it may nevertheless be considered an NGO. When this report speaks of ‘the Norwegian NGOs’, this should be read as including all the six organizations selected for the study.

<sup>3</sup> In the following, we will also include a consideration of how the program theory of the Norwegian NGO corresponds to the theory of the MFA and Norad on the one hand, and the Guatemalan partner organization(s) on the other.



**Table 1 Bilateral aid to Guatemala channelled through Norwegian NGOs**

Agreement partner	2 002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Grand Total
SCN – Save the Children Norway	11 022	13 181	9 700	10 515	5 349	49 767
NPA – Norwegian People’s Aid	5 489	5 083	4 952	5 980	5 666	27 169
NCA – Norwegian Church Aid	4 307	3 013	2 041	4 295	2 454	16 111
PYM – Norwegian Pentecostal Mission	1 658	2 340	1 360	1 442	1 286	8 086
FOKUS – Forum for Women and Development	867	1 681	1 880	2 053	1 577	8 058
LO – Norwegian Con-federation of Trade Unions	658	665	625	627	587	3 161
<b>Total six selected NGOs</b>	<b>24 001</b>	<b>25 963</b>	<b>20 558</b>	<b>24 912</b>	<b>16 919</b>	<b>112 352</b>
<b>Total Norwegian NGOs</b>	<b>50 004</b>	<b>35 662</b>	<b>30 886</b>	<b>38 661</b>	<b>28 701</b>	<b>183 914</b>

In thousands of NOK  
Source: Norad statistics

### 2.2.1 FOKUS (Forum for Women and Development)

FOKUS is an umbrella organization of 72 women’s organizations in Norway, and facilitates partnerships between Norwegian women’s organizations and women’s organizations abroad. In Guatemala, FOKUS supports programs through three of its member organizations:

- Kvinneutvalget i Latin-Amerikagruppene i Norge (the Women’s Commission of the Norwegian Solidarity Committee for Latin America), hereafter referred to as *FOKUS/LAG*
- Juridisk Rådgivning for Kvinner (Legal Assistance for Women), hereafter referred to as *FOKUS/JURK*
- Hvite Bånd (Norwegian White Ribbon), hereafter referred to as *FOKUS/White Ribbon*

The three Norwegian women’s organizations work with different Guatemalan organizations:

- FOKUS/LAG works with *Conavigua* (Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala), a national organization of indigenous women and their children. Norwegian support has been mainly oriented towards organizational development.
- FOKUS/JURK supports the Instituto de Ciencias Comparativas Penales de Guatemala – *ICCPG* (the Institute of Compared Studies in Penal Sciences in Guatemala) with a program focusing on the rights of women in relation to the police, the judiciary and the prison system.
- FOKUS/White Ribbon supports the *Fundación Deborah* and its project which provides vocational training, health and nutritional education, and day care services for poor women in a slum area of Guatemala City.

### 2.2.2 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

NPA is the humanitarian organization of the Norwegian labor movement, and among the largest NGOs in Norway. It sees itself as a solidarity organization, and its work in Guatemala is focused on supporting the organizational efforts of primarily peasants and indigenous people to claim their political and economic rights. NPA supports organizations with a solid popular base that have the potential to function as ‘agents of change’. NPA insists that the partner organizations must be free to set their own agendas. Thus it does not attempt to influence them on topics or ways of presenting demands. Currently, NPA has 12 partner organizations, down from 20 five years ago. In the evaluation, two of these organizations have been given particular attention:

- Coordinación Campesina *Kabawil*. This is an action group promoting organisation among Mayan peasants in the western highlands. Kabawil is strongly rooted in the Mayan worldview. It has been NPA’s partner since 1997.

- Asociación de Comités de Campesinos *Codeca*. *Codeca* is locally-based (at the Pacific Coast) and organises peasants at large estates. *Codeca* is a particularly outspoken defender of the peasants' rights and pushes for local democracy.

In addition, the indigenous NGO Organización Cultural Maya Mam – *Ajchmol* has also been studied. For all the organizations, the support from NPA funds different types of organizational training and workshops, as well as costs relating to particular activities, such as meeting and demonstrations.

### **2.2.3 Norwegian Missions in Development/Norwegian Pentecostal Mission (PYM)**

The Norwegian Missions in Development (Bistandsnemnda) is an umbrella organization for Norwegian missionary organizations. In Guatemala, there is only one of the 18 member organizations that has a program, namely the Norwegian Pentecostal Mission (PYM). PYM has one partner:

- Asambleas de Díos (*ASD*), the largest Guatemalan Pentecostal church, as well as the largest evangelical church in Guatemala.

PYM has worked with the organization since 1999, but will close its program in Guatemala in 2008. PYM supports a project promoting organic agriculture and a school construction project in Guatemala.

### **2.2.4 Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)**

NCA is a Christian ecumenical organization, and one of the 'Big Five' Norwegian NGOs operating in developing countries. Guatemala was its first important target of aid in Latin America, beginning with the earthquake in 1976. In addition to development aid, NCA has also been a key actor with respect to emergency assistance. NCA has an office in Guatemala, headed by a Norwegian representative. Among the seven core partners of NCA, the following four have been selected for the study:

- *CIEDEG* is a protestant ecumenical umbrella organization. NCA supports three programs: (i) institutional support, including building of emergency management capacity; (ii) ecological/sustainable agriculture; and (iii) the Ecumenical Forum for Peace and Reconciliation (FEPAZ). *CIEDEG* has for the last years been marred by internal conflicts leading to a split, as well as a financial crisis.
- *FUNDESCO*, Foundation for Community Development, is an NGO which has worked since 1984 with women's associations in slum areas in Guatemala City.
- *PMH/CEG*, 'Pastoral de Movilidad Humana' is a branch of the Catholic Church (Conferencia Episcopal de Guatemala) which works for the rights of national and international migrants.
- *MADRE SELVA* is a collective of environmental activists. *Madre Selva* mobilises networks of NGOs and communities in the struggles to secure natural resources and a strengthened national water policy.

### **2.2.5 The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO)**

For LO, strong labor unions are essential for the implementation of labor rights and the development of a democratic and socially equitable society. Their partner in Guatemala since 1987 is:

*Unsitragua* – The Trade Union of Guatemalan Workers. This is the largest union in Guatemala. LO supports *Unsitragua* with organisational development, women's involvement in trade union work, communication and information, and membership strengthening. Labour unionisation has always been difficult in Guatemala, and pressure has become worse since the signing of the Peace Accords. LO therefore also supports *Unsitragua* in lobbying towards national institutions, including participation in political processes such as "tri-partite collaboration and social dialogue". Furthermore, LO gives direct support in specific labor cases where possible.



### **2.2.6 Save the Children Norway (SCN)**

SCN has worked in Guatemala since 1976. Their main objective is to promote children's rights and participation. To comply with the principle of not being present in countries where there is a national SC organization, SCN plans to close its office in Guatemala by the end of March 2009. Support to SCG will be continued, whereas the other 19 partner organizations are being phased out. (Special arrangements for continued funding may possibly be set up in one or two cases.) SCN has the following main program lines:

- Fulfil children's right to education
- Fulfil the rights of children affected by armed conflict and disaster
- Fulfil the rights of children to protection against violence and sexual abuse
- Achieve better results for children through a stronger Save the Children
- Strengthening implementation and monitoring of Children's Rights.

For the evaluation, the following organizations and programs have been selected:

*PENNAT* – an educational program for working children and adolescents.

*CNEM* – National Council of Maya Education is a council of 20 Mayan organizations working with education at all levels from a Maya perspective.

*PDH* – Human Rights Ombudsman, working with SCN on a project promoting participation and organization of teacher training students.

*Quality Education Group* – Network of SCN partners working in education.

*Utz K'aslemal* – works with psychosocial treatment of children in war affected areas.

*Save the Children Guatemala (SCG)* – the national SC organization, working for child and adolescent participation on a broad scale, with education as one focus area.

### 3 Guatemala

Guatemala is a lower-middle-income country according to World Bank classification, with a GNI per capita of USD 2,640 in 2006.<sup>4</sup> Wealth, however, is highly unevenly distributed and social indicators reveal a poverty situation much greater than what gross income figures suggest. Thus, Nicaragua, with only 40% of Guatemala's GNI per capita, has an average life expectancy that is 2.5 years longer, and a measles immunization coverage rate of 96%, compared to Guatemala's 77%. The child malnutrition rate in Guatemala is 23%, whereas the average for a lower-middle-income country is 13%. Educational indicators are also very weak: the adult literacy rate is 20% below the average for the income group, and the primary school completion rate is 23.5% below average. Furthermore, in spite of a stable economy, no debt problem, and consistent overall growth throughout the last decade, there is little feeling that inequalities and poverty are being reduced. In some respects they may even be increasing: According to the Presidential Human Rights Commissioner Frank La Rue, the most recent statistics – yet to be released – show that the level of child malnutrition is rising.

Inequalities in Guatemala have deep historical roots. In the rural areas, they are intimately tied to the pattern of landholding, which is the most skewed in all of Latin America (Wittman and Geisler 2005), a continent characterized by unequal land distribution. Historical patterns of large-scale haciendas and plantations on the one hand, and very small *minifundista* holdings on the other, have been further aggravated through displacements and concentrations of landholdings during the armed conflict, and fragmentation of smallholdings through population growth and subdivision of properties. Despite some industrialization and modernization, labor relations have been characterized as almost feudal up until the 1970s. These inequalities formed the basis for the armed conflict which was framed by the revolutionary organizations as a class struggle to transform society. Unfortunately, they also represent structural challenges which have so far not been solved.

*Indigenous peoples.* Inequalities are also very much related to the ethnic composition of the country. The indigenous population is officially estimated to be 40% (some quote considerably higher estimates, up to 60%), and represents the majority in 10 of Guatemala's 21 *departamentos*. Different Maya linguistic groups make up the great majority of Guatemala's indigenous peoples, but there are also small groups of Xinka and Garífuna. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Issues, Rodolfo Stavenhagen:

One of the issues of greatest current concern is the close link between ethnic origin and poverty; the departments in which there is the highest concentration of indigenous people are also those with the highest incidence of poverty and extreme poverty. Being poor and indigenous in Guatemala also means living predominantly in the rural areas, engaging mainly in agriculture, being mostly illiterate, having school attendance rates below the national average, having no access to basic services and suffering marginalization and social exclusion to various degrees. Indigenous women experience the lowest levels of economic and social well-being (United Nations, Economic and Social Council, 2003, translated from the Spanish version).

The Special Rapporteur describes four different types of racial and ethnic discrimination against Guatemala's indigenous peoples: the *interpersonal discrimination*, encountered in exclusionary attitudes in face-to-face interactions with non-indigenous people; *institutional discrimination*, in the unequal share received by indigenous people in terms of state services and collective goods; *legal discrimination* in the linguistic and other barriers that limit indigenous people's access to justice; and the *structural discrimination*, where historical processes have led to the exclusion of indigenous people from economic, political and

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<sup>4</sup> Atlas method. Calculated by PPP, Guatemala's GNI per capita is USD 4,800. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf>. Unless otherwise specified, all figures in the following are from the World Bank website.

institutional resources. While the Peace Accords – especially the Accord on the Identity and Rights of the Indigenous Peoples – set a framework for addressing these problems, successive governments have shown little commitment to implement this program. The general consensus, ten years after the Peace Accords, is that the agreement on indigenous issues is the one where progress has been most limited.

From the outside, the indigenous people of Guatemala can be perceived as a unitary group, as described for instance in the paragraphs above. From within, however, such unity is less apparent. Rather than having a common ethnic identity as Maya, identity is more frequently perceived in terms of belonging to one of the 22 different Mayan sociolinguistic groups, or even more fundamentally, with respect to the local community. While a Maya movement does exist in the form of activists working for indigenous rights, primarily at the national level, such a basis of identification and organization has limited appeal among the majority. Broad and popular indigenous organizations do not exist, and attempts at using indigenous identity as a mobilizing force in national electoral politics have not been successful. Traditional indigenous organization has been at the community level, and involves a system of rotating elected officials. The Guatemalan political system has also used this structure to extend its reach into the indigenous communities, through the so-called *alcaldías indígenas* cooperating with the mayor of the municipality.

*State and conflict.* The Guatemalan state is often characterized as weak. Throughout most of Guatemala's history, the dominance of the executive has been relatively unchecked by the judicial and legislative powers, and the government has been very closely linked to the economic interests of a small elite and the military. The Guatemalan state has also consistently had difficulties in fulfilling key functions of the modern state: maintaining its monopoly on violence and upholding law and order on the one hand, and providing basic services, on the other. These shortcomings of the state are on the one hand linked to the fact that around one half of the population belong to indigenous groups and consequently live a substantial part of their lives under cultural, social and economic arrangements that are different from those of national society and the state. On the other hand, the weakness is also related to the fact that it is a small state, which still today has the lowest tax base (as percentage of GNI) in all of Latin America. Social spending amounts to only 2.9% of GNI, whereas the average for Latin America is 6%.

The armed conflict between 1960 and 1996 is crucial for understanding Guatemala today. The war was conducted with considerable brutality – in particular in the years 1981-83 – and has had profound effects on the social fabric in many areas. Around 200,000 people were killed, mostly civilians, and many hundred thousands more were displaced. The Historical Clarification Commission concludes that 93% of the documented Human Rights violations were committed by the forces of the state and its allied paramilitary groups. The mechanisms of the war served to spread fear, suspicion and divisions within communities, and effectively broke down traditional organizational structures. The legacies of these disruptions live on, even if the most intensive fighting ended more than two decades ago, and it is more than ten years since the Peace Accords were signed. Guatemala continues to be a violent country. With an average of more than 5,000 killings per year between 1996 and 2005, it is among the most violent in Latin America. A particularly worrying aspect of the violence is the fact that a significant number of murder victims are women, killed in ways that indicate sexualized violence. While the state is no longer the perpetrator of the violence, the fact that it is unable to control and punish those responsible, means that confidence in the state remains low. Indeed, there is a common perception that organized crime has penetrated the security apparatus of the state, and confidence in the courts and the police is close to nil. Another legacy of the war often referred to, is the so-called 'culture of silence': a widespread reluctance to talk, whether of the war itself or to express a clear personal opinion on an issue that might be perceived as controversial.

This is not to say that nothing has changed. The Peace Accords formed an important framework for developing and democratizing Guatemala, and even if they are far from fulfilled, a number of things are different today from before 1996: Nobody believes that Guatemala will return to civil war – in this sense peace has been consolidated. Human Rights abuses attributed to the state have gone down, the state has assumed responsibility for those committed during the war, a compensation program has been introduced, and in a few but

symbolically important cases, perpetrators have been brought to justice. Politically, government changes are routinely handled through democratic elections. Decentralization and new mechanisms for political participation at the municipal and community levels may be leading to more inclusive and representative politics locally, at least in some areas. And the Peace Accords themselves constitute an important point of reference for rights-based political arguments, and have formed the basis for some legal advances since they were signed.

In many ways then, the state has progressed. Understanding and acceptance of multi- and intercultural agendas has also increased, especially within the educational and social sectors. Here and in other areas, lack of implementation in practice may thus reflect the weakness of the state as well as continued resistance and adherence to an ideology that claims that indigenosity must be left behind in order to become a true and modern Guatemalan. But even though the state has changed, the regime in some ways remain the same. Many of the same people remain in power, the traditional economic elite makes sure changes that may affect them negatively are not implemented and economic globalization and neo-liberalism allow for new forms of adjustments to the Peace Agenda which often limit the real impact.

*Civil society.* Historically, civil society has never been strong in Guatemala, but what had developed since 1944 was to a large extent wiped out during the worst years of the armed conflict. The important role generally attributed to civil society during the Peace Process may therefore be considered more surprising than the fairly common characteristic of civil society today as weak. This, however, is not so unusual. A unified civil society tends to appear only at exceptional historical moments, and is usually short lived. With a joint focus on Human Rights, the civil sector obtained an important role in mediating between government and guerrilla. Representatives of different organizations were able to wield considerable influence and play an important role in shaping the Peace Accords. Since then, demands have been 'sectorialized', and alliances across themes have largely been absent. Organizations focus on indigenous rights, the agrarian issue, women's rights, access to justice, environmentalism or control over natural resources, but seldom work together. In addition, internal divisions have further fragmented these movements.

Guatemalan civil society needs to be understood in its historical context, most importantly with respect to the armed conflict. Many of the organizations of civil society were formed during the war, and this context has shaped their mission and understanding of how their goals can be achieved, as well as the divisions among them. Even organizations created more recently are usually formed within an organizational culture with roots in the war. Three elements with respect to a war-induced organizational culture can be pointed out: *Polarization*, a tendency to categorize all other actors as either allies or enemies (thereby reducing the scope for broad cooperation on specific issues); *verticalism*, or a lack of internal democracy (which may have a long tradition in Guatemala, but was reinforced during the war); and *the legacies of working clandestinely*, which include a lack of transparency and a reluctance to publicly express personal opinions.

One characteristic of Guatemala is a considerable gap between what might be termed a national civil society leadership (or spokespersons) and the popular sectors they seek to represent. There are a number of dimensions to this gap – related, for instance, to the history of repression of popular organizations; to the low educational and literacy levels, especially in the countryside; to the technical nature of the work in the *Comisiones Paritarias* (where civil society leaders were integrated in the follow-up processes of the Peace Accords); to the difference in perspectives between a Maya intellectual elite conceptualizing a struggle on the basis of indigenous rights from more localized popular identities and struggles for livelihood; to ingrained divisions between Guatemala City and the realities of the rural areas; to the differences between modern bureaucratic-rational organizations and indigenous collective organization; and to the distance and skepticism most people feel towards those who engage in the national level political sphere and in spaces of negotiation and dialogue with the state. On the other hand, the tendency of many left-leaning organizations to prioritize working for a complete political transformation of Guatemalan society, rather than piecemeal improvements in concrete economic conditions, may also be perceived by many as a failure to deal with their immediate concerns. Pointing out that this gap between leadership and popular sectors exists, should not be taken to imply a critique of a leadership out of touch with its bases. On the contrary we see the rights-oriented work at national level as highly important. However, the

very existence of such a gap is a characteristic that it is important to point out, as it is a limiting factor for the potential of Guatemalan civil society to contribute to a more democratic development.

On the other hand, we wish to point out that Guatemalan civil society does not consist of the kind of ‘fake organizations’ established in some countries as a response to the availability of donor funds. In general, the Guatemalan organizations we have met through this study remain firmly rooted in national society and the problems therein. Even if aid dependence is fairly widespread, our impression is that agendas are shared and not externally set by donors.

It is also important to emphasize that the picture we have presented is not static. Organizations are struggling to become more democratic; new organizations are being established that are less marked by the war experience; new leaders not formed in a militarized context are emerging. Such changes are taking place particularly at the local level, where new forms of participation and organization are formed, generally with less attention from the national public sphere, and often with more direct links to local concerns. In some cases, however, there is the risk that modern organizations compete with and de-legitimize more representative indigenous organizations.

A problematic issue for many Guatemalan organizations has been how to relate to the state. Given the recent history of the state as the perpetrator of massive repression, it is not surprising that skepticism towards engaging with the state is widespread. Yet, in the post-peace-agreement period, new opportunities for dialogue and cooperation with the state have appeared, and different responses to this have emerged among the organizations (thereby increasing divisions among civil society organizations). Some have entered these spaces in order to seek influence, while others have refrained out of a fear of being co-opted. New opportunities for interaction with the state appear both at the local level (through the decentralization process) and at the national level. Experiences of using these spaces are mixed, as state institutions (at all levels) often lack the capacity or the will to implement what has been agreed.

*Aid.* Aid to Guatemala increased after the Peace Accords, but has not made Guatemala particularly aid dependent. For 2005, total aid to the country equaled only 0.8% of GNI. Nevertheless, development cooperation is important within specific sectors: Aid does for instance make up 8% of the educational budget. This might still not appear as much, but considering that more than 80% of the budget is tied to teacher salaries and similar fixed running costs, aid accounts for around half of the funds available for improvements and innovations.

Assessments of the impacts of aid are diverging. Morales López, in his investigation of the role of aid in the ten years after the signing of the Peace Accords, concludes that ‘the international community is directly and indirectly co-responsible for the limited progress of the peace agenda’ during this period (Morales López 2007: 90, translated from Spanish). Tamup et al., on the other hand, claims that ‘international aid has been, and continues to be, decisive for the establishment of development patterns and in the process of consolidating democratic structures’, as well as ‘fundamental ... for the peace process and its subsequent implementation’ (Tamup et al 2007: 194, translated from Spanish). However, it is probably not very useful to assess all aid together. It is interesting to note that in his critical analysis of aid to Guatemala, Morales López claims that NGO aid, in particular from European countries, ‘has been one of the most efficient, transparent and committed mechanisms for social transformation ... [and that t]he quality and capacity of the interventions, even with the limited financial resources available, has generated profound changes, basically in the social and political spheres’ (Morales López 2007: 117). On the other hand, in our interviews we also encountered negative perceptions of the impacts of this aid, and allegations that it has contributed to fragmentation, imposition of external agendas, and ‘NGO-ization’ of civil society. After a large in-flux of aid following the Peace Process, some donors are now withdrawing or reducing their development cooperation with Guatemala. Aid for civil society is also showing a downward trend (ibid.).



## 4 Donor NGO and Intervention Analysis

### 4.1 Program theory

In accordance with the Terms of Reference, the evaluation team has identified and analyzed the *program theories*, or the underlying theories of change that explicitly or implicitly inhere in the organizations' development work. In this section, we give a brief overview of the program theories encountered, in terms of general orientation and the degree to which the theories are explicit, elaborated and internally consistent. This includes assessing the extent to which organizations seek to establish linkages between interventions and expected outcomes at different levels. Furthermore, we analyze their 'vertical coherence', that is, the extent to which the program theories of the different 'links' or levels in the aid chain – from back donor, through Norwegian NGO, to Guatemalan partner NGO and down to the project level – correspond, overlap or contradict each other. Thus, here we only aim to analyze program theories on their own. In the chapter on factors that affect the achievement of objectives, we will return to the questions of how they correspond to Guatemalan reality, and the degree to which these are good theories for effecting the desired changes.

The program theories of the Norwegian NGOs differ as to their degree of specificity – some are linked to a particular project or project type, while others, especially for the larger organizations, are more general ones that cover interventions in a number of different sectors. In most cases, program theories are quite clear and explicit, while in a couple of cases they appear to be more implicit and less thoroughly thought through (PYM, for one of its two projects; NCA). In two cases, changing circumstances are obliging the Norwegian organizations and their partners to rethink their strategies (FOKUS/LAG, FOKUS/White Ribbon).

In terms of intentions, there are considerable similarities between the theories of most of the Norwegian organizations, which all can be said to belong to the rights-based and civil-society-organizations-as-representatives-of-marginalized-groups school of program theory. The only exceptions are PYM and FOKUS/White Ribbon, where the latter is actually in the process of adopting a mainstream rights-based approach. It can thus be concluded that at the level of intentions, program theories are fairly similar.

At a more operational level, however, the program theories are quite divergent. The Norwegian NGOs select very different partner organizations to support in order to achieve their objectives. Thus, SCN works mainly with professional NGOs (but also with a few state institutions); NPA with peasant and indigenous organizations; NCA with a mix of faith-based organizations, an NGO and an activist environmentalist organization; PYM with a church; FOKUS with a broad-based social movement, a legal institute and a charity; and LO with a labor union. The projects selected show variety in terms of areas (education, agriculture, migrants, environment, child rights, land rights, labor rights, etc.), but are considerably more coherent when it comes to the approach, with the majority including components of organization and knowledge of rights, and with marginalized segments as target groups. All the Norwegian NGOs also provide some form of 'value added', directed at strengthening the partner organization. Program theories are thus similar in emphasizing this, although there are differences between organizations in the level of effort invested here.

Given the different backgrounds and accumulated experiences of the institutions of the aid chain (from the Norwegian MFA and Norad to the local project organization), it would not be surprising if considerable divergences were found between the program theories at different levels. In particular one might expect that the recent experience of a brutal civil war would make the program theories of the Guatemalan organizations different from the Norwegian theories. However, in practice, vertical coherence was in most cases found to be high.

Cases where there were discrepancies between levels include the following:

- CIEDEG's sustainable agriculture program is not rights-based, and thus not in accordance with NCA-strategy
- Lack of correspondence of service delivery project (Fundación Deborah) to back-donor (Norad) requirements of rights-based approach
- LO's emphasis on strengthening partner legitimacy through the introduction of internal democratic mechanisms versus Unsitragua's focus on activity as the way of acquiring legitimacy
- ASD objectives of school project as way of projecting church and faith in community, versus the Norad neutrality principle

A number of the programs had an explicit and well-planned strategy of combining interventions at different levels (individual, organizational, institutional), and thereby achieving synergies. This included Madre Selva, Conavigua, ICCPG, LO, and the SCN partner organizations. Some such linkages were also found in other projects, but in less systematic form.

### 5.1 Partnership relations

There is considerable variation in the types of partners selected by the Norwegian NGOs. These range from broad-based social movements and member organizations (Conavigua, Kabawil, CODECA), through labor unions (Unsitragua), churches and faith-based organizations (ASD, CIEDEG, CEG) as well as activist organizations (Madre Selva), to charity organizations (Fundación Deborah), professional NGOs (many of SCN's partners, Fundesco), a legal institute (ICCPG) and state institutions (PDH, Digebi). This wide distribution in organizational types is somewhat surprising, and partly in contrast to some of the international literature, which emphasizes the dominance of NGOs over more membership based or representative organizations among the recipients of civil society aid (Tvedt 2002).

However, this is not a random selection of partner organizations. Partner organizations are selected according to program theory, and they are generally well matched to their counterpart organizations. Thus, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions work with a Guatemalan Labor organization; the faith-based NCA and PYM work with religious Guatemalan organizations; the legal group JURK works with the legal institute ICCPG; Save the Children Norway works with a selection of Guatemalan NGOs and other entities with a professional mission related to child rights; the left-leaning NPA works with organizations and movements with similar inclinations, and so on. Even where partners are not really homologous organizations, they often share a common value orientation, and at a minimum, a common set of goals. Thus, partnerships are all between likeminded organizations, and have a clear value orientation. This is also the case of SCN's partnership with the state institution PDH – the Human Rights ombudsman – which is very much an activist institution within the state apparatus, dedicated to the promotion of rights. Such correspondence between partners contributes to the vertical coherence in program theory noted above.

There is also considerable variation in the number of partner organizations with which the Norwegian organizations work. The three large NGOs naturally have the highest number of partners: SCN: 20 (but in the process of phasing out up to 19 of them); NPA: 12 (down from 20 five years ago); NCA: seven main partners. FOKUS has three partner organizations in Guatemala, but the partnership relations are really with different FOKUS member organizations. Thus, these are one-to-one relations, just as is the case for LO and PYM and their partners. Partnerships are also of differing complexity. In most cases they relate to cooperation on a single project. However, in some cases (NCA-CIEDEG, SCN-SCG), where cooperation involves several quite different projects, the partner relationship inevitably becomes more complex and multi-dimensional.

Generally, relations between donor and recipient organizations vary in closeness. Some donors maintain frequent contact, visit projects regularly, show interest in project context, and are active in discussions on project design and development. Others have little interaction with their partners apart from the formal requirements of funding. In the case of the partnerships of the Norwegian NGOs in Guatemala, they are all at the close end of the spectrum, involving frequent contact and a high degree of interest in the work of the partners. Four of the organizations maintain some kind of representation in Guatemala (NCA, NPA, PYM, SCN). One might have expected this to mean closer relationships with partners, but this is not really the case. The other organizations only relate to one partner each, and with regular

visits from Norway, fairly close contact is maintained. Indeed, in the LAG-Conavigua partnership very close and personal relations have been maintained over a long period of time. With up to 20 partners to relate to, relations rarely get this close, even if the Norwegian NGO is represented in the country. Somewhat surprisingly, even if NCA has an office in Guatemala City, and maintains close relations with partner organizations at head office, NCA staff rarely visit projects in the field, and thus have not been close to this side of their partners. In a sense, they trust that program theory is shared with the partners.

All Norwegian NGOs are generally wary of imposing their own agendas on the partners. Obviously, the need for this is less when partners are selected on the grounds of their like-mindedness. To a large extent they have parallel objectives at the outset, thus limiting the need for imposition. Still, one will in many cases find that even where this affinity between partners exist, the donor will be eager to control and steer the concrete ways in which projects are designed. The Norwegian NGOs generally seem able to avoid this. Of course, there are some elements of such steering in all donor relationships, for instance in subtle forms of ‘self-imposition’ where recipients propose what they expect donors wish, in order to secure funding. Somewhat stronger forms of imposition were encountered in two cases: FOKUS/ White Ribbon’s insistence that Fundación Deborah adopt a rights-based approach, and the expressed wish from LO that Unsitragua put more efforts into developing formal democratic mechanisms within its organization.

PYM’s relation to its partner ASD is quite different from the other partnerships, in that PYM has a much stronger operational role. The Norwegian PYM missionary has designed the agricultural project, and organizes and supervises the implementation, and he has a key role in the implementation of the school project. ASD at central level has a weak involvement in the projects, while local congregations have an important role, in particular for the school project (they take over and run the schools after completion). Thus, the PYM approach is more akin to traditional ways of working that most donors have abandoned, and expresses a program theory where the partner organization is less central. A particularity of PYM, as well as of the FOKUS member organizations, is that they are smaller and with fewer resources in terms of staff etc. than their partners. This, however, does not mean that they are unable to contribute more than funds in the partnership.

In addition to the funding, there are elements of ‘value added’ by the Norwegian NGO in all the partnership relations. This general emphasis on strengthening the partner organization illustrates the centrality of the partner within the program theory. One such element that is found in all the cases is the facilitation of contacts and links to other organizations and institutions. Most commonly, this refers to Guatemalan organizations, but there are also cases where useful international connections are established. Exchange of experiences is one outcome of such contacts, in some cases concrete cooperation in activities or projects is also established. SCN, and to some extent NPA, establish networks among their Guatemalan partner organizations. The systematic work of SCN in promoting exchange through such networks has given a number of positive outcomes.

#### **Building bridges in civil society**

The Quality Education Group is made up of the ten SCN partner organisations working with education. The aim has been to build on their diverse experiences with working with different groups of marginalised children focusing on Maya education, children’s rights, education for working children, and for disabled children, as well as pre-school children in marginal situations and training of teacher students. The ambition of the group is to influence national education policies to promote educational quality. Where the Ministry focuses on competences and standards, the group points to the necessity of focusing on educational opportunity, qualitative participation, citizenship and significant learning. The participating organisations have benefited from mutual learning which has resulted not only in the development of a proposal to be presented to the Ministry of Education, but also to the improvement of their respective educational programmes. Pennat has, for example, been able to improve the contextualisation of their educational program with respect to Mayan culture, benefiting the indigenous children they work with at the markets in Guatemala City. The project has strengthened relations between civil society organisations and has built a potential for impact on national educational policy.



Another form of value added that is found in all relationships, is the contribution to project planning and design and to strategic organizational development that the Norwegian NGOs make through their role as dialogue partner. The importance of this contribution varies from case to case, but can be considerable and should not be underestimated. In some cases, the Norwegian NGOs own skills and capacities are complemented by the contracting of professionals with special competence in the relevant fields, for instance for training in pedagogical methods (SCN) or for developing appropriate agricultural technologies (PYM).

In terms of being a critical dialogue partner, there is a very delicate balance vis-a-vis the concern to avoid imposing agendas on the recipient partner, that may involve trade-offs. The very principled and strong position of NPA in respecting the partners' integrity and right to set their own objectives may for instance limit the potential for contributing positively on the basis of an external perspective. On the other hand, too much critical dialogue on specific points may send the message to the recipient that funding is dependent on addressing the issues pointed out. This may in turn lead to sub-optimal modifications to strategies and programs, with negative results, such as mission drift, half-hearted efforts only to please donors, changes in strategy that are based on a superficial or deficient understanding of the situation, interventions that are not locally owned or supported, etc. The principle of respecting the partners' own decisions is particularly important when working with grassroots organizations, as NPA does. Their legitimacy and reason for being is wholly based on the fact that they are owned by their members, rather than responding to the wishes of an international donor.

Norwegian support also contributes to general strengthening of partner organizations, both through the provision of specific training (SCN, NPA), and, in some cases, the provision of core funding (Conavigua), often the most difficult for national NGOs to secure.

In a few, but crucial cases, the link to an international donor organization has provided protection to organizations working in repressive contexts (ICCPG, Madre Selva, Conavigua). Added legitimacy through the links to an international donor is also an added value some organizations mention. In the case of LO, particular forms of value is added to the economic support through the political work and lobbying the organization does, both directly towards Guatemalan institutions, and more indirectly, towards Norwegian companies with ownership interests in Guatemala.

### 4.3 Target groups

The specific target groups or beneficiaries<sup>5</sup> vary between the projects, but a general characteristic is that they are all groups that are marginalized in some way. Poor women (urban, rural, indigenous, in prison) are the target groups of a number of projects: CIEDEG's sustainable agriculture project; Fundesco; Conavigua; ICCPG; and Fundación Deborah. Poor indigenous peasants are the target group of NPA and PYM (agricultural project), while children (poor, indigenous, working, handicapped, affected by the war) are the intended beneficiaries of SCN and PYM (school project). LO targets workers, and PMH/CEG works for the interests of poor migrants. Madre Selva seeks to represent and support communities whose access to natural resources are threatened, while CIEDEG's emergency preparedness program aims to benefit future victims of natural disasters.

Working with these kinds of marginalized and excluded groups implies at least two sets of challenges: Ensuring that interventions take into account the particularities of the target groups and their situation; and ensuring the participation of the target groups in designing and implementing activities.<sup>6</sup> How good are the programs of the Norwegian NGOs at meeting these challenges? To start with the issue of participation, it can be said that this is less relevant in advocacy programs, such as those of PMH/CEG and ICCPG. In the other projects, we find that in the majority of cases there is sufficient participation, and in a number of instances, projects are based on very strong principles of participation. The exceptions are the projects of Fundación Deborah, and PYM, neither of which can be termed rights-based or participatory.

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5 Some projects aim to benefit specific groups (for instance migrants) but choose to work directly towards other types of actors or institutions (for instance of the church), in order to create awareness or influence policies. In the following, when we discuss target groups, we refer to the first category, that is, those whom the project seeks to benefit.

6 The easy answer is that through ensuring the latter, the former will be achieved. In practice it is rarely this simple, and the standard rights-based program theory (as for instance expressed in Norad's guidelines for support to civil society) tends to gloss over the problems inherent in expecting the marginalized and excluded (the 'ideal' target groups) to be change agents themselves.

### Peasant struggles

The two peasant organisations supported by NPA, Codeca and Kabawil, have become the most important organisations representing, respectively, workers on the large export-oriented agricultural estates on the South Coast and the small scale farmers in the Northern highlands of Guatemala. Their approach is to raise political awareness through arranging meetings, discussions and courses in the villages, leading to both union activism at the farms and political activism in local governments. The latter is achieved through demonstrations and participation in local politics through the newly created decentralized advisory boards, the COCODES at the community level, and the COMUDES at the municipal level. NPA contributes with about 25 percent of the organisations' budgets, which is used for transport and training workshops. Even though the basic aim of both organisations is to prepare for political change in the country, their strategies differ and represent different attitudes to involvement with the state. Codeca puts more emphasis on what can be considered political work with the bases, whereas Kabawil, with an explicit indigenous perspective, has a more practical approach and also assists small scale farmers in buying and running large farms through the governmental land reform program.

There is also some variation in the way programs take into account the specific and disadvantaged situation of their target groups. We will discuss this in terms of gender and indigenous sensitivity. As mentioned, a number of projects have women as their specific target group. In all of these projects, the gender dimension has been taken into account in the design of the programs, which we find well suited to the specific situation of the particular women targeted. We also find that a number of other programs pay attention to gender issues, even if their target groups are not limited to only women. Thus, to mention a few examples: The SCN projects are generally strong in taking into account and counteracting structures of gender discrimination, and are for instance able to recruit promoters with a good gender balance. Partner organizations of NPA express that in their efforts to democratize, they give special priority to the issue of ensuring more women in the leadership. LO funds a component for the integration of women in trade union activities. Still, in these two cases, considerably more could be done. In other organizations, such as PYM and Madre Selva, there are few indications of any explicit concern with gender issues. In sum, there is significant scope for improvement in this respect.

In terms of having a specific indigenous perspective, this is of course very evident for those organizations that have indigenous rights as their main objective, such as Conavigua, Kabawil, and CNEM. A number of other organizations work with target groups that are only or mainly indigenous, with somewhat varying policies. Some are very serious in taking into account the indigenous dimension – for instance Utz K'aslemal, Pennat, and the NPA partners. Others could clearly do more in order to ensure that their programs are designed to respond to the needs of the indigenous people with whom they work, including NCA, Save the Children Guatemala and Fundación Deborah. In one case – PYM's school project, where children in a K'iché-speaking area are not allowed to speak their language at school, even outside of classes<sup>7</sup> – we find the project to be in direct contradiction with key principles of indigenous rights, as expressed for instance in the Norwegian guidelines for development cooperation with indigenous peoples.

#### 4.4 Relations with other actors

The types, range and intensity of relations with other actors and stakeholders vary between organizations and according to project types. Starting with the Guatemalan partner organizations, they all, with the exception of ASD, coordinate with a fairly broad range of organizations and institutions, and take part in some form of network of likeminded organizations. Thus, apart from ASD the organizations are well integrated into civil society. The great majority of them also have other donors.

All the organizations have some form of established relationship with state institutions. These relations differ. On the one hand there are relations that aim to influence or make advocacy: such as taking part in dialogues on the agrarian question, labor rights or other contested issues

<sup>7</sup> PYM has informed us that that this practice is against their guidelines and only found in one of the ten schools they have supported, and that after it become known to the head office through this evaluation, it has been stopped.

where the differences between the parties are considerable (NPA partners, Unsitragua); seeking to promote a specific educational model (CNEM; Pennat); working to secure respect for the rights of women in prison (ICCPG); or the right to compensation after the war (Conavigua). In some cases, this work is officially recognized when representatives are appointed to public commissions, even as leaders (Conavigua, CNEM), or when proposals are followed-up in the revision of legislation (ICCPG). On the other hand, there are forms of cooperation, mainly related to the service sector, where for instance the organizations' schools and educational programs are approved by the Ministry of Education (PYM, Pennat, CNEM); where project staff gives training to teachers of public schools (SCG); where organizations join with state institutions to arrange celebrations of the Day of the Child (Utz K'aslemal); or where a municipality has assumed the costs of the salaries of some of the teachers in the school run by the organization (Pennat). In general, within the service sector, the work of the Norwegian-supported organizations is well aligned with the relevant government policies and programs. In the case of SCN, there are also government institutions as partners – PDH and DIGEBI (the latter is currently not active as a partner, due to bureaucratic obstacles).

Coordination between the Norwegian NGOs seems limited. The Norwegian Embassy has arranged meetings with the organizations once or twice a year, but those that do not have representation in the country do not attend (and PYM, even if they have a missionary in the country, has by mistake not been invited). The Norwegian representatives of NCA and SCN meet informally and in different connections – also with representatives of the Embassy – thus ensuring exchange of information on a somewhat regular basis. In the feedback seminar arranged after the fieldwork for this evaluation, a number of the representatives of the Guatemalan partners expressed a wish that such opportunities to meet could be arranged on a more regular basis.

#### **4.5 Implementation and outputs**

The general conclusion is that the Guatemalan partners are efficient in implementing their programs, and that outputs therefore are well in accordance with project plans.

The exceptions to this general rule are the following:

- CIEDEG has struggled with a number of organizational problems throughout the last years, and implementation has therefore been slow in some of the programs.
- Unsitragua has achieved less than planned in some components (training) and more than planned in others (events, commemorations) – partly this may reflect differences in priorities between Unsitragua and LO.
- Madre Selva does not only work according to detailed plans. It also reacts to events and issues as they happen. Thus, 'implementation' and 'outputs according to plans' are less relevant categories than for other organizations.

The majority of the projects include the creation or strengthening of local groups or community organizations, which can be considered as 'outputs'. The organizations have been quite successful in these efforts. Still, this is not to say that there is no room for improvement. Even in the best of the programs, we find that some groups function better than others, and there are groups that do not function very well. Given the challenges involved in mobilization and organizational work, this is natural and does not invalidate the positive overall assessment. Still, we believe that better monitoring systems might have revealed difficulties at an earlier stage, possibly allowing adjustments to strategies that could have reduced such problems. Simple, robust monitoring systems that could aid learning and program adjustments are lacking or could be improved in most of the programs.

Outputs include physical construction and infrastructure only in a few cases (Conavigua, PYM). Training is a key component of the outputs in all projects, often with awareness-raising related to rights as a central topic. Furthermore, a large number of projects have among their outputs some form of lobbying or demonstrating in order to influence politics (all NPA partners, Unsitragua, Conavigua, ICCPG, Madre Selva, CEG, PDH, SCG, CNEM, Quality Education Group). A number of the outputs identified span the divide between service-based and rights-based approaches. The very rights-oriented educational programs of SCN are the best example of this.

## 5 Outcomes

Outcomes are defined as ...”*the likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention’s output*”. The aim of this chapter is to present the aggregate outcomes of the work of the Norwegian NGOs taken together. Initially, it is worth pointing out some of the difficulties inherent in this. The average annual support to Guatemala by Norwegian NGOs over the past five years has been in the region of USD 6 million. The six organizations selected for this study account for around USD 4 million yearly.<sup>8</sup> These amounts equal less than one half to one third of a dollar per inhabitant of Guatemala. Evidently, one cannot expect great effects in terms of development and peace building at national level from this amount of support. Still, there are results, even if they are necessarily modest.

A further complication is the fact that national level outcomes are the results of a number of different factors, and in the current context it is methodologically impossible to single out what is the specific contribution of one factor, such as Norwegian NGO aid. Thus, the aim of the analysis must be more modest. In the following we seek to show the direction of changes to which the Norwegian support is contributing.

Distinguishing between outputs and outcomes is not always self-evident. The strengthening of a partner organization may be considered more of a means than an objective, and therefore not relevant under the heading of outcomes. On the other hand, this also concerns objectives in terms of strengthening particular segments of civil society. In the following, organizational strengthening is therefore considered among the outcomes of the work of the Norwegian NGOs.

In order to structure the presentation, outcomes are analyzed according to broadly defined sectors. As a heuristic device, we distinguish between outcomes of Norwegian support in the following three sectors: Economic development; Service delivery; and Democratization/ Human Rights/participation. Furthermore, we distinguish analytically between three different levels at which outcomes are achieved: The individual level; the organizational level (referring both directly to partner organizations, as well as to broader civil society outcomes); and the institutional level (by which we refer to outcomes at the level of state institutions).

In order to prepare the ground for this analysis, it will first be necessary to present what we have found to be the outcomes of the work of each of the Norwegian NGOs (5.1). Thereafter, outcomes in the different sectors are analyzed separately (5.2-5.4).

### 5.1 Outcomes for the Norwegian NGOs

#### 5.1.1 FOKUS (Forum for Women and Development)

*Conavigua*: Conavigua has established a nationwide grassroots network, which through capacity-building and leadership training has empowered members and served as a basis for mobilization. A particular success, given Guatemala’s fragmented civil society and divided indigenous movement, is the fact that the organization brings together a broad range of different language groups. Furthermore, Conavigua has been successful in building alliances with other civil society actors, and has played a critical role in articulating and representing the views and interests of the victims of the war. Through its alliances, the organization has had national level policy impact, for instance in the cases of the law on alternatives to military service and the war compensation program. Currently, Conavigua faces the challenge of adapting to a post-peace-process situation, where urgent issues and member needs

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<sup>8</sup> Aid through Norwegian NGOs accounted for 29.9% of total Norwegian aid to Guatemala in 2006. An additional 15.7% (app. USD 2.3 million) was channeled through Guatemalan and regional NGOs (Norwegian MFA, <http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Utvikling/Statistikker/Landstatistikk-Guatemala.pdf>). Total aid to Guatemala from all donors averaged in excess of 300 million USD per year in the period 1996-2006 (Morales López 2007: 63). Unfortunately, we have not been able to find reliable figures for total aid to Guatemalan civil society. In comparison, remittances received by Guatemala in 2006 have been estimated at 3.6 billion USD; more than 10 times the amount of aid received (and close to 1,000 times more than the aid through the six Norwegian NGOs of this study).

increasingly diverge from Conavigua's traditional areas of engagement. Obviously, these outcomes cannot be attributed wholly or directly to the FOKUS/LAG support. Still, FOKUS/LAG has supported Conavigua for 19 years; there has been a close relationship based on personal knowledge and trust; and the Norwegian organization has contributed in crucial ways, such as funding the office premises, pushing for the formal registration of Conavigua, core funding covering the costs of central level staff, and facilitating staff training and organizational development in different ways.

*ICCPG*: The organization has succeeded in its objective of strengthening the rights of women in the penal system, through: Addressing individual cases of abuse; creating knowledge and attention to the issue; creating pressure for reform; establishing mechanisms for monitoring; creating juridical precedents; having concrete proposals implemented by the authorities; and by contributing to the approval of a new law regulating the penal system. Studies seem to confirm a reduction in number and seriousness of cases of abuses against women within the judicial system. Indirectly, the project also serves to reduce the stigma attached to women in prisons.

*Fundación Deborah*: The project has increased employment, income and self-esteem among the participating women (149 were enrolled in October 2007; a considerably larger number has received training throughout almost ten years). The project nursery provides high-quality pre-school facilities for 60 children of ages two to six, effectively preparing them for school. Considering the poverty, violence and marginality of the project area, these are considerable and important achievements.

The outcomes for FOKUS are in line with the objectives of the organization, to work for increased knowledge about, respect for and realization of women's rights. The FOKUS program theory emphasizes the organizing of women as the key mechanism for achieving change – only the Conavigua support corresponds to this.

### **5.1.2 LO (Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions)**

The most important outcome of the Norwegian support is that it contributes to keep the Guatemalan labor union Unsitragua alive, under extremely difficult conditions. Survival gives some hope for the future in the violence-ridden country with very weak institutions for protecting the rights of workers. The activity of Unsitragua probably has some effect in reducing the vulnerability of the members, even if conditions do not permit actually improving their living conditions. Unsitragua is the most active of the labor unions in Guatemala, and is considered the most successful one. The organization takes part in three-partite negotiations with the government and the private sector organization, but even if agreements are made, these are rarely followed up in practice. The practical outcome is therefore limited. Norwegian financial support accounts for close to a quarter of Unsitragua's budget, and as described above, is complemented by other forms of support.

Outcomes are therefore in line with LO's intentions and program theory, although weaker than hoped for due to the difficult context.

### **5.1.3 Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)**

At the *individual* level, most of the participating women in CIEDEG's sustainable agriculture project have achieved improved self-esteem and food security. A few hundred women have received vocational, political and organizational training through the FUNDESCO program, but there is a lack of systematic documentation as to how this training is put to use and contribute to improve the quality of life. The improved emergency response capacity of CIEDEG has probably benefited victims of hurricane Stan and other natural disasters.

At the *organizational* level, NCA has contributed to strengthening some core partners in specific areas, such as CIEDEG's emergency capacity, and CIEDEG and PMH/CEG's advocacy capacity and awareness of key issues. NCA had a limited and late response to the organizational crisis evolving in CIEDEG. To Madre Selva, NCA has provided legitimacy, and helped forge links with church-based organizations.



### **Environmental activism**

Madre Selva (MS) is a 'new social movement'-organisation, created after the 1996 Peace Accords. Its mission is to "participate in an active, pacific, radical and ethical way in initiating, following and strengthening local and national processes of conservation and defence of the environment". Madre Selva is opposed to "the neo-liberal and non-sustainable economic development model pursued by the government". The organisation is made up of a collective of dedicated full-time activists who work closely with local communities. A well-known example is the mobilisation with the Sipacapa community in San Marcos against the mining company Montana Exploradora. Even if unsuccessful, the campaign received large scale national attention and contributed to the electoral success of a local civic committee over the traditional elite dominated parties. Madre Selva mobilises independent expertise to sensitise local communities as well as the national public. It has become a national point of reference in environment-related policy debates, but has experienced several defamation campaigns in the media, as well as death threats against its activists. Madre Selva has worked with NCA since 2003, and the collaboration has led to the formulation of Madre Selva's Water and Sanitation Advocacy Project, and its energetic implementation since 2004. NCA has supported the building of alliances between Madre Selva and local churches, and has contributed to increased legitimacy and security for the environmental activists.

Finally, when it comes to the *institutional* level, the advocacy work of CIEDEG, PMH/CEG and Madre Selva has had effects in awareness-raising and agenda-setting, but has so far not resulted in many changes in government policies.

NCA has a complex program theory, with quite different objectives and partner organizations. This is reflected in the diverse set of outcomes encountered, which indicates some degree of fragmentation of efforts.

#### **5.1.4 Norwegian Missions in Development/Norwegian Pentecostal Mission (PYM)**

*Agricultural project:* Most participating farmers (300 in current project phase, 300 in the previous) have adopted some of the new techniques/crops being promoted, a very clear indicator of the fact that the farmers see that these innovations bring economic benefits. A few farmers have managed to turn their economic situation completely around. The new techniques should also improve soil fertility and reduce land degradation. Lack of attention to organizational issues may limit long-term effects.

*School project:* Ten schools have been constructed and two renovated (over two project periods); all have been handed over to local ASD congregations to run. The schools are operated efficiently in some respects, and the project thereby contributes to increased school coverage. The policy of disallowing the speaking of indigenous languages in school probably has negative effects on students' cultural identity and self-esteem.

Outcomes in the agricultural project derive directly from program theory and inputs. In the educational project, unintended outcomes do not correspond to program theory, but can be said to stem from the organizational model, as well as from the implicit objective of supporting the ASD. A weakness in the program theory is thus exposed.

#### **5.1.5 Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)**

The NPA contributions have fundamentally allowed Codeca, Kabawil and other peasant and indigenous organizations supported to be more active in making demands and claims towards the government. The processes of organizational strengthening and development, supported by NPA, has further increased the partners' ability to make use of existing spaces for dialogue and negotiations, without being co-opted or over-extending themselves in the process. While it is difficult to point to specific changes in government policies or legislation as the result of this activity, it is clear that the NPA support has contributed to keeping the issues of peasant and indigenous rights on the agenda. In the case of Kabawil, the organization has also helped its members acquire a number of farms through the land reform program. What the results of this will be for their livelihoods is still uncertain.

NPA has a very clear program theory behind its form of organizational support for broad-based popular organizations. Outcomes are clearly linked to inputs and intentions.

### **5.1.6 Save the Children Norway (SCN)**

At the *individual level*, in general, target groups, mainly marginalised children, are empowered through the work done by SCN and its partner organisations. The projects contribute to improvements in self-esteem both at the individual and collective level, to increased awareness of rights (and duties), and to increased participation in decisions and processes that affect them. Furthermore, a number of projects contribute to improved access to education for marginalised children. At the same time, the work of SCN and its partners – through developing appropriate educational models and training teachers – contributes significantly to the quality of education.

At the *organizational level*, through the creation of new organizations at grassroots level, and the strengthening and empowerment of others (such as COCODES), SCN and partners strengthen local level civil society. SCN has also systematically contributed to the capacity development of its partner organizations, both with respect to administrative capacity and to professional competence and methodologies for working with and empowering children. In particular, SCN has focused on strengthening the Guatemalan Save the Children organization. This is now judged to be sufficiently consolidated for the SCN to withdraw from Guatemala in 2009. SCN has also facilitated interchange and the establishment of strong networks between partners, which have strengthened the individual organizations and counteracted fragmentation in civil society.

Finally at the *institutional level*, the partner organizations of SCN have been good at coordinating and working with state institutions (there are even a couple of state institutions among the partners), especially at local levels. There has probably been an increased focus on children in local level planning as a result of this work. At the national level, Pennat, CNEM and the Quality Education Group all have potential to influence national education policies with their educational models, although concrete results are limited so far. SCN was one of many organisations which contributed to the approbation by Congress of “Ley de la Niñez” and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

For the SCN, outcomes are considerable and coherent, and very clearly following from systematic forms of intervention based on a very clear program theory for how children’s rights can be promoted through a focus on participation and education.

## **5.2 Outcomes in the sector of Economic development**

At the *individual level*, the majority of the 600 farmers in the PYM project and a number of those in the CIEDEG project have achieved increased income and improved management of soil fertility. Participants in the Fundación Deborah vocational training program have acquired new skills and increased income potential. Impacts on the livelihoods of the Kabawil farmers remain uncertain. At the *organizational level*, outcomes are quite limited. Only in the CIEDEG project are the participating farmers organized in groups. Some of these groups seem to function well, others do not. There are no *institutional level* outcomes within the sector of Economic development.

### **Scope, strategic impact on poverty reduction, sustainability**

There are relatively few projects studied that seek to promote economic development, just two promoting sustainable agriculture (NCA/CIEDEG and PYM), and one providing vocational training with the aim of providing employment and income (Fundación Deborah). In addition, Kabawil has acquired farms for members through the agricultural reform program, partly in contradiction to its stated policy. This limited attention to economic concerns may be surprising given the poverty profile of Guatemala, but it is in line with the general Norwegian policy of cooperation with Guatemala after the Peace Accords. In part, the finding is also related to the sampling of organizations for the study. If The Royal Norwegian Society for Development had been included in the study (as was the original intention), there would have been a greater focus on economic issues.

While two of the projects studied (PYM, Fundación Deborah) must be characterized as highly successful and good programs, the limited attention by the selected Norwegian NGOs to the economic sector must mean that their overall contribution to income poverty reduction is relatively low.

The benefits achieved – largely at the individual level – appear to be fairly sustainable (subject, of course, to the continued demand for the peasant products introduced and the vocational skills created).

### **5.3 Outcomes in the sector of *Service delivery***

#### **Individual level outcomes**

The outcomes for individual users of services include improved access to services and better quality of services in the fields of education (SCN, PYM, Fundación Deborah), psychosocial treatment (Utz K'aslemaal) and emergency relief delivery (CIEDEG).

SCN supports a very comprehensive program within the educational sector, which combines the objectives of working for improved access to education for excluded and disadvantaged groups (indigenous, poor, working, and handicapped children) with developing and promoting better and culturally relevant teaching methodologies, that ensure better results and completion rates, as well as promoting active, participating, critical and confident children and youth. In total ten thousands of children benefit from this. PYM's school program gives access to school for thousands of children, with benefits more in terms of coverage than particular advances in educational quality or appropriateness for the students. Utz K'aslemaal offers a form of psychosocial attention promoting self-esteem and participation among a limited number of children from highly war-affected areas. Fundación Deborah offers a vocational training program especially developed for women living under extremely difficult slum conditions.

Through the support for its emergency preparedness program, CIEDEG is becoming capable of responding better to the needs of victims of natural disasters.

#### **Organizational level outcomes**

The SCN partners in the educational sector have become greatly strengthened as providers of educational services through the systematic capacity building obtained through the partnership. The interchange of experiences and methodologies between the organizations – in particular through the Quality Education Group (and its predecessor, The Initiative) – has been especially relevant in this context. Furthermore, support has been given to the development of educational models, appropriate to the needs of the organizations' target groups. This has served to strengthen their professional competence significantly. Some of the organizations have received considerable recognition for this work, in some cases including official recognition and the request for using adaptations of the educational model in other contexts (i.e. Pennat).

Through their role in PYM's school project, the local congregations of the ASD have received increased projection and recognition within the communities. NCA has contributed to CIEDEG's improved emergency response capacity.

#### **Institutional level outcomes**

The Guatemalan school system struggles with a number of weaknesses. A fundamental one relates to its exclusionary character – it is developed with reference to the ladino urban elite reality, making it inappropriate and inaccessible to large parts of the population, in particular those groups which do not have Spanish as their mother tongue. Low scores, high drop-out rates, low educational levels and high incidence of illiteracy among these groups are the result. The development and large-scale implementation of a truly bilingual and intercultural education is therefore an urgent need, and a precondition for the development of a more inclusive and democratic Guatemala. It is within this perspective that the institutional level outcomes of the work of SCN needs to be considered. The partner organizations – notably Pennat, CNEM and the joint Quality Education Group – have done a considerable job of developing appropriate educational proposals for Maya education and for education for working children. To some extent this work is recognized: Pennat's educational model for



working children is officially approved, and the municipality of Guatemala City is assuming some of the costs of running the schools. It seems likely that Pennat will succeed in their ambition of having the municipality assume the total costs of the program in the course of a few years. CNEM's development of a Mayan educational model has so far not received the same recognition. But the fact that such a model is developed, with the immense work that this implies, means that there is a potential for having it officially approved, or important aspects of it integrated into a new model. This would have a great impact on the Guatemalan educational system. CNEM itself was much more optimistic now than before as the Ministry of Education had recently opened for more interaction and dialogue. Moreover, they consider the change of government a political opportunity to present their proposal and negotiate. The extent of approval of CNEM's proposal will depend largely on political developments that cannot be predicted, but the work done constitutes a considerable potential for large-scale impact at the institutional level.

### **Sustainability**

Services are notoriously hard to make self-sustaining. This is also the case with many of the programs in question here – but not all. Pennat is something of an exception, and stands a good chance of having its work funded by the authorities in the not-so-distant future. CNEM has hopes of having its model taken over by the Ministry, as well as of getting legal status as a public institution responsible for the development of Mayan education (a status which so far is grounded in the Peace Accords), which could also translate into direct economic support. ASD is able to run their schools without outside support, and there is no reason they should not be able to continue to do so. The remainder of the service programs, however, will depend on external funding if they are to be continued.

## **5.4 Outcomes in the sector *Democratization, Human Rights, participation***

### **Individual level outcomes**

The majority of the Norwegian NGOs (FOKUS/LAG, LO, NPA, SCN, and to certain extent NCA) – and their partner organizations – have given very high priority to training and capacity-building among their target groups with the purpose of promoting empowerment, participation, knowledge of rights, self-esteem, and cultural identity. In all the mentioned cases, training has been clearly rights-oriented, with explicit aims of creating the active citizenship necessary for the democratization of Guatemalan society. Our general impression is that this work has been quite effective. Furthermore, this has not been theoretically oriented training in abstract rights that might seem to be left hanging, and ultimately lead to disillusionment as they are not fulfilled in practice. On the contrary, all of the mentioned experiences have been linked to organizational efforts; thereby giving the people trained the opportunity to participate and influence their own situation. An example of this is SCG's work in Canilla, where training is given to a variety of actors, and linked to support to different local level organizations, from children's organizations to COCODES and a citizen's committee for influencing municipal planning with a children's agenda.

In all of these cases, the target groups of the projects have been particularly marginalized parts of the population: Poor, indigenous widows and women; workers; indigenous and other poor farmers; children that are marginalized in different respects (indigenous, handicapped, poor, working); poor women in urban and rural areas; communities whose natural resources are under pressure. In a number of cases, the disadvantaged situation of the target groups is directly linked to their ethnic identity, and in the majority of these cases the organizations have also sought to foster cultural self-esteem and reduce stigmatization. In this way, the empowering effect is strengthened. However, there are also cases where sufficient attention is not paid to the indigenous aspect of marginalization, and in one of them the result is probably increased stigmatization.

The direct beneficiaries of these programs include tens of thousands. The scope of the described empowerment outcomes is therefore significant.

### **Organizational level outcomes**

Outcomes at organizational level are of different kinds. Most directly, they can be found in the strengthening of the partner organizations. Simply by initiating a funding relationship, the partner is strengthened in some sense. But over and above that, many of the cooperation and

funding relations have explicit organizational strengthening components. In some cases – where the partners are member organizations representing marginalized groups (FOKUS/ LAG, LO, NPA) – strengthening the Guatemalan partner organization is actually the fundamental objective of the project. In other cases, focused organizational strengthening is included within the project in order to further the partner’s ability to achieve project objectives and/or to comply with administrative requirements of the funding relationship (SCN, some of the NCA partnerships). And even in the remaining cases, it can be argued that partners are strengthened simply through the experience gained from implementing the projects, and the legitimacy and recognition this implies (FOKUS/White Ribbon, FOKUS/ ICCPG, PYM). The protection that comes from cooperating with an international organization likewise strengthens the position of some organizations.

The Guatemalan partner organizations are a highly varied lot, from broad-based social movements and member organizations (Conavigua, Kabawil, CODECA), through labor unions (Unsitragua), churches and faith-based organizations (ASD, CIEDEG, CEG) as well as activist organizations (Madre Selva), to charity organizations (Fundación Deborah), professional NGOs (many of SCN’s partners, Fundesco), a legal institute (ICCPG) and state institutions (PDH, Digebi). Thus, it cannot really be said that the Norwegian support is directly strengthening a particular segment of Guatemalan civil society. But what can at least be inferred is that through the strengthening of partner institutions, the Norwegian support is directly strengthening that part of civil society which represents or works for marginalized groups, as well as (with the exception of PYM/ASD) a rights-based approach as such.

There is also a number of projects that seek to strengthen community-level organization. This includes the creation of new community-based organizations of the project beneficiaries – women (Fundesco, CIEDEG) children (different SCN partners) or people in communities where natural resources are under pressure (Madre Selva). But it is also done by supporting already existing structures. A number of organizations (partners of NCA, NPA and SCN) work to improve the potential of the Community Development Councils – the COCODES – to function according to intentions, both by training council members and by ensuring that proper procedures are followed for establishing them. The effects of this work vary – not all local groups or efforts at vitalizing COCODES are very successful. But some are, and in sum this work of stimulating local organizational life – together with the promotion of active citizenship referred to above – add up to important contributions to the growth of new organizational experiences and civil society at community level.

Another effect of the support is that in many cases it is promoting or leading to increased relations between the organizations of Guatemalan civil society. Particularly noteworthy in this respect is the work of SCN which has systematically promoted exchange between its partner organizations, broadly, with a focus on child participation, and more professionally focused, within the educational sector (see the text box on page 23). This has resulted in mutual learning, the implementation of joint projects, and the development of a common platform for advocacy purposes. Although with less consistency and intensity, examples of establishing links and cooperation between partners are found in a number of other cases: NPA organizes an annual meeting of all partners; NCA has facilitated links between Madre Selva and different church-based organizations that aid grassroots mobilization; FOKUS has promoted contact and cooperation between Conavigua and ICCPG.

On the basis of the observations above, it is possible to draw certain conclusions on the effects of the Norwegian support for civil society in Guatemala. Civil society can be understood as being composed of a wide range of different types of organizations. As we have seen, the Norwegian aid goes to – and strengthens – a very broad range of different types of organizations. Thus, the aid does not significantly change the composition of civil society. A process of ‘NGO-ization’ of civil society is observed as an effect of aid in some countries (Wallace et al 2006; Borchgrevink 2006). This results in part from the fact that donor NGOs tend to prefer to work with organizations that are similar to themselves, and national NGOs thus get the lion’s share of aid. This may give the NGO sector a dominant position in civil society over more membership-based and representative organizations. Furthermore, the technical and administrative requirements of aid, and the focus on building institutional structures that ensure financial accountability within the recipient organizations, may strengthen this process by increasing the importance of professional staff and reducing the

relative weight and influence of members and constituencies. Some observers claim that similar processes are going on in Guatemalan civil society. In our opinion, this is not a fair description of the cooperation through the Norwegian NGOs. For several reasons, it cannot be said to be promoting NGO-ization: It supports a wide range of organizational types; it is quite focused on creating awareness of rights and conditions for participation at grassroots level; and it shows sufficient awareness of and respect for the organizational particularities of its partners. Indeed, one might even point to an opposite tendency, in that Norwegian support has contributed in its small way to building critically important representative organizations, such as Conavigua, Kabawil and Codeca. Thus, a common but unwanted consequence is avoided, indicating the strength of the program theory of the Norwegian NGOs.

In the previous chapter, in the discussion of partnership, it was concluded that the Norwegian organizations generally show strong respect for the priorities of their partner organizations, and are wary of imposing certain objectives or ways of working. However, such imposition is usually unnecessary, as the Norwegian NGOs select like-minded partners that share their objectives. And moreover, within the framework of the partnership, the Guatemalan partner probably presents proposals that correspond to what it knows is likely to receive funding. Thus, even without directly imposing Norwegian agendas, there is a certain selection effect. This effect serves to strengthen the segments of Guatemalan civil society that represent and work with marginalized groups, within a rights-based framework.

Fragmentation - or lack of unity and coherence – is an often-mentioned critique of Guatemalan civil society. The overall effect of Norwegian NGO aid is to promote cooperation, and thereby contribute its small share to counteract this tendency.

A gap between a ‘national civil society elite’ and its broad, popular bases was referred to as a general weakness of civil society, as was a lack of internal democracy within organizations. The Norwegian organizations are probably not very effective in addressing these problems. There are very few – if any – cases where the Norwegian NGOs have managed to promote internal democratization within a partner organization (even if support has been very forthcoming for democratizing efforts arising within the partner itself). Reducing the gap between elites and bases is an immense task, and by promoting a rights orientation that might not always correspond to immediate concerns at the grassroots, the Norwegian support may actually be cementing the gap in the short term. However, it must be added that in the longer term perspective, this gap can only be reduced through precisely the kind of creation of an active citizenship and stimulation of local organizational experiences that several of the Norwegian NGOs are supporting.

The Norwegian aid is also contributing to changing the relations between civil society organizations and the state. On the one hand, it is helping Guatemalan organizations to take part in the new spaces for dialogue with the state that have opened since the Peace Accords, and enabling them to make better use of the opportunities these spaces offer. This goes for broad-based membership organizations such as Conavigua, Kabawil, Codeca and Unsitragua, as well as for more professionally focused organizations, such as ICCPG, Pennat, CNEM and the Quality Education Group. And on the other hand, it is strengthening the capacity of a number of organizations (ICCPG, Madre Selva, Conavigua, APN partners; CIEDEG, PMH/CEG) to put specific themes on the agenda. In sum, the net effect seems to be to promote the willingness and capacity of the organizations to engage with institutions of the state, rather than remaining only within a confrontational mode. This implies that overall objectives of civil society support are to some extent achieved, and thus serves to validate the underlying program theories.

### **Women in prison**

The collaboration between JURK and the Institute of Compared Studies in Penal Sciences in Guatemala (ICCPG) was started in 2003 as a result of a Norad funded study that demonstrated a need to strengthen the rights of women in custody and prisons to ensure that women are safe from abuse and that all women feel safe in prison. Based on this study and its legal competence, the ICCPG spent a lot of time and effort developing a unique intervention methodology with detailed objectives and indicators for measuring success - as ICCPG had not worked on women's issues earlier. Through a three-pronged methodology of i) documenting and investigating cases of abuse of women in custody and prison (including prosecution of the perpetrators); ii) the strengthening of the capacity of public officials on gender issues through training; and iii) advocacy for national level legislative changes, ICCPG set out to change the mechanisms that led to abuse. Three years later, as the only institution in Guatemala working on this issue, the project has come a long way in achieving its objectives. This can be attributed to its well designed intervention methodology combined with a committed and professional staff with the capacity to identify important allies within the judicial system of the state. The project has also encouraged other women's organisations to take legal action, and in a less tangible but important way, the work of the ICCPG also helps break the stigma attached to women in prison.

### **Institutional level outcomes**

Through the programs supported by Norwegian NGOs, there have been some effects at the level of the central institutions of the state. In certain cases, the Guatemalan organizations (Conavigua, ICCPG, SCN and partners) – in alliance with other actors – have been instrumental for the approval of new legislation (for instance on war compensation, on the penal system, on military service, and on the rights of the child), or for changes in policies (in the educational and justice sectors, for instance). In other cases, organizations (Unsitragua, NPA partners) have participated in dialogues with state institutions where agreements have been reached, without these agreements having much impact in practice, mostly because of lack of capacity or will of the state institutions to implement them. In these cases, the outcome is rather that the organization is co-opted, and gives legitimacy to the government through its appearance of willingness to work with civil society, without any of the organization's goals being achieved. Perhaps the area where civil society organizations in Guatemala have been most successful in influencing state policies is in connection with mining projects, where local opposition has managed to halt and revoke the granting of concessions. Madre Selva and NPA partner Ajchmol are among the organizations that have been central in these processes.

At the municipal level, there are other types of experiences of relating to state institutions – both with local elected officials and bodies, and with offices of the line ministries. Some organizations report that opportunities for having an impact on policies are greater at the local level, but there are great variations between municipalities in this respect.

### **Sustainability**

The outcomes within this sector of '*Democratization, Human Rights and participation*' are largely related to the creation of new knowledge and attitudes and new or strengthened organizational structures. Ideally, such outcomes should be self-sustaining and not require further funding. In practice, however, for these benefits to be sustained over time, the activity levels of the organizations need to be maintained, and this again often depends on continued funding. In addition, capacity building and organizational strengthening will often need to be repeated. Thus, one should not expect these outcomes to be to totally sustainable in the financial sense.

It is important to be aware of the interrelations between the levels described above. The most successful outcomes are generally where linkages between interventions at different levels are sought. Thus, where individual training and awareness-raising on rights is linked with support for establishing or strengthening community organizations, both components are mutually reinforced, and the potential for influencing state institutions is greater. Where the latter is achieved, and there are outcomes at all levels – as for instance in the work of SCG in the

municipality of Canilla – the likelihood of benefits to be institutionally sustainable is strongest.


## 5.5 Conclusions

The table below summarizes outcomes in terms of sectors and levels:

	Economic development	Service delivery	Democratization, HR, participation
Individual level	Some increases in income and food security for limited groups	Considerable outcomes in terms of coverage and quality of education	Considerable outcomes in terms of awareness of rights and potential for participation
Organizational level	Very limited results	Strengthened organizational capacity in education and relief provision	Significant outcomes in terms of strengthening civil society
Institutional level		So far limited impact on public education, but potential for considerable impact	Some specific impacts in legislation, cooperation at municipal level, risk of cooptation

As the table suggests, outcomes are strongest in the sector of *Democratization, Human Rights and participation*, and concentrated at the individual and organizational level. In addition there are important outcomes in the sub-sector of education within the broader Service delivery sector. In sum, then, one can conclude that outcomes are quite concentrated and coherent.

At this aggregate level, outcomes can be envisioned not only as the sum of the work of a number of different NGOs, but also as the outcomes of the support to these organizations from Norad and the MFA. Thus, it seems relevant to link these outcomes to the Norad program theory. The figure below illustrates how this program theory can be understood.



As appears from the figure, there are many links in the chain leading to outcomes, and linkages become increasingly complex. Norad and the MFA really only control the first link. One would naturally expect outcomes from such a long and complicated intervention chain to be varied and divergent. However, as appears from the table above, outcomes are actually quite concentrated and coherent. Furthermore, as will be argued more in detail in section 7.2, these outcomes are highly in line with Norwegian objectives for support to Guatemala. This, then, implies a fairly strong validation of Norad's program theory.



## 6 Factors Affecting the Achievement of Objectives

### 6.1 Internal/organizational factors

There are a number of factors – internal to the organizations and projects – that contribute to the positive achievements that we have identified. Very many of the success factors identified refer to strengths of the Guatemalan partner organization. Commitment, effective and inclusive leadership, legitimacy, experience, professionalism and staff qualities, the capacity to form alliances, and the ability to learn from experience are key elements in this respect.<sup>9</sup> One might have thought that given the variation in terms of types of organizations, there would be differences in the key factors for ensuring success, but the above list applies very much across the range of organizations. For the grassroots organizations – Conavigua, Kabawil, Codeca – another key issue is their relationship to their constituencies, and the ways in which they are integrated into, participate in, are represented by, and own the organization. There is some difference between the sectors as to what are the relevant success factors: While legitimacy is a fundamental requirement for achieving results in the sector of *Democratization, Human rights and participation*, technical and professional competence take on greater importance in the sectors of *Service delivery* and *Economic development*.

Related to the programs themselves, we see that clear, well-designed, consistent strategies are the basis for some of the successes, such as for instance ICCPG, the overall work of SCN, or PYM's agricultural project. Furthermore, the ability to achieve synergies between interventions at different levels – as for instance in the work of Madre Selva and SCG – gives greater impacts, that probably also are more sustainable.

Given the primary importance of the characteristics of the Guatemalan organization for achieving the objectives, a fundamental task of the Norwegian NGOs is selecting partners with the required strengths. Furthermore, the ability to strengthen partners through the relationship may be an important contributing factor for achieving successful outcomes. Doing so may be particularly challenging when working with grassroots organizations, as strengthening must be done in ways that ensure that the organizations are still owned by its members. The examples of Conavigua, Codeca, and Kabawil show that this is possible, but that it requires a partnership that is strongly based on trust and respect. The support to these organizations has focused on the realization of core organizational functions, and thereby avoided the danger of mission drift.

There are also a number of internal factors that limit the achievements of program objectives. To some extent, these are the flip side of the factors mentioned above. In terms of qualities of the Guatemalan organizations, the lack of internal democracy and an inclusive organizational structure is pointed to as limiting the potential for impact in a number of cases (Madre Selva, CIEDEG, APN partners, Unsitragua). As previously mentioned, vertical organizational forms are widespread within Guatemalan civil society and one should not be surprised that the problem appear also among the partners of the Norwegian NGOs. Similarly, limited legitimacy; a 'war mentality' that foments suspicion and polarization and impedes the ability to form alliances; lack of clarity or vertical coherence of program theories; and limited attention to participation, local organization and rights issues; are other factors encountered that to greater or larger extent limit the capacity of the organizations to reach their objectives.

### 6.2 Contextual factors

There are a number of contextual factors that have facilitated the achievements of the organizations in Guatemala. Fundamentally, they relate to the changes to the Guatemalan state that have followed as a result of the peace process. The Peace Accords implied a new institutional framework, built on a liberal rights regime. While many have become

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<sup>9</sup> This should not be taken to imply that all partner organizations possess all of these positive attributes.

disillusioned because of the limited implementation of the agreements, they nevertheless imply a watershed, or paradigm shift, where rights-based arguments have achieved acceptance and legitimacy in a new way. Following from this, new legislation has been introduced, and important international conventions have been signed, such as ILO Convention 169 on the rights of indigenous peoples, and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The peace process also opened for increased participation of civil society in the political processes of the country, and was followed up by the establishment of a number of commissions with civil society representation. The decentralization process and the introduction of community and municipal development councils opened further spaces for participation and civil society dialogue with institutions of the state.

In sum, then, the political developments since the peace process started have fundamentally changed the context within which Guatemalan civil society exists, and have thereby made possible the outcomes described above, particularly in the sector of *Democratization, Human Rights and participation*.

Still, there are a number of contextual factors that limit the effects of the work of the organizations. The characteristics of the state are important. Even if fundamental changes have been made in terms of democratizing the Guatemalan state, it remains weak, with limited capacity to implement the agreements it makes. Furthermore, it has remained under the control of regimes that mainly represent the traditional elites. Willingness to engage in real discussions on redistribution of wealth in favor of the poor has therefore not been forthcoming. Thus, for the Guatemalan organizations, the issue of how to engage with the state remains difficult. Even if new spaces for dialogue are appearing, there remains a well-grounded fear that the only outcome of taking part in such dialogue is increased legitimacy for the state, and the de-legitimization of the organizations.

Furthermore, repression remains in a number of contexts. It is based on forms of violence that differ from the institutionalized violence of the state during the armed conflict, but nevertheless have pervasive effects. In some areas, activism that challenges strong economic or political interests means exposing oneself to the risk of being killed (Madre Selva, ICCPG). In rural areas, where ex-members of the PAC-militia responsible for many of the atrocities committed during the war still live, grassroots organizations operate in fear that they may take up arms again (Conavigua). In other areas, the pervasive presence of youth gangs or drug trafficking imply high violence levels that threaten any kind of work (Fundación Deborah, Fundesco). Unsitragua encounters repression in unchecked forms of union busting. For instance, immediately after forming Unsitragua chapters in three companies, all the new members were fired. The failure of the authorities to stop these kinds of violence and repression is a sign of the fundamental weakness of the Guatemalan state. That the organizations continue to function and achieve results under these conditions merits great respect. But it is clear that this context also limits the organizations and their capacity to achieve changes.

Another negative contextual factor relates to the divisions between the organizations of civil society. To some extent, these are explained as further legacies of the war, stemming from generalized mistrust and a tendency to categorize in terms of dichotomies of allies and enemies. In the cases of the NPA partners, and of Unsitragua, the failure to create broader alliances may be limiting their impacts. For the rest of the organizations, they seem less affected by such a tendency within Guatemalan civil society. The gap between civil society 'elite' and grassroots – related among other things to low educational levels – is another limiting contextual factor.

It should be noted that a major part of the work of the organizations is oriented towards overcoming these limiting contextual factors of repression and weakness of both state and civil society. The promotion of participation and education among marginalized groups is a huge and long-term undertaking, but one where the organizations are making important contributions. In this sense the organizations are slowly modifying the limitations they encounter.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> In the terminology of the Terms of Reference (Appendix 1, section 3.5), these limitations could be understood as 'mediators' rather than contextual factors. However, given the long-term character of the process of changing them, we stick with the term 'contextual factors'. The important point, though, is that there is no absolute line dividing these two types of factors.

## 7 Relevance of Outcomes

### 7.1 In relation to the Guatemalan context

The overall conclusion must be that the outcomes identified for the aid through the Norwegian NGOs is highly relevant for Guatemala. The strongest combined effects are found in the sector of *Democratization, Human Rights and participation*. Here we find that the work of the Norwegian NGOs has considerable effects at the grassroots in terms of creating an awareness of rights and establishing the potential for active participation as citizens. This is absolutely vital for the continued democratic development of Guatemala – both of the Guatemalan state and in terms of democratizing Guatemalan civil society.

In terms of impacts on civil society, we find that the Norwegian support, in its small way, contributes to upholding a diverse set of organizational forms, and that, contrary to what is found in some contexts, this also includes broad-based membership organizations and social movement types of organizations. Furthermore, the Norwegian NGOs promote the building of alliances and networks between organizations, and between types of organizations, and support the engagement in dialogues with the state. Although the size of these effects should not be exaggerated, they do, in our opinion, imply a strengthening of the democratizing potential of Guatemalan civil society.

We have furthermore found considerable impacts in terms of improving the quality and coverage of the educational sector in Guatemala, with an emphasis on including the most marginalized groups, among them the indigenous peoples. We believe this also to be of fundamental strategic importance. Education is much more than simply the provision of a service, it has an emancipating potential which is particularly great in a country with high levels of illiteracy and exclusion, such as Guatemala. Such an empowering effect is strengthened through the participatory methodologies promoted in SCN's educational programs.

As Guatemala's main problems can be said to be inequality and exclusion, we believe the outcomes described above to be highly relevant.

A small caveat should be mentioned with respect to the limited outcomes in terms of economic development. The focus on the more political issues, and the limited attention to resolving short term economic needs, have been justified with reference to the fact that there exist sufficient economic resources in Guatemala, and the problem therefore is related to distribution, hence the focus on politics. We agree with this line of reasoning. Still, it is possible to point out a danger here. If the organizations focus only on issues that do not correspond to the perceived and urgent needs of the majority, the gap between civil society leadership and grassroots will remain, and may reduce the legitimacy and potential of those working for political change. Addressing people's immediate economic needs is therefore important in several ways, and ought not to be completely neglected.

### 7.2 In relation to Norwegian objectives

Key documents describing Norwegian objectives are the Norwegian guidelines for support to civil society (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001), the Norwegian guidelines for development cooperation with indigenous peoples (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004), and the strategy for aid to Central America through the Norwegian regional grant (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003).

The strategy is very clear in emphasizing that the focus in development cooperation with Guatemala should be less focused on poverty reduction than Norwegian aid in general, and more targeted on following up and supporting the implementation of the Peace Accords. The



key areas singled out for Norwegian support are democratization, Human Rights, the justice sector, and indigenous rights. Women and children are identified as key target groups.

The guidelines for support to civil society emphasize the organizations' roles in being a watchdog towards the state, in representing and giving 'voice' to marginalized sectors, and in empowering them to influence the policies and social structures that affect them. To the extent that the organizations provide services, these should be provided in a rights-based manner and be coordinated with government services.

The guidelines for development cooperation with indigenous peoples emphasize that this should be based on a rights-based approach and in accordance with the ILO Convention 169. This implies, among other things, the right to self-determination on development, respect for culture, and a focus on the state as 'duty bearer'.

The outcomes we have identified are fully in line with the priority areas of the strategy for aid to Central America.<sup>11</sup> However, with respect to the overall goal of ensuring the implementation of the Peace Accords, progress has been limited, mostly due to the limited will and capacity of the Guatemalan state. In general, the work of the Norwegian NGOs and the outcomes in Guatemala are in accordance with the sets of guidelines referred to. There are a few instances where greater concern should be paid to indigenous rights.

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<sup>11</sup> Even if not all areas indicated by the strategy are equally focused by the Norwegian NGOs. With the exception of ICCPG, the organizations do not work with the justice sector.

## 8 Conclusions and Recommendations

### 8.1 Conclusions

#### Overall conclusion

While the amount of aid channeled through Norwegian NGOs is relatively limited, and the outcomes at national level are consequently also limited in scope, we still conclude that the outcomes identified are significant in their contexts, positive, and highly relevant. The combined outcomes of increased knowledge of rights, better conditions for participation, strengthened democratizing potential of civil society, and improved quality and coverage of education, are important contributions towards the creation of a more just and democratic Guatemala. While such processes inevitably take time, this positive assessment of the NGO aid may be particularly relevant considering the fairly negative assessments many donor countries make about the effects of development cooperation in Guatemala through other channels.<sup>12</sup>

#### Coherence

Even though the Norwegian NGOs work with very different types of partner organizations, and support a wide variety of different projects, there is considerable coherence in terms of basic orientation, target groups, and types of outcomes. Five of the six organizations have a clear and explicit rights-based approach. All organizations target marginalized groups, with a focus on women, indigenous peoples, children, landless peasants, agricultural laborers and other organized workers. Outcomes are concentrated in the sector we have termed *Democratization, Human Rights and participation*, with the most important results at the individual and organizational levels.

This consistency in terms of approach, target groups and outcomes is very much in line with the Norwegian policy, as expressed in the guidelines for civil society support, the guidelines for development cooperation with indigenous peoples, and the strategy for development cooperation with Guatemala.

#### Value added

In addition to the funding, there are elements of ‘value added’ by the Norwegian NGO in all the partnership relations. Perhaps most clearly, this is found in the focused and systematic capacity and alliance building that SCN contributes to its partners, or the complementary and sometimes indirect political support that LO gives to the work of Unsitragua. In the majority of cases, the Norwegian NGO also provides links and contacts to other organizations, national or international. Advice, technical inputs and critical dialogue on program development are other common elements in the partner relations. In a few, but crucial cases, the link to an international donor organization has provided protection to organizations working in repressive contexts. The Norwegian NGOs have generally been quite careful not to impose their own agendas on their partners.

#### Indigenous rights orientation

In general the Norwegian NGOs and their partners show an awareness of the special requirements of working in a country with a large and marginalized indigenous population. Many of the projects are focused specifically on addressing the problem of exclusion of indigenous peoples. Still, in some cases there is room for improvements in taking into account the indigenous dimension of the social context of the projects, and in at least one case, awareness of the issue is clearly deficient.

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<sup>12</sup> See for instance <http://www.fride.org/publicacion/292/guatemala-seguridad-derechos-humanos-y-el-estado-despues-de-las-elecciones>.

### **Gender awareness**

In the majority of cases, the programs show sufficient awareness of gender issues – this goes both for projects specifically oriented towards women, as well as a number of other projects. In some cases, the programs would have benefited from a clearer gender orientation.

### **Implementation**

In the overwhelming majority of cases, the implementation of projects is efficient and in accordance with plans.

### **Effects on Guatemalan civil society and state-society relations**

In monetary terms, the aid channeled through Norwegian NGOs is modest, and national level outcomes are consequently limited.

In sum, Norwegian support strengthens a wide variety of different types of organizations, but with an emphasis on those that work with and represent marginalized groups, with a rights-based approach. The Norwegian support promotes cooperation between civil society organizations in different ways, thereby counteracting the tendency towards fragmentation identified by many observers as a weakness of Guatemalan civil society.

In the short term, Norwegian support is not particularly effective at reducing the distance between civil society elites and the grassroots, or at resolving problems of lack of internal democracy, two other characteristics frequently mentioned as weaknesses of Guatemala's organizational sphere. However, in the long run, the work that Norwegian NGOs and their Guatemalan partners do to foment local participation and citizenship among marginalized groups has the potential to contribute to reduce these problems.

The Norwegian aid supports Guatemalan civil society organizations in engaging with the state through the new spaces for dialogue that have opened after the Peace Accords, and enables the organizations to make better use of these spaces. In practical terms, the outcomes of these dialogues have often been limited, as agreements are not implemented, mostly due to lack of capacity or political will in state institutions. In some instances, experiences of cooperating with state institutions are more positive at the municipal level.

There are no indications that the outcomes in terms of increased participation and strengthened organizations have so far succeeded in influencing the state to redistribute economic resources. Effects in terms of ensuring the implementation of the Peace Accords have also been limited.

### **Other outcomes**

Within the educational sector, there are considerable outcomes, in particular of the work of SCN's partner organizations in developing appropriate pedagogical methodologies and improving access to education for marginalized groups (indigenous, poor, working and handicapped children).

There are some, but fairly limited outcomes in terms of improving income and promoting economic development.

### **Common critiques of aid in Guatemala not relevant for the work of the Norwegian NGOs**

Aid to civil society in Guatemala is sometimes criticized for contributing to negative tendencies, such as: fragmentation; competition for funds; mission drift and the imposition of external agendas; NGO-ization of organizations and the creation of a civil society elite de-linked from the grassroots. Our study of the Norwegian NGOs does not confirm this picture. On the contrary, we see the Norwegian aid as counteracting fragmentation, as careful not to be imposing agendas, and we do not see any effect of NGO-ization. With respect to the latter point, we would like to emphasize that Guatemala is different from many other countries where we have worked, where organizations and their priorities to a much greater extent have been shaped by the availability of donor funds.

## **Fashions, principles and results**

Principles are important in development work, and the evaluation team would like to emphasize that we are strong supporters of rights-based approaches as such. At the same time, we should not blind ourselves to the facts that it is the results and impacts of the projects that matter, not how well they correspond to abstract principles or development fashions. Among the projects evaluated, there are two examples of highly successful projects that are not rights-based, and thus unfashionable (PYM's agricultural project and Fundación Deborah). Support for the latter is in danger of being phased out with reference to its lack of rights-orientation. A somewhat parallel issue can be seen in the case of SCN, which is closing down its excellent program in Guatemala, in order to adhere to the principle of not being present in a country where there is a national SC organization. In connection with these cases, we would like to make a plea that achieved results on the ground should be considered to be as important as principles.

## **8.2 Recommendations**

### **Norwegian NGO aid to Guatemala should not be reduced**

As the Norwegian aid is found to have positive and highly relevant outcomes, it should be continued. The fact that total aid to Guatemalan civil society is decreasing strengthens this conclusion. In a country such as Guatemala, with highly uneven distribution of wealth and very high levels of poverty, it is important that decisions on aid and aid levels are not based solely on aggregate indicators such as GNI per capita. Moreover, the goals of supporting the Peace Accords and changing the conditions that caused the war are still valid, but such deep structural changes cannot be expected in the short term. Finally, given widespread perceptions of little progress in other arenas, it is important to recognize that experiences are more positive with the civil society channel.

### **Maintain strategic focus on promoting participation and democratization**

In Guatemala, the problem is not primarily the lack of economic resources but the way that these are distributed. Supporting processes and actors that can contribute to a more equitable distribution in the long run – as the Norwegian strategy for aid to Guatemala advocates, and as the Norwegian NGOs do in practice – is a sensible strategy in the context.

### **Consider more systematic use of core funding**

As the major aim is to strengthen democratic organizations, core funding might be used more systematically. When all funds are earmarked for project activities, the effect may actually be the draining of organizational resources and the diverting of attention from main tasks.

### **Increase attention to indigenous rights**

While the majority of the projects of the Norwegian NGOs pay sufficient attention to indigenous issues where this is relevant, there is still room for improvement in this respect in the programs of at least four of the six Norwegian NGOs evaluated.

### **Consider the integration of components for economic development**

As argued above, the focus on promoting participation and democratization does not respond in the short term to what are the urgent concerns of most poor Guatemalans. An exclusive focus on these long term issues may serve to increase the grassroots perception that what the organizations are doing is irrelevant for their situation. Thus, where it is possible to include program components that also respond to the immediate needs of the popular constituencies of the organizations, without compromising the overall rights-orientation of the work, such efforts should be encouraged and supported.

### **Establish meeting points for Norwegian NGOs and their partners**

There is relatively little contact between the Norwegian NGOs, as well as between their respective partner organizations. Establishing arenas that would allow the exchange of information could be useful for coordination. For instance, Fundesco and Fundación Deborah work with similar projects in the same slum area yet were not aware of each other before the evaluation. Moreover, such meeting places could serve as a basis for closer dialogue and mutual learning between organizations working within the same thematic area.

**More systematic monitoring of results**

Monitoring of results is important for systematic learning and improvement of project activities. There is considerable room for improvements in this respect in the majority of cases studied.

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# Appendix 1

## Terms of Reference

### Evaluation of the Development Cooperation through Norwegian Non-governmental Organisations in Guatemala

#### 1. Introduction

##### 1.1 Background

Civil society organisations are well-established as key players in the international development arena. Among the OECD countries, Norway channels the largest share of its official development assistance through civil society organisations, and has the largest number of civil society organisations as development partners. In 2005 NOK 3,9 billion, or approximately 33 per cent of the bilateral ODA (including multi-bi ODA) was channelled through non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other actors that belong to civil society. More than 80 per cent of the total assistance through NGOs was channelled through Norwegian organisations and their partners in developing countries.<sup>13</sup>

While formerly Norwegian NGOs generally implemented projects and programmes themselves, the majority are now implemented in cooperation with local partner organisations. Moreover, traditionally, service delivery has formed the largest share of development cooperation through civil society, but increasingly rights-based projects and programmes have become a more important part of the cooperation. Generally, there is often not a clear divide between more traditional forms of service delivery and a rights-based approach, in as much as service delivery may be a prerequisite for, or at least an important contribution to, the building of trust and legitimacy in relation to local partners, which again may serve as a basis for directing the cooperation in a more rights-based direction.

Until relatively recently, there has been considerable optimism in relation to the role of civil society in the development cooperation process. Increasingly, however, a more critical focus has been directed towards civil society as a channel for development cooperation. Amongst others, a Norwegian Government appointed commission<sup>14</sup> pointed to a number of challenges in relation to the development assistance channelled through civil society.

Norad's Evaluation Department is intending to commission several evaluations of the cooperation through civil society at the country level. It was decided to choose case countries from various regions, beginning with Central America. Guatemala was chosen because it is the partner country in the Central American region where NGOs have played the most important role as a channel for Norwegian development cooperation.<sup>15</sup> In addition there have been few Norwegian evaluations in Guatemala as of recently. The selection of Guatemala as case country must also be regarded in view of the current government's announced renewed focus on Latin America in Norwegian development cooperation, and is intended to serve as a contribution to policy development by focussing on experiences and knowledge from a Latin American country where Norway has been involved in development cooperation through civil society for an extended period of time.

In 2006, approximately NOK 21 mill. was channelled through Norwegian NGOs in Guatemala. Around 10-15 Norwegian NGOs have been engaged in Guatemala in recent years, the majority of which work in areas such as the health and education sector, as well as governance-related efforts. The majority of Norwegian NGOs began their engagement in Guatemala in the aftermath of the earthquake in 1976. Currently the Norwegian NGOs' efforts

<sup>13</sup> In the context of these Terms of Reference, the terms civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations will be used interchangeably.

<sup>14</sup> The commission delivered its report "Nye roller for frivillige organisasjoner i utviklingssamarbeidet" on June 15th 2006. Henceforth the report will be referred to as the Rattså-commission report.

<sup>15</sup> This is also the case for Nicaragua, which is Norway's other partner country in Central America, however a major evaluation of the Norwegian support through civil society was carried out in 2001.

are generally associated with the implementation of the peace accords, which Norwegian actors played a role in securing.

### **1.2 Challenges and Dilemmas**

A perceived lack of sustainability and effect beyond the reach of local projects are challenges often mentioned in connection with the work of NGOs. Furthermore, the ability of NGOs to function as agents of change depends on the organisations' representing knowledge, competence and capacity which can communicate with the demands of societal development, something which has often proved not to be the case.

In the case of the major Norwegian NGOs, from having to a large extent based their work on voluntary efforts, now increasingly operate on a professional basis. This, combined with the fact that a major part of their income stem from official sources, are factors that contribute to challenge the traditional understanding of the NGOs' legitimacy, role and autonomy.

While international cooperation between NGOs may be important and necessary in order to develop a strong civil society in the partner countries, such cooperation may also lead to dependency, both economically, politically and professionally.

Moreover, recent efforts to render development cooperation more effective, have lead to an increased focus on the significance of the state in the process of development, and the imperative to give aid in ways that underpin the partner countries' own priorities and systems, in order to ensure a greater level of ownership in the development process. This again has lead to an increased focus on cooperation and alignment to local governments' own policies, such as through sector and budget support. Furthermore, mechanisms of coordination and harmonisation have been put in place to minimise the pressure on the partner countries' administrative capacity. While on the one hand the importance of including the NGOs in these broad forms of cooperation at the country level are underlined, on the other these modes of cooperation challenge the organisations' autonomy and defined roles. In particular, NGOs that define their role as being a critical voice to the government's policy and programmes, may find it challenging to balance this role in the context of new aid modalities, alignment and harmonisation.

Finally, an increased tendency to assess the efforts of the NGOs against parameters such as country strategies and the Millennium Development Goals, rather than in relation to the local context where the organisations work, may in the long term contribute to weaken many of the NGOs perceived advantages, including their ability to be innovative, flexible and adaptable, as well as their proximity to the target groups.

### **1.3 Knowledge and Knowledge Gaps**

A number of reviews and evaluations focussing primarily on the project- and programme level have generally presented positive conclusions with regard to the efforts of the Norwegian NGOs. The majority of these evaluations emphasise traditional areas of NGO activity, particularly service-based efforts within sectors such as health and education. Meanwhile there are far fewer evaluations and less systematic knowledge about the NGOs ability to strengthen civil society through organisational development and capacity development, as well as the organisations' efforts in advocacy and lobbying, despite the fact that most Norwegian NGOs claim results within these areas to be amongst their major aims. Moreover, the evaluations that have been undertaken, tend to focus more on processes than on results, thus dealing primarily with performance at the input and output level, rather than outcomes and impact. A more pronounced interest in, and the existence of an increasing number of evaluations notwithstanding, the lack of reliable information about mid- to long-term outcomes of NGO efforts is nonetheless evident. Consequently, with the existence of only limited information about the efforts of individual NGOs, the basis for broad generalisations about the effects of civil society as a channel for development cooperation, remains limited.

## **2. Purpose and Objectives**

### **2.1 Purpose**

The main purpose of this evaluation is to obtain a systematic assessment of the Norwegian development cooperation through civil society at the country level. It should focus on the overall and combined efforts of Norwegian NGOs and their Guatemalan counterparts, and thus contribute to the building of knowledge and filling of knowledge gaps, provide lessons learnt and recommendations for future policy development in this field.

The evaluation should relate to both accountability and learning purposes, with an equal emphasis on both. Moreover, the evaluation should serve as a contribution towards the needs presented by the report of the Rattsø commission, particularly with reference to the focus on outcomes and the NGO effort at country level.

### **2.2 Objectives**

The main objectives of the evaluation is to

- document and assess the outcomes of Norwegian development cooperation through Norwegian NGOs, across sectors and themes.
- describe and assess the influence of relevant and significant mediators and contextual factors on the implementation and outcomes of development programmes carried out by Norwegian NGOs and their partners.

## **3. Scope and Key Evaluation Questions**

In order to produce information of a sufficient quality within acceptable time- and resource frames, it will be necessary to draw a number of limitations with reference to the scope and direction of the evaluation. Given that the evaluation should focus on results in the short and medium term, the evaluation must focus on the NGOs' long term development cooperation, and not efforts of a more temporary character, such as emergency aid, humanitarian assistance etc.

The evaluation team should select the 5-7 major Norwegian NGOs operating in Guatemala, the selected organisations should have been involved in development cooperation in the country for a duration of at least five years. The sample should include the major organisations in terms of the amount of support received from Norwegian official sources, but should also to the extent possible cover the whole spectrum in terms of thematic and geographical focus of cooperation. Furthermore, the sample should include organisations engaged primarily in service delivery-based activities, as well as organisations with a more rights-based approach. In view of the large number of local cooperating partners, a selection process has to take place at this level also. This selection process will be a major part of the inception phase, and should adhere to the selection criteria suggested above.

Generally the donors' approach to support through civil society is not based on robust theories about how states and societies change, and how civil society contributes to these processes of change. This picture is reinforced by the lack of systematic knowledge about which type of interventions that work (or don't work) in various contexts, and the causes behind. In order to address some of these challenges, the evaluation should be grounded in programme theory. Theory based approaches to evaluation rest on the premise that social programmes are or contain theories, and that evaluations test theories with the intention to reveal and explain implicit premises, programme logic and mechanisms behind complex interventions, in order to explore the connections between expected and not expected, planned and not planned outcomes. A programme theory is a theory or model of how a programme is intended to produce the intended outputs and outcomes, and the factors affecting or determining its success. The evaluation should describe the linkages between inputs, the implementation strategy, and the intended outputs and outcomes. Furthermore, it should examine how performance is affected by mediators, a concept which refers to factors affecting performance that can be modified by the project or programme, and by contextual factors that affect performance but over which project managers have little control.

The evaluation should focus on the theory or model through which the NGOs themselves envisage change, the steps and sequence necessary for change, and who must take these steps (agents of change). The evaluation should also include an analysis of the theory or theories of

change that are the basis of MFA/Norad's support of NGOs, for instance those that are expressed in the Guidelines,<sup>16</sup> and contrast this to the NGOs own theories.

The approach is twofold, on the one hand to determine the observable changes the interventions have led to, on the other the factors that have contributed to these changes. The evaluation should be able to present some conclusions about why, how and to what extent an intervention has contributed to observed change. It is important to underline however, that in complex social contexts, changes (or lack thereof) can be caused by a large number of factors, and programme theory must be employed with caution when it comes to inferring and explaining causality. While not a major part of the evaluation, issues connected to causality and attribution must be acknowledged and explored in connection with this approach.

The evaluation should relate primarily to the evaluation criteria relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and coherence<sup>17</sup>, and consist of, but not necessarily be limited to, the following main components and underlying evaluation questions:

### **3.1 Development Inputs**

The evaluation should present an overview of the financial, human and other relevant resources employed in the selected projects and programmes.

- What is the level of financial resources committed to the various projects and programmes? The overview should include all budget lines where NGOs can apply for support, including both provisions earmarked for civil society, as well as other thematic and geographical provisions where the organisations can apply for support.
- How and to what extent are the financial resourced channelled from Norwegian NGOs to local partners?
- What type and degree of human resources are committed to the various projects and programmes, with reference to aspects such as knowledge, experience, capacity and competence? The overview should include human resources in both Norwegian NGOs and their local partners. Do these human resources constitute a significant degree of added value in addition to the available financial resources?
- Are there any other types of resources that constitute an important input to the project or programme cycle?

### **3.2 Implementation Strategy**

The evaluation should to the extent feasible document actions taken or work performed through which inputs, such as funds, technical assistance and other types of resources, are mobilised to produce specific outputs, and how and to what extent intended beneficiaries were involved. The focus should be on the operational procedures employed to transform inputs to outputs.

- How have the different components of the projects and programmes been implemented, and how closely has the implementation on the ground conformed to the plan or operational manual?
- Was the design and organisation of the programme participatory, managed by a small group, or top-down? Who is involved in decision-making during the implementation phase?
- Who has access to and/or uses the services and who does not?
- To what extent are the Norwegian NGOs and their local partners' efforts aligned and coordinated with local needs, goals and working methods, as perceived locally?
- To what extent are the Norwegian NGOs working in Guatemala supporting and coordinating their efforts with the Norwegian bilateral efforts, and the priorities of national authorities and other bi- and multilateral donors in Guatemala?
- To what extent and how does the implementation strategy encourage and support the realisation of NGOs' perceived advantages, such as innovation, flexibility, adaptability and proximity to the target groups?
- How and to what extent is the cooperation through NGOs administered by MFA, Norad and the Norwegian Embassy, coordinated and coherent?

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<sup>16</sup> "Tilskuddsordninger for norske og internasjonale frivillige aktørers humanitære bistands- og utviklingssamarbeid", MFA/Norad 2001, henceforth referred to as "the Guidelines".

<sup>17</sup> Ref. OECD/DACs evaluation criteria and the ALNAP guide for evaluating humanitarian action.

### 3.3 Development Outputs

The outputs are the most immediate and visible results, generally results that can be counted or measured.

- What products and services have resulted directly from project and programme activities (including both service-based and rights-based interventions)?
- How are the outputs distributed between service-based and more rights-based approaches?
- How are the outputs linked to inputs, in financial and substantive terms?
- How and to what extent are the outputs designed to address identified needs?
- How are the outputs expected to lead to the anticipated outcomes?

### 3.4 Development Outcomes

The evaluation's main focus should be to document the outcomes of Norwegian development cooperation through civil society. OECD/DACs definition of outcomes as ...*"the likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's output"* should be applied. The evaluation should assess the relationship between inputs and outputs on the one side, and outcomes on the other.

The evaluation of outcomes has to relate to several levels where change can occur. The Norwegian NGOs operate to a large extent through partnerships with local organisations. The evaluation should document results at both the meso, i.e. organisational level and the micro, i.e. individual level, depending on who is defined as the beneficiaries or target group of the interventions in question. To the extent feasible, indicators should be used to document change and must be applied for the various steps of the process of change.

- Which concrete outcomes can be identified with reference to the stated aims, objectives and targets of the Norwegian NGOs and their local partners? How and to what extent have the Norwegian NGOs and their partners contributed to change in their cooperating partners, including changes in attitudes and behaviour, and change related to social, legal, political and economic status? The assessment should emphasise how and to what extent the cooperation has strengthened the partners' ability and capacity to cooperate, also with the authorities, and to influence societal development in ways that serve to increase the participation of poor and marginalised groups and better opportunities to improve their standard of living.
- Which concrete outcomes can be identified with reference to the intended end target group(s)?
- How can the observable outcomes be documented, and how can they be assessed in relation to expected outcomes?
- How can the observable outcomes be assessed in relation to the identified theory of change, information about inputs, outputs, implementation strategy, and assumptions about the necessary steps in the process, the sequence and magnitude of the interventions, and the degree to which they have been implemented during the expected timeframe?
- As a part of a wider assessment of the outcomes' sustainability, to what extent is there coherence with regard to values, knowledge, competence, capacity, interests, attitudes and behaviour in the relationship between the Norwegian NGOs and their partners?
- How and to what extent do the Norwegian NGOs endeavour to secure the sustainability of the outcomes by establishing processes and mechanisms that serve to avoid dependence, financially, professionally and institutionally? To what extent have exit strategies been defined and/or put in place? Is it likely that the outcomes of the projects and programmes can be maintained also after the Norwegian support has been terminated?
- How and to what extent has the cooperation affected the mobilisation of local resources, positively and negatively?

### 3.5 Mediators and Contextual Factors

Most projects and programmes are influenced by a range of factors that affect their implementation and performance. Mediators refer to the intervening variables potentially affecting project or programme performance that can be modified by the project. Contextual factors affect performance but generally programme implementers exert little or no influence or control over these variables.



### 3.5.1 Mediators

- Which pre-existing socio-cultural characteristics of the target populations have had an influence on project or programme performance and effectiveness?
- How and to what extent have factors connected to gender relations and the status and conditions of indigenous groups had an influence on project and programme outcomes?
- How have these characteristics influenced different groups' ability and willingness to share in the project or programme benefits? The assessment should be undertaken from both a social and a cultural point of view, and include such factors as attitudes, traditions and practises.
- How and to what extent have the projects and programmes attempted and/or succeeded in addressing these socio-cultural characteristics?

### 3.5.2 Contextual Factors

The evaluation should include a description and assessment of relevant and significant aspects of the socio-political context that is expected to influence the outcomes. The assessment should include central aspects of the political context, issues such as respect for fundamental political and civil rights, rule of law, degree of corruption and degree and level of decentralisation could be included. Political culture should also form part of this analysis, with reference to factors such as social capital, trust, tolerance, patronage and expectations of the political system. The legal framework surrounding the existence of civil society, such as procedures for registration, legislation that hinders various types of activity, legislation that encourages the development of civil society, are all highly relevant factors. The evaluation should also include an assessment of the relationship between the state and civil society, including the degree of civil society autonomy, the degree and form of dialogue between the state and civil society, as well as degrees and forms of cooperation and coordination between the state and civil society. Moreover, the economic and social context is significant, such as level of poverty, conflict, economic and social crisis and degree of socio-economic inequality. Finally, the contextual analysis should include an assessment of environmental factors that may influence the programmes' performance. The contextual analysis should to the extent feasible distinguish between the national and regional/local level.

- Which aspects of the socio-political context have had the most significant and decisive influence on the effectiveness of the projects and programmes?
- How and to what extent does the context present opportunities and limitations with regard to the success of the interventions, and by extension the outcomes of the cooperation?
- To what extent have the projects and programmes been adjusted to this context?
- Is there any evidence that any of the projects and programmes have attempted to and/or succeeded in influencing the socio-political context?

### 3.6 Overall Assessment and Conclusions

The outcomes of NGO interventions are often to be found at the local level, and it is not likely that the efforts of one single organisation should be observable at the national level. However, change at the national level may occur as a result of broad alliances and the collective effort of many civil society organisations.

In the final part of the evaluation, the evaluation team should pull together the findings from the sections above, and present a tentative assessment of and conclusions regarding the outcomes of the cooperation through Norwegian NGOs at the national level. By aggregating outcomes at the project and programme level, an overall expression of the level and degree of achieved outcomes should be made, bearing in mind the challenges associated with such aggregation. Evidently such an overall assessment is complicated by the sheer number of organisations involved, the wide range of thematic and geographic approaches and the complex patterns and modes of operation and cooperation. In order to assist such an assessment, a scoring matrix could be developed with reference to the selected NGOs and their various projects and programmes. The challenges connected to such an assessment, including the question of whether and to what extent changes at one level can be attributed to changes at another, should be thoroughly discussed and reviewed as a part of the evaluation.

- Overall, has the majority of projects and programmes been primarily service-based or rights-based? Is there any evidence pointing to the one approach having been more successful than the other?



- Overall, what has been the major focus of the development cooperation through NGOs thematically and geographically, and which target groups have been most important in Guatemala?
- Overall, has the cooperation through NGOs been in line with major aims and objectives of official Norwegian development policy?
- Overall, has the cooperation through NGOs been coherent and coordinated with the main aims and objectives of the Guatemalan government's development policy? What types of challenges and dilemmas have the NGOs experienced in relation to this?
- Overall, has the NGOs effort been coherent and coordinated with that of other donors' (bilateral and multilateral)? What types of challenges and dilemmas have the NGOs experienced in relation to this?
- To what extent have the Norwegian NGOs and their partners been effective in achieving their goals and planned outcomes? What has been the main obstacles and challenges? How and to what extent can success or lack thereof be traced to or linked with the NGOs implementation strategy? How and to what extent can success or lack thereof be traced to or linked with contextual factors and significant mediators as described above?
- Is there any evidence suggesting that the development cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in Guatemala has had any effect beyond the reach of the local projects and programmes?
- Is there any evidence suggesting that the channelling of support through Norwegian NGOs and their local partners have had any impact at the national level? How and to what extent have Norwegian NGOs and their partners formed alliances and cooperated to achieve such impact?

#### **4. Methodology and Data Collection**

A major task of the inception phase will be to develop a methodological approach which allows the team to address the evaluation topics in a thorough and precise manner. The methodological approach must be presented in detail and related to the evaluation questions. Furthermore, the suggested approach must contain a description of how the various levels with regard to input, output and outcome, are to be assessed and related to each other. An analytical and methodological model of how outcomes can be related to and assessed in view of the mediators and contextual factors described in section 3.5 must be developed. The presentation must emphasise advantages and limitations in connection with the chosen approach, for instance by comparing and contrasting it to other potential approaches. Finally, the approach should identify potential and present constraints, including factors such as budget, time, data and other.

The approach should primarily focus on outcome evaluation methods that serve to address the evaluation topics as well as, to the extent possible, include the issue of attribution. While this is not a major part of this evaluation, attribution should be included in the sense that factors that are perceived to have contributed to change in outcome should be documented and assessed. The large variety in terms of types of projects and programmes that this evaluation will encompass, must be reflected through the inclusion of a broad spectre of outcomes, also those that may present a challenge in terms of measuring.

The evaluation will include literature review, interviews, focus group discussions, and relevant outcome evaluation methodology. The evaluation must draw on existing information, research, and data, including progress reports, reviews, evaluations and studies undertaken by both Norwegian and other development partners.

Information should be triangulated and validated, data quality assessed in a transparent manner which highlights data gaps and weaknesses. The data material underlying the analysis shall be made available.

The interviews should involve a broad spectrum of informants and stakeholders, including primary and secondary beneficiaries. Validation and feed-back workshops shall be held in Guatemala before departure, involving key partners and stakeholders.

## 5. Evaluation Team and Stakeholders

### 5.1 Evaluation Team

The team should consist of minimum three persons, and must have the following qualifications:

#### 5.1.1 The team leader

- Documented experience with leading evaluations of a comparable complexity and magnitude.
- Knowledge of and experience with the application of evaluation principles and standards in the context of international development.

#### 5.1.2 The team

- Experience and knowledge in carrying out similar evaluations, reviews and/or research, particularly outcome analysis using social science theory and methods.
- Thorough knowledge of international and Norwegian development policies and processes.
- Thorough knowledge of the role and functions of civil society and NGOs in the development process.
- Good knowledge of Guatemala generally, including familiarity with the socio-political context and the role of civil society in the country.
- Ability to work within set deadlines, and to write concise reports.
- Gender balance in the team is an asset.
- Languages: English, Spanish and Norwegian.

### 5.2 Stakeholders

The main stakeholders of this evaluation will be the Norwegian development cooperation administration, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norad and the Norwegian Embassy in Guatemala. Other obvious stakeholders include the Norwegian NGOs that will be part of the evaluation and their partners in Guatemala, as well as these partners' target groups. Furthermore, national and regional/local authorities in Guatemala should be included among the relevant stakeholders, as well as Norwegian and Guatemalan NGOs that are not directly included in the evaluation. Less immediate, but still relevant stakeholders would be the Norwegian Auditor General, the Norwegian Parliament and the interested general public.

## 6. Work Plan and Budget

### 6.1. Tentative Work Plan

ACTIVITY	DEADLINE
Contract signature	September 2007
Inception Report	October 2007
Draft Final Report	November 2007
Final Report	December 2007
Printing, distribution	January 2008
Presentation Seminar	January 2008

### 6.2 Tentative Budget

Maximum number of person weeks: 45

## 7. Reporting, Evaluation Management and Organisation

### 7.1 Management and Organisation

The evaluation will be carried out by an independent team of consultants contracted by Norad according to standard procurement procedures. Evaluation management will be carried out by Norad's Evaluation Department. All decisions concerning ToR, inception report, draft report and final report will be taken by the Evaluation Department. Any modification to the ToR is subject to approval by the Evaluation Department. The Team is entitled to consult stakeholders pertinent to the assignment, but it is not permitted to make any commitment on behalf of the Governments of Norway.

A reference group will be established, chaired by the Evaluation Department, to advise and comment on the evaluation process and the quality of products.

## **7.2 Reporting**

All reporting will be in English. The evaluation team shall adhere to the terminological conventions of the OECD DAC Glossary on Evaluation and Results Based-Management,<sup>18</sup> as well as the Norad Evaluation Guidelines.<sup>19</sup>

The inception report should present an elaborated evaluation approach, a detailed analytical and methodological evaluation framework, revised evaluation questions and detailed data-collection strategies. A work plan should be included. The inception report should be of no more than 15 pages excluding necessary annexes. The inception report will be submitted for approval to Norad's Evaluation Department.

A draft final report will be presented and discussed in a meeting of the reference group where the team leader will participate. The evaluation team must take note of the comments that are presented. In instances of significantly diverging views between the evaluation team and stakeholders, these should be reflected in the report.

The final report will be submitted to Norad's Evaluation Department for approval, and subsequently presented in Oslo in the context of an open seminar.

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<sup>18</sup> <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/54/35336188.pdf>

<sup>19</sup> See. [http://www.norad.no/items/4620/38/6553540983/Evalueringsspolitikk\\_fram\\_til\\_2010.pdf](http://www.norad.no/items/4620/38/6553540983/Evalueringsspolitikk_fram_til_2010.pdf)

## Appendix 2

### LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Date	Institution/organization	Person	Place
18.09.07	Norwegian Church Aid	Erik Berge	Oslo
18.09.07	FOKUS	Mette Moberg	Oslo
18.09.07	LO, International Department	Christine Parker, Latin America advisor, Nina Mjøberg, Head International Trade Union Solidarity	Oslo
20.09.07	PRIO	Beate Thoresen	Oslo
20.09.07	NPA	Per Ranestad, Latin America advisor	Oslo
	White Ribbon	Margaret Østenstad	Phone interviews (several)
26.09.07	SCN	Solfrid Haugen	Oslo
28.09.07	LAG	Kristin Mellin-Olsen	Oslo
01.10.07	Norad	Turid Arnegaard	Oslo
03.10.07	JURK	Nina Hallenstvedt	Oslo
04.10.07	PYM	Eli Bjørnebråten, Gaute Hetland, Birger Sandli	Oslo
05.10.07	LO, International Department	Christine Parker, Latin America advisor	Oslo
08.10.07	MFA	Hege Araldsen, Ingunn Tysse Nakkim	Oslo
10.10.07	SCN	Johanna Godoy Ingrid de Soto	Guatemala City
11.10.07	NCA	Kjetil Bøe Verónica Sagastume	Guatemala City
12.10.07	Royal Norwegian Embassy	Tom Tyrhjell Håvard Austad	Guatemala City
12.10.07	Conavigua	Lucia Quilá, Magdalene Sarat	Guatemala City
13.10.07		Hans Petter Buvollen, Ex UNDP	Guatemala City
15.10.07	SCN	Kari Thomassen	Guatemala City
16.10.07	Utz K'aslemal	Flor Monzano, director. Enrique Lux, project coordinator	Santa Cruz, Quiché
16.10.07	NCA	Kjetil Bøe and his team	Guatemala City
16.10.07	APN	Rigoberto Saloj	Chimaltenango
16.10.07	CODECA	11 Board members	CODECA Mazatenango
16.10.07	CODECA	Community members in Las Delicias	Las Delicias, San Antonio Suchitepéquez
16.10.07	Utz K'aslemal.	Child promoters in community, Local leaders, incl. Alcaldía Auxiliar, Representative from local office of Ministry of Culture and Sport, 2 staff members-Utz	Caserío Cucul, San Bartolo Jocotenango, Quiché
16.10.07	Ministerio de Trabajo	Elena Girol	Santa Cruz de Quiché
16.10.07	AIN	Work team	Guatemala City
16.10.07	Fundación Deborah	Dora Coloma de Barrientos Eugenia de Calderon	Guatemala City
16.10.07	ICCPG	Dra. Claudia Paz y Paz Paula Barrios Nidia Corzantes	Guatemala City

Date	Institution/organization	Person	Place
17.10.07	Madre Selva	Gerardo Paiz	Zacapa, montaña "Las Granadillas"
17.10.07	Lutheran Church	Pastor Nestor Eduardo Alvarez	Montaña "Las Granadillas" Zacapa
17.10.07	PDH	Mayra Rossana	Zacapa
17.10.07	Familias Beneficiarias	Familia Miguel Juan Inocente López	Montaña "Las Granadillas" Zacapa
17.10.07	Workshop Utz K'aslemal	Child promoters from different communities and representatives from COCODES	Santa Cruz, Quiché
17.10.07	UNSITRAGUA	Junta Directiva del sindicato del Ingenio Palo Gordo: Juan Ramírez, Víctor Hugo Samayoa, Isaac Puac, Manuel Xicará y otros miembros	Ingenio Palo Gordo, Suchitepéquez
17.10.07	Ingenio Palo Gordo	Gerber Tirado, encargado de recursos humanos	Ingenio Palo Gordo, Suchitepéquez
17.10.07	UNSITRAGUA	Representatives from clubs at the following fincas: Santa Cecilia, La Exacta, El Ferrol, Rosario, Las Delicias, and from the municipal club of San Miguel Pochuta Chimaltenango	Restaurante del IRTRA, San Martín Zapotitlán
17.10.11	Utz'Kaslemal	Teachers in Canillá: Armando Urizar. Orlando Cruz María Cruz	Canillá, Quiché
18.10.11	SCG - target group.	14 children: Promotores of communication, of the environment, of the rights of children, of health in addition to representatives from school governments. gobierno escolar	Canilla, Quiché
18.10.07	SCG	Iván Pérez	Canilla
18.10.07	COCODES	Pedro Cabrera Tereza Quinoa	Canilla
18.10.07		Luis Fernando Quiñones, retired teacher	Canilla
18.10.07	Kabawil	Board of directors Kabawil and members of the board of the Wajxakib' Q'anil community, also known as Finca California (14)	Wajxakib' Q'anil en San Antonio Suchitepéquez
18.10.11	Procuraduría de los Derechos Humanos.	Emerson José Sical Galindo	Canilla, El Quiché, Guatemala
18.10.07	Pastoral de Movilidad Humana	Rafael López Urrutia	Zacapa
19.10.07	Centro de Acción Legal para los Derechos Humanos -CALDH-	Eda Gaviola, director. Roberto Morales Sic, Coordinator of program for Indigenous Peoples	CALDH office, Guatemala City
19.10.07	CIEDEG	Roberto Muj	Totonicapán
19.10.07	Ixmucané	Marisela Chic Barreno and associates	Totonicapán, Aldea Casa Blanca
19.10.07	CEG/PMH	Padre Mauro Verzeletti Mario Salguero Obispo Rodolfo Bobadilla	Guatemala City
19.10.11	SCN	Heliodoro Cumes, Area of Education	Guatemala City
19.10.11	CNEM	Gregorio Mucu, Francisco Puac Bixcul Julián Cumut	Guatemala City
19.10.11	PDH	Dora de Beteta Gustavo Vides Rafael Rodriguez	Guatemala City
19.10.07	Ministry of Education	Alvaro Alvarez Marinelli	Guatemala City
19.10.07	CNOC	Carlos Paz	Guatemala City

Date	Institution/organization	Person	Place
19.10.07	UNSITRAGUA	Board members: Daniel Vásquez Amparo Lotan Luis Ernesto Morales	Guatemala.City
22.10.07		Alvaro Pop, political analyst	Guatemala City
22.10.07	NCA	Kjetil Bøe	Guatemala City
22.10.07	Dirección de Educación Bilingüe Intercultural	Rodrigo Chub Ical	Guatemala City
22.10.07	Ministry of Education	Claudia Mazariegos, Director of policies and projection (cooperation)	Guatemala City
22.10.11	Proyecto Integral de Escuelas y Agricultura.	Promotores Agrícolas: Santos Uz, Jorge Vidal, Manuel de Jesus Santiago Francisco Pú	Uspantan, Quiché
22.10.07	AJCHMOL	Miembros del Consejo Directivo: Porfirio Faustino Bartolón Coordinador microregión 1 Eligio Ventura Arriaga, Consejo Directivo Rolando López Coordinador General	San Pedro Sacatepéquez, San Marcos
22.10.07	KABAWIL	Walter Castro	Quetzaltenango
22.10.07	Pastoral de la Tierra de la Conferencia Episcopal de Guatemala.	Alvaro Ramazzini	Quetzaltenango
22.10.07	Liga Maya	Daniel Matul	Quetzaltenango
22.10.07	CONAVIGUA	Lucía Quilá María Canil Grave Irma Yolanda Mocilla Iveth Morales Edgar de León Jorge Morales Toj	Guatemala City
23.10.07	CONAVIGUA	Beneficiarias de aldea Saquitakaj Beneficiarias aldea Paxcabalché	San José Poaquil, Chimaltenango
23.10.07	Universidad de San Carlos, Western region.	Eduardo Vital y Eduardo Ordóñez, director of Western office and the Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de Occidente	Quetzaltenango
23.10.07	CODECA	Mauro Vay	Sede de CODECA en Mazatenango
23.10.07	Pastoral de la Tierra en Suchitepéquez	Padre Miguel Rodas Y otros miembros de la pastoral Un exlíder sindical Dos miembros de base de CODECA Un representante de COCODES	Iglesia de San Antonio Suchitepéquez
23.10.07	CNEM	Andrés Cholotío García, Proyecto Lingüístico Fransisco Marroquín, member org. in CNEM Esperanza Tuctuc, CNEM Rosalino Tichoc, CNEM	Guatemala City
23.10.07	Ministry of Education	Celso Chaclán, Vice-Minister of Bilingual Intercultural Education	Guatemala City
23.10.07	Red Interagencial de Cooperación	Rina Rohanet Nuñez	Mineduc, Guatemala City
23.10.11	Colegio Monte Sión	Teachers: Diego Ixquiaptap, Antonio Tzep, Federico Tzaj	Nahuala, Sololá
23.10.11	Dirección Departamental de Educación	Maximiliano López Cristobal Coordinador Técnico Educativo	Nahualá, Sololá
23.10.11	Alcalde Municipal	Miguel Tzep Rosario	Nahualá, Sololá
23.10.07	Colegio Monte Sion	Steering Committee	Nahualá
24.10.07	Asamblea de Dios	Everildo Velásquez	Guatemala City
24.10.07	Asociación CDRO Tonicapán	Gregorio Tzoc Norato	Guatemala City
24.10.07	El Observador	Fernando Solís, political analyst	Guatemala City
24.10.07	PDH	Felicia Gonzales	Guatemala City



Date	Institution/organization	Person	Place
24.10.07	FLACSO	Ivonne Solórzano Paorla Ortiz	Guatemala City
24.10.07	Defensoría del Trabajador de la PDH	Marco Vinicio Hernández	Guatemala City
24.10.07	Ministerio de Trabajo	Rafael Lobos Viceministro de trabajo	Guatemala City
24.10.07	CIEDEG	Hugo Garrido	Guatemala City
25.10.07	Fundación DEBORAH	Dora Coloma de Barrientos Eugenia Coloma Beneficiarias del proyecto	El Mezquital, zona 18, Guatemala City
25 October	Ixmucané	Olga Tumax	Guatemala City
25.10.07	FUNDESCO	Fredy Batres Brenda Xulul Fernando Hernández Melvin Rivas Beneficiaries of the women's associations El Mezquital, Monja Blanca, Villacanales	El Mezquital zona 12, Guatemala City
25.10.07	Mesa Nacional de CONAVIGUA	Feliciana Macario Rosa Amanda Pérez Toj Magdalena Sarat Rosenda María Maldonado Ortiz María Canil Lucía Quilá Juana Celestina Batz Teresa Tomas Maria Gabriel Morales	CONAVIGUA, Guatemala City
25.10.07	ICCPG	Paula Barrios Nidia Corzantes Beneficiarias del proyecto de distintas organizaciones	ICCPG, Guatemala City
25.10.07	ILO	Carlos Linares	Guatemala City
25.10.07	Secretaría de Asuntos Agrarios	Mariel Aguilar Secretaria de Asuntos Agrarios Columba Sagastume Ingeniera	Guatemala City
25.10.11	SCG	Lisette Minerva	Guatemala City
25.10.11	SCN	Heliodoro Cumes	Guatemala City
25.10.11	Grupo de Calidad Educativa	Carlos Sanchez (Pennat) Gregorio Mucu (CNEM)	Guatemala City
25.10.07	Norwegian Embassy	Miriam Molaños	Guatemala City
26.10.07	Pennat	Carlos Sanchez, director. Teachers at methodology course	Guatemala City
25.10.07	PDH	Leticia González	Guatemala City
26.10.07	Christian Aid	Ana Leticia Aguilar Thaisen	Guatemala City
26.10.07	Norwegian Embassy	Liland Medina	Guatemala City
26.10.07	Pennat	Beneficiaries: 15 children and adolescents	Guatemala City
26.10.07	Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales FLACSO	Simona Yagenova Wendy Santa Cruz	Guatemala City
26.10.07	Colectivo de Organizaciones Sociales COS	Carlos Barreda, analista	Guatemala City
26.10.07	Fundación de Antropología Forense -FAFG	José Suasnavar, Sub director	Guatemala City
26.10.07	Comisión Presidencial para los Derechos Humanos- COPREDHE	Frank La Rue; Director	Guatemala City
26.10.07	Madre Selva	Oscar Conde, Carlos Salvatierra, Astrid Lopez	Guatemala City
26.10.07	FEPAPZ	Rev. Vitalino Similox and Nora Coloma	Guatemala City

## Appendix 3

### Development cooperation by Norwegian NGO and partner organization, 2002-2006

(Note: As figures come from different sources and are in some cases aggregated in different ways, figures from different tables are not directly comparable.)

Table A3: 1

SCN, Guatemala program, 1000 NOK	2002	2003	2 004	2005	2006	Total
PRODESSA Rural Youth El Quiche	203	176				379
ADMI Women and childrens rights	161	20	34			215
SCG-Save the Children Guatemala	3 473	2 997	3 136	3039	3554	16 199
ASEDSA Children's rights, Solola	206	180				386
FUNDEMI Young women as change agents	295	247	357	334	337	1 570
ASCATED Disabilities training	313	253	342	333	333	1 574
PENNAT Working children	1 185	1 118	1 250	1215	1215	5 983
APAPTIX Children's Rights-CBOs	184	194	237	258		873
IDEI Children's rights, Peace Accords, A world fit for Children	131	650	308			1 089
SAQBE Education Materials for Mayan Children	191	171	232			594
EDECRI Disabilities, training	197	172	321	304	304	1 298
FUNDAJU Youth for peace	165	225	313	298		1 001
ADEBQ'I Bilingual Education-Izabal	115	171	409	198	197	1 090
UTZ K'ASLEMAL Child/Youth Mental Health	304	266	275	265	265	1 375
CENDEP Young Investigators	188	283	283	277		1 031
SADEGUA Child and Youth Organisation	783	2 152	983	970		4 888
Disappeared Children (La Liga)	393	342	348	348	348	1 779
ACEMM Children's Rights, Comitancillo	78					78
Child Labour follow up (GTI-PAMI)		228	205	199	61	693
Ministerio de Educación -Intercultural bilingual education					202	202
CNEM Advocacy quality education / intercultural education			1 115	2 963	304	4 382
FLACSO Teachers training on quality education					660	660
Futuro Vivo -Education for children in urban marginal areas					152	152
Procuraduria DH Education for constituency building					202	202
Network for strengthening of quality education (Pennat)					1 652	1 652
ACJ Youth and peace building	31	167	322	304	304	1 128
Children and recuperation of historical memory					253	253
CONACMI Violence and sexual abuse and exploitation					101	101
HIV aids hotline (Asociación de salud integral, ASI)					152	152
Doses -Children's rights promotion in media					208	208
Ministerio de Trabajo Child Labour prevention					61	61
<b>Total</b>	<b>8 596</b>	<b>10 012</b>	<b>10 470</b>	<b>11 305</b>	<b>10 865</b>	<b>51 248</b>
<b>SCN Total (1)</b>	<b>12 013</b>	<b>14 223</b>	<b>15 612</b>	<b>17 701</b>	<b>15 145</b>	<b>74 694</b>
<b>Norad funding</b>	8 405	10226	9 873	7032	4 993	

1) Includes smaller projects, humanitarian projects, administration costs and organizational support

**Table A3: 2**

<b>NPA in Guatemala, 2002-2006, 1000 NOK</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>Total</b>
CORCI (Cooperative Coordination)	265 408	255 822				521 230
TPS, (Health and Technology)	359 249	299 922				659 171
CONCAD, Training and Assistance to Peasant Communities	404 085	478 006	363 435	419 908	34 407	1 699 840
Kabawil-Consejo Campesino Kabawil - CCK (Mayan Land Defence Kabawil)	760 994	810 204				1 571 198
(Democratisation initiatives) (1)	530 753	796 360				1 327 113
AJCHMOL, (Mam Peasant Empowerment)	507 584	708 165	341 934	389 633	294 867	2 242 182
Fundacion Myrna Mack, (Human Rights training)	224 232	-35 554				188 678
COMACI, (Strengthening local power in Patzun)	176 308	507 708	375 886	349 614	245 082	1 654 598
(Democratisation initiatives, joint project) (1)	205 249	166 269				371 518
(Joint project, local power) (2)	555 846	545 574				1 101 420
KABAWIL - Consejo Campesino Kabawil - CCK			582 258	534 747	430 961	1 547 966
CNOC, Coordinacion Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas			88 033	84 648	85 015	257 695
Organizaciones Mujeres Maya Nan Ixim			285 775	84 868		370 644
Red Organizaciones Mujeres Maya			201 376	270 481	234 735	706 591
Defensoria Indigena - WAXAQUIB NOJ					125 780	125 780
Liga Maya			223 960	190 481	211 131	625 572
CODECA, Comite de Desarrollo Campesino			165 710	274 985	553 879	994 574
Alcaldia Indigena Solola			80 604	82 868	128 099	291 570
COINDI-Jóvenes			53 260	250 055	183 062	486 377
COMANCHI-Mujeres			40 495			40 495
AJCHMOL			71 915	84 428	81 323	237 666
ADICTA			176 958	161 575	194 665	533 199
AMACOGEM			300 970	444 560	332 587	1 078 117
New Initiatives (14240150 Indigenous People's Rights) (1)				257 186	510 863	768 049
CONCAD (14240201)					375 438	375 438
<b>Total for partner organizations</b>	<b>3 989 706</b>	<b>4 532 476</b>	<b>3 352 569</b>	<b>3 880 037</b>	<b>4 021 893</b>	<b>19 776 680</b>
Other costs (NPA staff, courses, workshops, follow-up, in-country office, auditing, consultants, travel, bank charges)	<b>1 349 098</b>	<b>852 649</b>	<b>1 224 779</b>	<b>1 268 111</b>	<b>1 830 414</b>	<b>6 525 051</b>
<b>Total costs Guatemala-program</b>	<b>5 338 804</b>	<b>5 385 125</b>	<b>4 577 348</b>	<b>5 148 148</b>	<b>5 852 307</b>	<b>26 301 731</b>

**Funding each year shared NORAD (90%) and NPA (10%)****Notes:**

- 1) Support for limited projects with new partners and one-off activities
- 2) Joint project handled on behalf of NCA, SCN and NPA, with 4 partners

**Table A3: 3**

NCA, Guatemala, budget figures, 1000 NOK	2003	2003	2004	2004	2005	2005	2006	2006	Total Norad	Grand total
	a	b	a)	b)	a)	b)	a)	b)		
Scholarships	100	100	200		200		200		100	800
CIEDEG		1500		1100		1000		1000	4600	4600
FUNDESCO		600		600		600		500	2300	2300
CEG		400		400	225	400		300	1500	1725
OPSAG	500		340						0	840
Gente Positiva (GP)	400		400		400		400		0	1600
HIV/AIDS seminar, NCA Guatemala		300	250						300	550
ASODESPT		100							100	100
Partner Evaluation		100							100	100
Madre Selva -Water and Sanitation Advocacy			300			400		400	800	1100
VIDA project					225		225		0	450
Catholic Church -Health Comission								225	225	225
CONIC -Contitental Summit, Indigenous Peoples of the Americas								100	100	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>1000</b>	<b>3100</b>	<b>1490</b>	<b>2100</b>	<b>1050</b>	<b>2400</b>	<b>825</b>	<b>2525</b>	<b>10125</b>	<b>14490</b>

a) NCA own funds

b) Projects with Norad co-funding

**Table A3: 4**

PYM / Norwegian Missions in Development, 1000 NOK	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Asambleas de Dios (ASD)	1 658	2 340	1 360	1 442	1 286	8 086

Figures from Norad

**Table A3: 5**

FOKUS, Project partner, 1000 NOK	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Grand Total
Hvite Bånd	360	509	729	675	666	2 940
JURK/ICCPG		529	580	709	908	2 725
LAG/Conavigua	540	1 098	1 094	1 098	1 072	4 903
<b>Total</b>	<b>900</b>	<b>2 136</b>	<b>2 403</b>	<b>2 482</b>	<b>2 647</b>	<b>10 568</b>

Notes:

Budget figures.

JURK/ICCPG 2006 is not co-funded by Norad.

**Table A3: 6**

LO, Project partner, 1000 NOK	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
UNSTRAGUA (Union Sindical de Trabajadores de Guatemala)	541,972	556,927	600,000	732,439	638,609	3069,947

Note: In 2002, 82,5% are funded by Norad; for the remaining years, 85% are funded by Norad



**Norad**

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