




# Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, Sudan

Evaluation Report 2/2009



**Norad**

Norwegian Agency for  
Development Cooperation  
P.O.Box 8034 Dep, NO-0030 Oslo  
Ruseløkkveien 26, Oslo, Norway

Phone: +47 22 24 20 30  
Fax: +47 22 24 20 31

Photos: Gunvor Skancke  
Design: Agendum See Design  
Print: Lobo Media AS, Oslo  
ISBN: 978-82-7548-380-3

# **Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, Sudan**

**January 2009**

Submitted by:

ITAD

Jon Bennett

Jups Kluyskens

James Morton

Derek Poate

## Preface

This evaluation has been organised by the Evaluation Department of Norad on behalf of the governments of Denmark, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Norway, the partners behind the Joint Donor Team for South Sudan. The team was established following Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 in order to encourage donor harmonisation in Sudan and as a pilot for donor integration elsewhere. Its stated mission included promoting policies in support of sustainable peace and poverty reduction, support the World Bank managed multi-donor trust fund, co-operating with the Government and other stakeholders, and managing programmes outside the trust fund.

Two main questions were asked: What has been the added value of the team? And how effective is the team as a working model for joint donor engagement in fragile states?

Only to a limited extent have the high expectations been met. The apparent lack of success seem to be due to factors outside the joint team and the office as such. The World Bank-managed trust fund was expected to be a single aid instrument, but it turned out that almost half of the aid was taking place outside of the fund. Humanitarian aid was expected to decline in favour of long-term co-operation, but that did not happen. Management of programmes outside the trust fund remained bilateral, with the joint donor team only having responsibility for two small funds. As a model for donor harmonisation the score is moderate. It was acknowledged at the start that donors have different managerial systems and levels of delegation, but they also have widely varying approaches and have not had a single strategy for Sudan. All donor partners acknowledge – according to the report – that the governance structures have been inadequate and have performed poorly.

It is worth noting that the main contribution of the joint donor team does not seem to be in the area of donor harmonisation, but related more directly to strengthening the Government. The team was successful in its support to the government in developing an aid strategy and strengthening government capacity in budget planning. It has also played a significant role in promoting policy dialogue between donors and the government, and the team has been strong in adjusting to the Sudanese context.

The evaluation report comes up with a number of recommendations to remedy the situation. The main thrust of the recommendations is that donors need to strengthen their partnership by clarifying “rules of engagement”, agree on key

strategic priorities for the team, give it a stronger role in monitoring, and invest greater resources in the team.

The Evaluation Department has delivered the report. It is now up to the partners to consider and decide on the future of the joint donor team in South Sudan.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'A. Eidhammer', with a stylized, cursive script.

Asbjørn Eidhammer, Director of Evaluation

## Acknowledgements

The team was managed by Charlotte Vaillant at ITAD and led by Jon Bennett. Three team members – Jups Kluyskens, James Morton and Derek Poate – traveled to Khartoum and Southern Sudan. We also received valuable contribution from Simon Baka and Mariska van Beijnum. The team would like to thank all staff from the Joint Donor Team in Juba for their support during the field visit, as well as all stakeholders who met with the team in Sudan and those who participated in the web survey and telephone interviews.

# Contents

<b>Preface</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>Contents</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>List of Acronyms</b>	<b>vi</b>
<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>xi</b>
<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Background	1
1.2 Purpose	3
<b>2. Southern Sudan Context</b>	<b>5</b>
2.1 Political Context	5
2.2 Socio-economic/ Development Context	8
2.3 Aid to Southern Sudan	11
<b>3. Methodology</b>	<b>12</b>
3.1 Methodology	12
3.2 Analytical Framework	14
<b>4. Joint Donor Team Strategic Development and Portfolio</b>	<b>15</b>
4.1 Relevance of Joint Donor Team Mission	15
4.2 Strategic Development	18
4.3 Activities	19
4.4 Risks	26
<b>5. Joint Donor Team Outputs and Delivery</b>	<b>27</b>
5.1 Measuring Outputs	27
5.2 JDT's Contribution to the Paris Declaration Agenda	28
5.3 Joint Donor Team's Contribution to Programme Delivery	37
5.4 Joint Donor Team's Contribution to State Building	40
<b>6. Joint Donor Team as a Pilot Model for Harmonisation</b>	<b>49</b>
6.1 Institutional Analysis	49
6.2 Final Recommendations	59
Appendix 1 Terms of Reference Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, Sudan	iii
Appendix 2 Millenium Development Goals (MDGs), Sudan	ix
Appendix 3 Survey Monkey Results for Evaluation of Joint Donor Team (JDT), Juba, Sudan	xii
Appendix 4 List of Interviewees	xvii

## List of Acronyms

<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Full Title</b>
AARR	Average Annual Rate of Reduction
AEC	Assessment and Evaluation Commission
AG	Advisory Group (Khartoum)
ASI	Adam Smith Institute
BSF	Basic Services Fund
BSWG	Budget Sector Working Group
CBTF	Capacity Building Trust Fund (Southern Sudan)
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund (UN)
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
FPP	Final Project Proposal
GoNU	Government of National Unity (post-CPA)
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
GoSS	Government of Southern Sudan (post-CPA)
ICC	International Criminal Court
IMAC	Inter-Ministerial Appraisal Committee (GoSS)
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IPP	Initial Project Proposal
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
JDAS	Joint Donor Assistance Strategy
JDO	Joint Donors Office
JDP	Joint Donor Partnership
JDT	Joint Donor Team
JIU	Joint Integrated Units
JRD	Joint Donor Response Document (for JDT)
LGRPSS	Local Government Recovery Programme in Southern Sudan
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MASP	Multi-Annual Strategic Plan (Southern Sudan)
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MLPSHRD	Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labour, Public Services and Human Resource Development (Southern Sudan)



MoFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (GoSS)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NCP	National Congress Party
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
OC	Oversight Committee (MDTF)
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PFM	Public Finance Management
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SMB	Strategic Management Board
SPA	Strategic Partnership Arrangement (UNDP project)
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SRF	Sudan Recovery Fund
SSDF	Southern Sudan Defence Forces
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TAF	Technical Assistance Fund (Southern Sudan)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
USAID	United States Agency International Development



# Executive Summary





# Executive Summary

## Introduction

Following the signing of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005, the Governments of Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to establish a Joint Donor Team (JDT) for South Sudan. Denmark joined this partnership in December 2005 and Canada in May 2007.

The Team opened its office in Juba in May 2006 with a stated mission to:

- Promote policies in support of sustainable peace, poverty reduction and the attainment of Millennium Development goals in South Sudan;
- Support the World Bank managed Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) and cooperate with the Government and other stakeholders in South-Sudan
- Manage programmes which cannot be implemented under the MDTF;
- Encourage donor harmonisation in Sudan, as well as to act as a pilot for donor integration elsewhere.

The JDT is now in its third year of operation. The purpose of this mid-term evaluation, which was agreed by the Strategic Management Board (SMB) at the time of signing the MoU, is to take stock of JDT's progress against the above objectives.

The two main questions relevant to this evaluation are:

- What has been the value-added of the JDT in South Sudan?
- How effective is the JDT as a working-model for joint donor engagement in a fragile state context?

The evaluation was conducted in three phases. An inception stage discussed the Terms of Reference of the assignment with Norad Evaluation Department – the office responsible for commissioning this evaluation – the head of JDT and representatives of the Joint Donor Partners (referred to as Donor Partners) in their respective capitals. The second stage comprised a two-week field visit to Juba and Khartoum, the launch of a web survey and follow-up interviews. The web survey aimed at capturing stakeholders' perceptions of the JDT's achievements with respect to the Paris Declaration commitments. A total 50 stakeholders, both external and from Donor Partners, responded. The survey has been an important tool to complement narrative data collected during the field visit and the follow-up interviews.

The third stage of this evaluation has been the compiling of data and writing of the Final Report. In this report, Chapter 1 introduces the purpose of this evaluation,

Chapter 2 analyses the Southern Sudan context, and Chapter 3 explains the methodology. The main analysis is provided in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Our main findings and recommendations are based on the OECD-DAC criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact. A framework logic linking JDT's inputs (activities) with outputs (Paris Declaration principles) and outcomes (state-building and poverty reduction) is also used to support this evaluation.

### **JDT Strategic Development and Portfolio**

This section summarises findings in Chapter 4. This Chapter focuses on JDT's inputs over the evaluation period. It assesses the relevance of its mandate and describes strategic development over the evaluation period. The main findings are as follows.

The model supported by the JDT initiative was in conformity with the Paris Declaration agenda. However, the assumptions that underpinned the JDT initiative at the time of signing the MoU in 2006 have not materialised:

- The World Bank-managed MDTF was expected to be used as a single aid instrument, allowing for strong donor coordination and alignment. But by 2007, almost half of the partners' development assistance was taking place outside the Fund, either on bilateral programmes (26%) or through other UN pooled funds (19%).
- Humanitarian needs were expected to decline gradually, with attention switching to long-term assistance as a result of peace. This has not been the case and about one-third of the partners' expenditures still go towards humanitarian assistance (USD 110m in 2007). The role of International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) hence remains crucial.
- Programme management outside MDTF has remained bilateral, with JDT only having responsibility over two small funds, the Technical Assistance Fund and the Small Scale Fund. Plans for a pooled civil society fund and expectations that the Team would play a management role in the DFID-led Basic Services Fund, launched in 2006, were not met.

There were important changes in strategic direction over the evaluation period. JDT lacked coherent strategy, after the Strategic Management Board stopped short of approving a multi-annual strategic plan, submitted by the Team in early 2007. Initially, the Team was to focus on three priority sectors: basic health and HIV/AIDs; Security Sector Reform, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration; and peace-building; and public finance management.

- On security sector reforms, a joint assessment report confirmed the need for greater coordination in this sector and recommended that the partners agreed on a common policy framework as a platform for engagement in Southern Sudan. Instead, activities were pursued bilaterally and security sector reforms were dropped from JDT's priorities.
- Focus on public finance management was widened to include planning, budgeting and public sector reform, after it proved too difficult to find a public finance management adviser. This decision also reflected a change in context as the government of Southern Sudan took an early lead in developing Budget Sector Plans.

In terms of inputs, JDT's main activities evolved over the evaluation period to include:

- Supporting the MDTF: as well as co-chairing the Oversight Committee, JDT provided technical support to the MDTF Secretariat and in the identification and selection of key projects.
- Managing programmes: JDT managed the Technical Assistance Fund and the Small Scale Fund from 2007, and, with the former worth USD500,000 and financing short-term advisory inputs and the latter worth USD200,000 and supporting capacity building for local organisations.
- Engaging in policy dialogue: The Team established a close relationship with the Government with its office in Juba becoming a landmark for meetings. JDT also engaged in policy dialogue at sector level through its participation in Budget Sector Working Groups, MDTF, and directly with the relevant Ministries.
- Representing Donor Partners outside MDTF: the Team represented Donor Partners in Budget Sector Working Groups and provided advisory inputs to UN pooled funds that received their financial support.
- Reporting to Donor Partners' capitals: Communication between the Team and the capitals was weak at the beginning of the evaluation period, but the quality and frequency of reporting subsequently improved. JDT spent more time than envisaged organising field visits for Donor Partners.
- Working with NGOs: The Team established close relationships with international NGOs working in Southern Sudan, a role which was not envisaged in the MoU.

In conclusion, assumptions that were made at the time of drafting the MoU, with regard to aid delivery and the Government of Southern Sudan's agenda, did not materialise. As a result, the JDT had to adjust its range of activities to match the reality of the South Sudan context, while responding to the demands of Donor Partners. There was a missed opportunity, after JDT invested considerable efforts drafting a multi-annual strategic plan, which Strategic Management Board (SMB) did not approve.

### **JDT Outputs and Delivery**

This section summarises Chapter 5. This Chapter identifies JDT's outputs at three levels: its contribution to the Paris Declaration agenda; its contribution to programme delivery; and its contribution to state-building.

While difficult to measure, results of the on-line survey and specific examples indicate the following JDT's contribution to the Paris Declaration. JDT's contribution to promoting ownership in Southern Sudan is rated as high.

- One of the Team's early achievements was its support to the Government of South Sudan in developing an aid strategy. Elsewhere, JDT supported the preparations for the 2007 and 2008 Sudan Consortiums; following the recruitment a temporary economist, JDT helped the Government draft its Future Priorities paper.
- JDT also contributed to strengthening government capacity in budget planning – an essential step towards making poverty reduction strategies operational. The Team helped to make the Budget Sector Planning process more effective by working closely with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and encouraging greater donor participation (and more linkages) in the respective Budget Sector Working groups.

JDT's contribution to strengthening donor alignment to government policies is also rated as high.

- The Team played a significant role in promoting policy dialogue between donors and Government on often sensitive issues, such as public sector reforms. JDT also encouraged NGOs to participate in the Budget Sector Working groups, an initiative subsequently endorsed by the Government. The majority of donor-funded projects in Southern Sudan are implemented through NGOs.
- JDT, however, had only limited influence on strengthening on-budget aid reporting in Southern Sudan. Despite its encouragement, few Donor Partners report their projects to the Inter-Ministerial Appraisal Committee.

JDT's contribution to promoting donor alignment to government systems is rated as moderate.

- Here, the Team has principally worked through the MDTF. Because of its limited technical capacity, the Government needed donor support to take the lead in the implementation of the MDTF. This was done with mixed success: for example, it took almost two years for the procurement issues to be resolved.
- The Team's direct contribution to strengthening public finance management has been limited, although its involvement in joint donor missions and the Accountability Budget Sector Working Group has been significant.

JDT's contribution to donor harmonisation in Southern Sudan is assessed at two levels: amongst Donor Partners and more widely, with boundary partners. JDT's contribution is rated as moderate in both cases.

JDT was perceived as effective in representing Donor Partners under one banner, hence showing a "united front". Outside this representative role, however, the Team has found it difficult to "harmonise the harmonisers":

- While shared analysis improved over the evaluation period, thanks to JDT's efforts, Donor Partners have not united behind a single one-policy framework, as it was initially envisaged. The Team has also had little success in encouraging Donor Partners to combine their missions. On using common arrangements, the JDT has not been able to curb the increase in the Donor Partners' bilateral programmes, although they remained in principle committed to joint programming.

JDT's contribution to donor harmonisation outside its own group is also rated as moderate.

- JDT's work with boundary partners has been less visible; promoting shared analysis (through the facilitation of meetings or the commissioning of work) is where JDT is seen to have made a positive impact.
- JDT has also strengthened donor harmonisation between UN, WB and bilateral agencies, through its involvement in the MDTF and to a lesser extent, other pooled funds. Examples include lobbying the World Bank to strengthen the Technical Secretariat, and helping to resolve procedural disagreements between the headquarters of the Bank and UN agencies by liaising closely with Donor Partners.



JDT's contribution to improved programme delivery in Southern Sudan is primarily linked to MDTF performance. Here, results have been disappointing: it took one year after the Fund became operational for project development to move into an implementation phase. As a result, disbursements only reached 15% in the second quarter of 2006. With the support of JDT, MDTF performance improved the following year, leading to a 40% disbursement rate. JDT advisers have played a role in the selection of projects submitted through the MDTF, including in health and police. Less attention has been paid to the quality of implementation, however. JDT's contribution to the performance of other multilateral programmes has been less visible, yet positive.

State-building is at the core of JDT's mandate to promote pro-poor policies in Southern Sudan and one of the main OECD-DAC principles of engagement in fragile states. In Southern Sudan, the challenges are enormous, as the formal government structures had to be built from scratch. While progress has been made in establishing the structures of government at regional and state level, the provision of basic services is still very limited and corruption has become a major issue. There have nonetheless been some important institutional advancements.

- JDT is perceived to have made a visible contribution to capacity building in the area of public sector management reform. Its contribution to capacity building is also recognised in the health sector and in governance.
- Sustainability, however, remains an issue. Despite the effective use of the Capacity Building Trust Fund and other donor-funded Technical Assistance mechanisms, capacity building in Southern Sudan is yet not institutionalized across government departments in a systematic manner.

JDT's adherence to the OECD/DAC fragile states principles has remained partial.

- This is in large part because of the lack of a joint diplomatic and developmental approach. This division between politics and aid derives from the difficulty of merging the JDT's six donor countries' political relationships with Sudan.
- One particular area of concern is that among Juba-based agencies there has been a focus on building the Southern Sudan state, with much less attention given to building the overarching relationship between the Government of South Sudan and the national government – the latter being a central plank of the Peace Agreement under the "Make Unity Attractive" agenda.
- On the positive side, the Team has been strong in adjusting to the Sudanese context, by seizing opportunities when they arose.

In conclusion, the JDT has become a key interlocutor for the Government, multilateral agencies, and International NGOs over the years. Its contribution to policy dialogue and government processes has also been important. This has had a positive impact on promoting country ownership and strengthening donor alignment and harmonisation.

- JDT's value-added has been principally linked to the presence and availability of its advisers in Juba. The Team's permanent presence as co-chair of the MDTF Oversight Committee (as opposed to a system based on a rotating representation) has proved an important entry point to sustained dialogue with the Government.

Access to quick funding has also helped JDT fill technical assistance gaps.

- But the proliferation of projects, including bilateral projects financed by JDT's Donor Partners, has continued to make aid coordination in Southern Sudan difficult.
- In addition, competing donor approaches to the "make unity attractive" agenda and the disconnection between political and development issues have limited JDT's ability to contribute to state building in a coherent and sustainable manner.

### **JDT as a pilot model for harmonization**

A significant aspect of JDT as a pilot initiative is the way in which Donor Partners were expected to work together and relate to each other. Although the MoU places the initiative closer to a legal agreement, little in the arrangements prepared Donor Partners to work in a partnership.

- It was assumed that shared objectives and the provisions of the MoU and Joint Response Document, in combination with a Host Donor's administrative and financial systems, would provide a sufficient basis for an effective and efficient cooperation.
- That partners had different managerial systems and different levels of delegation was acknowledged as a risk before the launch of the initiative. Identifying and fixing all problems upfront was seen as unrealistic, and it was hence decided to start the initiative and deal with potential problems as they came along. This has not happened in practice.

Donor Partners have widely varying approaches: to the resources being committed to Sudan; to the extent of decentralised working from their headquarters; to the nature of engagement in policy with the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan; and their wider context of global or regional interests. While such a diversity is often an attractive feature to join a partnership, in the case of JDT, these differences have fuelled tensions among Donor Partners.

One of the main issues for the JDT was that as the Donor Partners in Khartoum did not have a common strategy for Sudan.

- Not all Donor Partners had developed a country strategy. Their views as to whether South Sudan should be part of a common strategy for Sudan or be treated separately have differed. Therefore the JDT could not fit a common development strategy for the South into an overall Sudan strategy.
- This absence of a common strategy was, paradoxically, both a driving force for the drafting of a multi-annual strategic plan and a critical factor in a lack of constructive engagement by the Donor Partners that could have ensured its successful outcome.

Without exception, all Donor Partners and the JDT acknowledge that the governance structure has been inadequate and has performed poorly. Governance arrangements did not respond to the realities on the ground and held back progress by the JDT.

- The design assumed a high degree of independence and autonomy of the JDT and a light-touch oversight by the SMB and Advisory Group (AG). It was implicit that the JDT in South Sudan was to act independently of the donor programmes

in the rest of Sudan. This suggested treating Southern Sudan as a separate entity, which clashed with the “Make Unity Attractive” agenda.

- The SMB is made up of senior officials of Donor Partners’ development agencies based in national capitals. But management from the partner’s headquarters was too remote to adapt efficiently to this situation.
- The close proximity of Donor Partner representatives in Khartoum led the AG to wrest the management initiative from the SMB and impose a more hands-on style of interaction with the Team.

Staff shortages have limited JDT’s performance. Southern Sudan is acknowledged as a difficult development context and it has proven hard to recruit staff for longer periods. The JDT staff capacity – in terms of numbers, but more importantly in terms of level of experience – was not suitable for this situation.

- An underlying problem has been the method of recruitment. Posts are assigned to specific countries for recruitment but the pool of potential recruits has been limited to members of the respective civil services (mainly from ministries and aid organizations) in the partner countries. This approach has not resulted in the recruitment of the best available skills and expertise.

Although cost-effectiveness was not within the evaluation remit, we note that the budget for 2008 amounted to €2.1m, with €1.1m going to the Juba Office to cover local salaries and other operating costs, and the remaining €1m going to the host country to cover Human Resource and estate management. This budget does not include international staff salaries, a significant contribution in kind from the Donor Partners employing agencies. Nevertheless, this investment seems good value for money when compared with what Donor Partners would have had to spend to open bilateral offices in Juba. There is in fact scope to invest greater resources into the initiative, particularly in staff numbers and quality.

In conclusion, the JDT governance structure, with its multiple and overlapping areas of responsibility, has created both confusion within JDT and impediments towards fulfilling its mandate.

- The joint donor partnership concept was never discussed in terms of ‘rules of engagement’ among the six partners and if and how the JDT should ‘represent’ donor members in the South has remained a contentious issue.
- Vertical and at times informal communication channels have reinforced existing differences in communication flows among the Donor Partners and undermined the principle of joined approaches as well as the Team’s morale.
- In light of recommendations made by the 2007 Managerial Audit, there has been an agreement in principle to maintain the Strategic Management Board and the Advisory Group as originally defined in the Memorandum of Understanding signed between its Donor Partners.

### **Recommendations**

The resources available to JDT should be compatible to its mandate. Operating in fragile states is labour-intensive. There is a need to invest greater resources both in staff numbers and quality.

As staffing issues are resolved, JDT's mandate needs to be revised appropriately to match the new donor landscape in Southern Sudan:

- JDT should be given a stronger role in monitoring the bilateral (and post-bilateral) programmes of Donor Partners. This will help reduce transaction costs as well as ensure greater coherence amidst its donor activities.
- JDT's advisory role in pooled funds managed by UN agencies should be formalized.
- JDT's work with NGOs should also be fully acknowledged and encouraged.

Similarly, the JDT governance structure needs to be redesigned to match the context of Southern Sudan. The recently-drafted Terms of Reference should ensure that clear roles and responsibilities for SMB, AG, and their respective relationship with the Host Donor and Team are established.

- The SMB should promote strategic direction on political and development policies in Southern Sudan while also outlining modalities of a donor integration model as represented by the JDT.
- The AG should remain in an advisory role with respect to JDT. Its key role should be in promoting the coherence of participant's political and development programmes in Southern Sudan, and the coordination between this and national policy.

Renewed engagement and commitment from Donor Partners is required to reinforce the Team in its delivery of objectives, outcomes and impact. It is important that Donor Partners strengthen their partnership by clarifying their 'rules of engagement' for the next stage of work for the JDT.

- Rules of engagement should be clarified with regard to joint donor mission and political and development presence in Juba
- With the support of JDT, Donor Partners should commit to greater complementarity and synergy of their activities within and across sectors.
- Early consultations should be sought when developing new projects. Joint donor mission should be organized in priority sectors.

In the absence of a joint strategy for Sudan or South Sudan, Donor Partners should at least agree on key strategic priorities for the JDT over the next stage, on the basis of a shared analysis and common understanding of the South Sudanese context.

- Context analysis, rather than the availability of advisers and/or bilateral interests, should dictate the choice of sector priorities.
- Clear political and developmental Benchmarks should be agreed upon to support the period leading to the 2011 referendum – which is the year JDT mandate expires.

In conclusion, JDT has shown that joint donor initiative can operate in a challenging aid environment. The establishment of a joint donor office and availability of full-time advisers in Juba have contributed to sustained and coordinated policy dialogue in Southern Sudan. The initiative has been welcomed by the recipient government as a good model to reduce transaction costs in its dealing with bilateral donors.


- Although programme management can remain bilateral, access to small strate-

gic funding is important for leverage and credibility purposes. Adequate staffing resources also matter greatly.

- Despite being like-minded, Donor Partners have inherited from different ways of working. Yet working in a highly-fluid environment like Southern Sudan calls for a pragmatic and flexible approach, as well as quick and consensual decision-making. Institutional constraints therefore need to be identified at an early stage. Roles and responsibilities within the governance structure, the level of delegation and rules of engagement are better being discussed upfront.
- As well as identifying the country's needs, through joint assessment missions, a shared understanding of the political context is important. A coherent approach to engagement is unlikely otherwise. All political dimensions – domestic, regional, and global -and their links with the respective strategies of Donor Partners will be key determinants in the success of the initiative.



# Main Report







# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Background

Following the signing of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, the Governments of Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to establish a Joint Donor Team (JDT) for South Sudan. Denmark joined this partnership in December 2005 and Canada in May 2007.

The Joint Donor Office (JDO) in Juba was opened in May 2006. The Netherlands Government is the Host Donor and the office is granted a diplomatic status as a sub-office of the Netherlands Embassy in Khartoum. The JDT, however, does not play any role in the political relations between the donors and the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS); rather, its stated mission is to:

- Promote policies in support of sustainable peace, poverty reduction and the attainment of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in South Sudan
- Support the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), and cooperate with the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and other stakeholders in South-Sudan
- Manage programmes which cannot be implemented under the MDTF
- Encourage donor harmonisation in Sudan, as well as to act as a pilot for donor integration elsewhere.

JDT has no operative role in financial disbursement of aid to the GoSS. The two channels for aid-disbursement are the multi-donor funds such as the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) managed by the World Bank, and the Funds managed by UN organisations. In addition, aid is disbursed through bilateral initiatives of the participating donors. The head of the JDT, however participates in the Oversight Committee (OC) of the MDTF, and therefore has a channel to influence the management of that fund.

The JDT is now in its third year of operation. Since 2007, its work has been guided by annual plans and reports approved by the Strategic Management Board (SMB). In October 2007 the SMB agreed to undertake an external Mid-Term Evaluation of the JDT in 2008.

**Table 1: Emergence of JDT with the post-war timeline**

<b>2005</b>	
January	Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on January 9th
March	Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) 1st Sudan Consortium in Paris
July	Interim National Constitution signed
August	MDTF started working out of Nairobi
September	GoNU established
October	GoSS sworn in
November	Signature of MoU establishing the JDT Joint Response Document (JRD) approved
December	Denmark joins the JDT
<b>2006</b>	
March	Head of Office and Head of Operational Management appointed to JDT in Juba along with a small team of advisors JDT holds co-chair of the MDTF
May	Opening of the JDT office by Ms van Ardenne, former Dutch Minister of Development Co-operation Full-time EU presence established in Juba
<b>2006</b>	
July	Residences on compound completed and staff moved in
Second Half 2006	GoSS takes the lead in developing 3-year sectoral strategies through the Budget Sector Working Group process JDT develops a broad set of objectives based on the functions of the JDT as set out in the MoU, as well as a set of projected year one results as set out in the Results Matrix of the JRD/ MoU.
December	JDAS process initiated, lasting until May 2007. The JDT now reaches a total of seven international staff and ten administrative/ support staff.
<b>2007</b>	
March	2nd Sudan Consortium meeting in Juba and Khartoum GoNU National Strategic 5 year Plan 2007-2011 launched
May	Canada joins the JDT JDT initiates and supports WB High-Level fiscal assessment mission in response to the GoSS fiscal crisis; Joint sectoral review of the education sector led by EC
May/June	Final 2007 work plan approved by SMB The Small Scale Support Fund (SSS) and the Technical Assistance Fund (TAF) become operational A Joint Review Mission (UK, Netherlands) focusing on financial administration of JDT, assisting it to become fully operational
October	SPLM suspends participation in GoNU Joint Managerial Audit Review Team (UK, Netherlands) visits the JDT. JDT participates in Health Umbrella Review mission

December	2008 work plan approved SPLM rejoined GoNU Seminar on future development cooperation in Sudan and possible further harmonisation, Stockholm. At the end of 2007 JDT had 7 international staff and 11 national staff
<b>2008</b>	
February	JDT supports study by the NGO Forum on the Southern Sudan funding environment
March	World Bank Interim Strategy Note
May	3rd Sudan Consortium
July	Mid-Term Evaluation of JDT
December	A new head of Office is recruited.

## 1.2 Purpose

As stated in the Terms of Reference, the purpose of the Evaluation is to “assess the contributions of the JDT to promote policies in support of sustainable peace, poverty reduction and the attainment of Millennium Development goals in Southern Sudan and to assess JDT as a working-model for harmonised donor engagement in a fragile state environment”

The dual-purpose of the Evaluation implies two user groups: (a) the JDT, its respective member donors and its boundary partners (GoSS, World Bank and UN Multilateral Funds); and (b) the participating donor governments and international donor community in general with respect to the design of joint-initiatives for working in fragile state environment.

The two main questions posed in the Evaluation are:

1. What has been the value-added of the JDT in South Sudan?
2. How effective is the JDT as a working-model for joint donor engagement in a fragile state context?

### Box 1: OECD-DAC Principles of Engagement

1. Take context as a starting point;
2. Do no harm;
3. Focus on state building as the central objective;
4. Prioritise prevention;
5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives;
6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies;
7. Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts;
8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors;
9. Act fast... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance;
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion.

The policy and operating environment in Southern Sudan is complex and challenging. JDT main role in this fragile environment is to function as a catalyst in the realisation of the objectives stated in the MoU. Since the JDT is essentially an experimental model for harmonised donor engagement in a fragile state, it is important to measure its impact against judgemental criteria informed by the Paris

Declaration on Aid Effectiveness<sup>1</sup> and the OECD guidelines for engagement in fragile situations<sup>2</sup>. If these are the benchmarks (Box 1), a number of supplementary questions emerge:

- What work has been developed in relation to existing MOU, incl. the Joint Response Document (JRD), and to what extent are MOU and JRD still valid documents?
- What are the outputs, short-term outcomes and possible long-term impacts on the ground of the JDT work: hard facts, quantitative and qualitative shall be documented?
- To what extent is the JDT contributing to strengthening the will and the ability of the GoSS to fulfil the core functions to reduce poverty, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of its population?
- What are the stakeholders' perceptions of what has been done by JDT?
- Which lessons have been learned regarding the joint elements of JDT operations?

---

1 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the indicators for monitoring its progress are available on [http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3343,en\\_21571361\\_39494699\\_39503692\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3343,en_21571361_39494699_39503692_1_1_1_1,00.html).

2 "Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations", OECD, available on <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf>

## 2. Southern Sudan Context

This chapter examines the political, social-economic/developmental context of Southern Sudan and the role of the international community since 2005.

### 2.1 Political Context

With the signing of the CPA between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement / Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A, hereafter SPLM) in January 2005, Sudan began the process of resolving Africa's longest civil war. The 1983-2005 conflict between North and Southern Sudan was, however, only one of several conflicts afflicting Sudan in the mid-2000s. The situation in the Darfur region has been the most serious, but armed conflict has also plagued eastern Sudan and the Blue Nile province for much of the preceding decade. All of these conflicts share a common root: competition over access to the levers of political and economic power and economic opportunities.

The responsibility for the success or failure of the CPA ultimately lies with the signatories themselves, and no amount of international funding or technical assistance would overcome a lack of domestic political will. The CPA was designed to be a roadmap, guiding the former warring parties through a census in 2007, elections in 2009, and finally to a 2011 referendum on southern independence. The National Assembly passed the National Electoral Law in July 2008, but the census has yet to be undertaken.

At the same time, there have been significant disagreements within the SPLM on whether to follow a 'South first' strategy and to focus on preparing for independence in 2011, or to engage seriously in the Government of National Unity (GoNU). These divisions have influenced relations with the GoNU, the National Congress Party (NCP) and other groups within Sudan (including Darfur rebels). They have also impeded the implementation of the CPA, and the ability of the GoSS to address urgent socio-economic needs. The NCP has been able to exploit these divisions in order to keep SPLM 'weak and focused on the South.'<sup>3</sup> For its part, the SPLM has increasingly sought to develop relations with marginalized and rebel groups, including the Darfur rebels, to provide additional leverage against the NCP.

---

<sup>3</sup> International Crisis Group, *Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis*, Africa Briefing no. 50, Nairobi / Brussels: 13 March 2008, p. 7.

## Box 2. Highlights of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, January 9, 2005

The signing of the CPA by the GOS and the SPLM/A on January 9, 2005 successfully concluded the final phase of negotiations to address the issues of inclusiveness, identity, and access to resources that were among the most significant structural causes of the conflict. The CPA builds on years of discussion and prior agreements, including the Machakos Protocol (July 2002), which established the right of the people of Southern Sudan to control and govern affairs in their region and participate equitably in the national government.

The CPA represents a complex and detailed set of arrangements and actions, key features of which include the following elements:

The **Power Sharing Agreement** provides for a largely autonomous government for Southern Sudan, with a view to making 'unity' attractive to the Southern Sudanese population. The Agreement provides the basis for broader participation in government and the civil service, the restructuring of critical national institutions (e.g. the judiciary), and a new national constitution. It also recognizes the right of the Sudanese to elect their representatives in free and fair mid-term elections at all levels of government, and emphasizes internationally-acknowledged human rights and freedoms, including a commitment to a bill of rights and basic freedoms of expression, religion and association.

The **Wealth Sharing Agreement** provides a framework for resource allocation and sustainable decentralization, establishing comparative underdevelopment and war-affected status as the key criteria for prioritization of public revenue allocations. The Agreement assigns a share of almost 50% oil and non-oil revenue that is collected in the South to GoSS, as well as the right to collect additional domestic revenue and external assistance, and the right to have its own banking system within the framework of the Central Bank of Sudan.

The **Security Protocol** outlines a collaborative approach to security issues by providing for two armed forces and joint integrated units that will become the nucleus of a future national army, enabling the parties to gradually downsize their forces and allowing the GoSS to mobilize resources for the SPLA.

The particular factors that precipitated conflict in **Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile** (also referred to as the Three Areas) are recognized, and special power and wealth sharing arrangements have been agreed upon. These include the establishment of State Land Commissions, special provisions on education and security, the right to solicit external resources, popular consultation rights for the local population, and a unique administrative status for Abyei, including a referendum on its final status within the North or the South.

Many of the CPA provisions were acted upon, wholly or in part, during the first 18 months after the signing of the CPA. Among the achievements was the work of a National Constitutional Review Commission in Khartoum, along with the establishment of a Civil Service Commission. More recent achievements include the implementation of an agreement to settle the conflict over Abyei, the completion of the census enumeration, and developments relating to the electoral process. In Southern Sudan 10 new state governments have been formed and the constitutions of all but one ratified. Central government ministries and commissions have been formed and staffed and some progress has been made in extending reach and representation to the state and county levels.

There has also been a broad international engagement in the Joint Appraisal Mission (JAM) process (see Box 4) and, for the South, the creation of Budget Sector Working Groups (BSWGs) has ensured adherence to a common framework for interventions. Broadly speaking, international actors have adhered to national plans and priorities; few have been criticized for attempting to impose their own agendas.

However, neither GoNU nor GoSS made much progress in fiscal decentralization, or in assisting the populations in marginalized areas. Concerns were soon raised over the slow pace of implementation. Specifically, there was a lack of clarity with respect to the borders separating North and Southern Sudan, making it difficult to calculate the share of oil revenue attributable to the South. In addition, there was an urgent need to step up efforts to ensure transparency in holding of national elections in 2009 that would be greatly influenced by the security and political stability of the whole country.

Slow implementation of the CPA led to the withdrawal of SPLM from the GoNU in October 2007. The issues that prompted this action lie at the heart of a reallocation of power and control over resources between North and South: a) implementation of the Abyei Protocol (May 2004), b) redeployment of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and SPLA troops, c) the census for the preparation of elections, d) demarcation of the North-South border, and 5) transparency in the oil sector.

After two months of intensive negotiations between the NCP and the SPLM agreement was reached on several of these issues, particularly redeployment of forces and oil sector transparency, which enabled the SPLM to rejoin the government in December 2007.

Despite progress on some of the key issues during the first four-five months of 2008, the blockages have by no means been completely resolved. Moreover, the deadlock over Abyei led to full-scale fighting in mid-May, the destruction of a large part of Abyei town, and the displacement of some 90,000 individuals. This was widely seen as the most serious crisis since the signing of the CPA. In a step back from the brink, the parties reached an agreement in early June to implement the Abyei Protocol.

By mid-2008, the NCP and the SPLM opted to move forward with the peace process. Notwithstanding the progress recorded on number of the major outstanding issues, significant work remains to be done to achieve provisions of CPA and questions remain about commitment of the parties to fully implementing the CPA. Advancing this process relies heavily on stabilizing security in the south through the disarmament, demobilization, the reintegration of surplus government and SPLA troops, and the creation of Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), intended to be the core of a new, unified Sudanese military. There remain some fundamental obstacles to progress in this regard (see Box 3).

The spectre of indictment by the International Criminal Court that hangs over Sudanese President, Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir, for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide adds a further layer of uncertainty. While the responsibility for implementing the CPA rests squarely with the parties, it is also clear that the

international community has not played as strong and proactive a role as it should have. It has tended to see the crisis in Darfur and CPA implementation as separate issues, and the focus of attention has been Darfur.<sup>4</sup>

### **Box 3: Security in Southern Sudan**

The key to stability in Southern Sudan lies in the successful implementation of the disarmament plan, still far from being achieved. The JIUs – the 39,000 strong force meant to comprise composite units of SAF and SPLA – while just over 80% deployed, are ‘integrated’ in name only, with the two sides maintaining split allegiances and parallel command and control structures. Northern troops have not withdrawn from all parts of the South as envisaged in the CPA, and troops loyal to the Khartoum government remain around some of the economically important oil fields. Not all southern troops have withdrawn from all parts of the north either

The JIUs are likely to be dissolved in 2011 when the south is expected to vote in favor of independence, but neither party to the CPA has showed any real commitment to the creation or integration of these units, with the possible exception of those in strategic or oil producing areas. Even the composition of some of the JIUs is questionable, as former members of “Other Armed Groups,” a loose assortment of militia groups from various tribal backgrounds aligned with, but not strictly a part of, either the SAF or the SPLA, are being added to JIUs in areas where they have a history of committing abuses against rival tribal groups. This has giving rise to increased tension and mistrust between the JIUs and the local people that they are meant to protect.

Police forces do exist in the south, and some procedural reforms are underway, with the support of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) Civilian Police, the MDTF, and bilateral donors such as the United States and the UK. But after decades of conflict in which police were more often identified as an enemy of the southern Sudanese people than as a security service, basic law enforcement continues to be exceptionally weak and inconsistent. The GoSS has had some difficulty paying its public servants, resulting in malpractices and illegal fines becoming a feature of policing. Meanwhile, important traditional authority structures responsible for the implementation of justice have been undermined by the war and in some cases completely abandoned as traditional chiefs and elders were killed or forced to flee the violence.

Banditry, violent cattle raids, theft of children, and inter-tribal conflicts persist as a backdrop to the ongoing North-South tensions, particularly around the contested border areas of Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile states. With the security situation unstable and disarmament at a standstill, people are understandably unwilling to give up weapons that are their sole means to defend themselves and their families. UNMIS does not have the mandate to cope effectively with the prevailing non-military insecurity in the south. It has been given a mandate to protect civilians under ‘imminent threat of violence’ (primarily military violence), but has not been enabled to intervene in matters of law and order. Peacekeepers cannot take the place of the weak policing system, and as such they are ill-equipped to address the inter-tribal violence and criminal activity that makes up the bulk of the insecurity in the south.

## **2.2 Socio-economic/ Development Context**

When the CPA was signed in January 2005, Sudan had experienced nearly 40 years of civil war since independence in 1956. The impact on the country’s econ-

<sup>4</sup> The point was emphasized by the UN Secretary-General in mid-2008. See United Nations, Security Council, S/2008/485, p. 17, para. 86.



omy, its social relations and its development prospects were profound. While all parts of the country had felt the effects of civil war, Southern Sudan was particularly disadvantaged:

'The GoSS has adopted a vision for equitable development and poverty eradication, but will start from a much lower level in terms of institutional capacity and socio-economic development. Key education and health indicators, such as child and maternal mortality and primary enrolment, are among the worst in the world. Infrastructure is virtually non-existent, with no paved roads outside the main urban centres, and a civil service and service delivery structures for service delivery must be created essentially from scratch. Millions of IDPs are expected to return to the South, compounding the challenges.'<sup>5</sup>

A table summarising progress towards MDGs is provided in Appendix 2. The Sudanese economy as a whole grew at 9 percent during 2005-2007. However, this growth was heavily reliant on increased oil production and revenue, and pro-poor peace dividends in key social sectors have been slow. Agriculture remains the main source of income for two in three people in the North living in rural areas, and for more than 85 percent of those in the South. In the South, agricultural performance varies considerably from place to place and from year-to-year ranging from the regular possibility of at least two consecutive harvests from the same area in the Greenbelt located from Tambura (Western Equatoria) to Kajo-Keji (Central Equatoria), to crop failures in the marginal areas of the East Equatoria and Northern Bahr el Ghazal.

Flooding in 2007-2008 and insecurity continue to negatively affect food security conditions in Southern Sudan. Floods and water-logging across wide areas in the South during the May-December 2007 period affected some 56,000 hectares of crops and nearly 90,000 households<sup>6</sup>. However, generally favourable rains and relatively few outbreaks of pests and diseases, together with improved civil security situation, have resulted in an above average cereal harvest of about 859,000 tonnes in the 2007/08 season<sup>7</sup>.

The World Bank reports that fiscal pressures in the South have proven acute. In 2006 the GoSS suffered a cash deficit due to limited spending discipline as well as oil revenue shortfalls in the second half of the year. Aggregate spending was driven by outlays on wages and operations that were roughly double planned amounts, while capital expenditures were cut sharply. In the first half of 2007, oil revenue shortfalls continued, GoSS significantly over-estimated non-oil revenue, and in the face of huge development needs, expenditure plans in the 2007 budget were significantly expanded relative to 2006.<sup>8</sup>

One result is that planned investments have been squeezed by the burgeoning payroll<sup>9</sup>. GoSS expenditures on infrastructure, health, education and rural develop-

---

5 Joint Assessment Mission, Volume I: Synthesis – Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication, March 18, 2005, p. 9.

6 [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2008.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/KKAA-7K42KK-full\\_report.pdf/\\$File/full\\_report.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2008.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/KKAA-7K42KK-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf)

7 [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2008.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/LSGZ-7B3CJ3-full\\_report.pdf/\\$File/full\\_report.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2008.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/LSGZ-7B3CJ3-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf)

8 World Bank, *Sudan: Public Expenditure Review*, Report no. 41840-SD, December 2007, p. v, para.

9 Salary expenditures increased from 33% of GoSS spending in 2006 to 50 percent in 2007, as the wage bill rose from USD 546 million in 2006 to USD 742 million in 2007.

ment have declined. In 2006 they accounted for 24 percent of spending financed by GoSS revenues; in 2007, this had decreased to 19 percent. This has led to concern within the donor community that there has been 'significant under-spending on basic services and infrastructure for the population and thus on a tangible peace-dividend.'<sup>10</sup>

#### **Box 4: Joint Appraisal Mission (JAM)**

JAM was carried out jointly by the World Bank and the United Nations, with the full endorsement, guidance and participation of the Government of Sudan and the SPLM. The primary objective of the JAM was to provide a detailed assessment of rehabilitation and transitional recovery needs across eight thematic clusters for the first two years of the Interim Period. The Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication is a final outcome of the JAM.

The JAM identified eight thematic clusters: capacity building and institutional development; governance and rule of law; economic policy; productive sectors; basic social services; infrastructure; livelihoods and social protection; and information and statistics. There are four crosscutting themes: gender; HIV and AIDS; conflict prevention; and the environment. Performance indicators for reform and actions were also developed by the JAM process for the eight clusters plus indicators on security and donor accountability, as well as a commitment to a decentralised framework.

The JAM was presented by the parties of the CPA at the Oslo Donor's Conference on Sudan in 2005 and accepted by all participants as the road map for peaceful development in the country. It sets out the main challenges, the respective programme and policy priorities under the National Government and Northern States and the GoSS, the financing needs and institutional arrangements; and the monitoring arrangements.

Southern Sudan is highly dependent on oil revenues transferred from the federal level. It has very little capacity to generate income independently of the GoNU<sup>11</sup>. In part this is a reflection of GoSS's weak institutional capacity, especially in the area of tax administration. In addition, the execution rates of GoSS pro-poor spending have been extremely low and the 2:1 spending ratio agreed under JAM was not met. Instead, the sectors prioritised by GoSS have been public administration, transfers to states, accountability and the army.

Social development throughout the country and particularly in Southern Sudan has been uneven and weak. The JAM foresaw a gradual decline in humanitarian assistance during the 2005-2007 period, enabling donors to spend more on development priorities. This has not occurred; rather, humanitarian needs have been large and expanding as crises such as the one in Abyei in May 2008 and the continuing situation in Darfur continue to absorb resources.

The distribution of resources within the south is made more complex by population movement (return and resettlement) since 2005 – both 'formal' returnees in official programmes (run either by UN or the Government), as well as the so-called 'spontaneous' returnees. For humanitarian services, those in official programmes have direct access to services; the 'spontaneous' group must be located, registered and verified as returnees before assistance can be provided—a major targeting chal-

<sup>10</sup> 'Third Sudan Consortium: Joint Staff Assessment Report,' p. 22, para. 66

<sup>11</sup> Over 2005-2007, GoSS received USD 3,315 million in revenue, over ninety nine percent of which was from oil revenue.

lenge in 2007 and 2008. Even by 2006, it was clear that the most food insecure areas were those that were simultaneously most affected by the war and those that were under the strain of supporting large numbers of returnees, such as Northern Bahr al-Ghazal.

### 2.3 Aid to Southern Sudan

The projections for the overall cost of the JAM in the South showed that, in total, the South required USD 3,553m to finance the JAM over the period 2005-2007<sup>12</sup>. Overall donor financing estimates were derived from an estimation of GoSS's share of oil revenues ('wealth sharing') for the period 2005-2007, together with an estimate of GoSS's non-JAM requirements (mainly security expenditures, but also the accumulation of 'strategic reserves'). The JAM estimated that GoSS would receive USD 4,215m as revenue from wealth sharing for the period 2005-07, of which USD 1,156 would be spent on non-JAM needs. This meant that a balance of USD 2,116m would be available from GoSS to finance JAM needs, leaving a "financing gap" of USD 1,437bn to be financed by donors.

JAM revenue estimates, however, proved optimistic, both in terms of revenues from oil, and in terms of donor financing. GoSS revenues for the period 2005-2007 fell short of JAM estimates by USD 901m, while donor financing fell short by USD 886m. While this total shortfall of USD 1,790m is of concern, one should recall that spending itself also fell short of targets (JAM spending by USD 847m and non-JAM by USD 943m).

Part of the donor shortfall of USD 886m can be attributed to delays in MDTF implementation. Another reason may be related to inadequate reporting of commitments by some donors and UN agencies, but even then, the shortfall remains significant. Overall, donor resources have also been focused on Darfur and on humanitarian assistance for those areas affected by continuing conflict. As a result, reduced resources available for recovery, reconstruction and development have been particularly problematic for Southern Sudan.

#### Box 5: Sudan Consortium

The Sudan Consortium provides a forum to annually review progress in implementing the social and economic aspects of Sudan's 2005 CPA. The Consortium is jointly chaired by GoNU and GoSS and organized by the UN and the World Bank. The May 2008 meeting of the Consortium represented the mid-point of the six-year Interim Period since the 2005 signing of the CPA. The Consortium reviewed the progress in the implementation of the CPA and JAM commitments to date (2005 -2007); and discussed the recovery and development priorities for the second half of the CPA period (2008 – 2011).

At the meeting, donors pledged about USD 4.8 billion in total support to humanitarian, recovery and development efforts in the whole of Sudan, for the period 2008-2011. Part of the funds for development efforts will be channeled through two complementary mechanisms – the MDTFs administrated by the World Bank which will receive an estimated US\$650 million; and the newly created Sudan Recovery Fund managed by the UN.

<sup>12</sup> These estimates excluded DDR.

## 3. Methodology

### 3.1 Methodology

This Mid-Term Evaluation was conducted in three phases. An inception stage discussed expectations and the Terms of Reference of the assignment with Norad Evaluation Department, the head of the JDT, and Joint Donor Partners (JDPs). The methodology focuses on standard OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact. In addition, the Inception Report confirmed interest in two main areas: i) assessing JDT's performance against its objectives, including the relevance and validity of its mandate; and ii) assessing JDT as a model for harmonisation by measuring JDT's contribution in light of commitments made in the 2005 Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness.

A. The first set of issues of particular interest for this assignment relates to **JDT delivery:**

(1) Although the Joint Donor Office has produced regular reports on JDT activities, there is a need to go down a level and find concrete examples to measure JDT performance against its core objectives.

(2) As JDT has only recently begun to manage programmes, most of its activities relate to dialogue and coordination. This assignment will hence pay particular attention to data collection on **JDT perceived and actual results.**

(3) Identifying the main obstacles to JDT delivery will be important, so that a conclusion can be drawn as to whether the **JDT mandate** is appropriate or should be revised to more closely match the local context, JDT capacity constraints and/or the respective JDP agendas.

B. The second set of issues relates to **JDT as a model for harmonisation:**

(1) Measuring JDT contribution against commitments made in the 2005 Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness will be essential. This assignment will not only look at progress towards donor harmonisation but also seek to capture its benefits and costs for donors and government alike.

Other questions related to JDT as a model for harmonisation are :

(2) What are the main lessons that can be drawn from two years of JDT operation with regards to harmonising JDPs own **incentives** and institutional constraints? (3) Do bilateral interventions compete or complement JDT activities?

(4) What are the main strengths and weaknesses of JDT as a model for harmonisation in a fragile context like Sudan? What is JDT added value?

(5) Is the JDT format aligned with the OECD/DAC principles of engagement in fragile states and has it contributed to **state building** in particular?

The second stage was the main study. This comprised a field visit to Juba, the launch of a web survey and follow-up interviews. The field visit in Juba lasted two weeks, and included a 2 day visit to Khartoum to meet JDPs at their respective Embassies. The four person field team comprised Derek Poate, Jups Kuyskens, James Morton and Simon Baka.

A web survey was launched in early August (See Appendix 3 for Survey questions) and aimed at capturing stakeholders' perceptions of JDT's achievements with respect to the Paris Declaration commitments. The survey has been an important tool to complement narrative data collected during the field visit and the follow-up interviews. It has also allowed respondents to provide additional information, while remaining anonymous. The response rate has been high, with 55 out of a total 80 responding to the survey. Respondents to the survey are categorised as follows:

<b>Employer of respondent</b>	<b>%</b>
Development /diplomatic staff – JDPs	43.1%
Other development organisations	25.5%
Government of Southern Sudan	3.9%
Non-Governmental Organisations (nat/int)	17.6%
Permanent or temporary staff/consultant to the JDT	9.8%

The survey collected views from Sudan (Juba, Khartoum) and JDP Headquarters, as follows:

<b>Where are you based?</b>	<b>%</b>
Juba	52.7%
Khartoum	12.7%
Other (JDP HQs)	34.5%

Separate questionnaires were developed as a guideline for follow up interviews with JDP representatives. (See Appendix 4 for a full list of interviewees). The third stage was the analysis and report writing. A workshop took place in December 2008 to present the report to SMB. The revised Terms of Reference for JDT was shared with the Consultant ahead of this workshop<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>13</sup> This report does not include an analysis of the draft ToR, which were shared with Consultants after completion of the final report.


The JDT as well as representatives in Khartoum and the capitals fully assisted in terms of access to documentation, support during the fieldwork and in individual responses to Evaluation questions. There are, however, a number of limitations that affected the sourcing of evidence. The main one is the absence of a systematic and consistent monitoring and evaluation mechanisms and data to measure JDT's performance against its objectives. The JDT has in the course of its existence developed a range of different work plans and reporting systems which, because of their lack of mutual compatibility, have impeded systematic information gathering and analysis. In addition, the annual reports often remain descriptive and concentrate on activities, processes and issues, rather than on assessing achievements against targets at outcome level.

The second main limitation was that not all interlocutors were exposed to the JDT over the whole three-year period. Some have only been engaged with the JDT for a short time and from a distance – for example, from the capitals. Finally, although key persons from all JDPs and their boundary partners (World Bank, UN agencies etc) were interviewed, access to other stakeholders, in particular the GoSS and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) was more limited.

### 3.2 Analytical Framework

The structure of the report mirrors a result-oriented analytical framework, which the Consultant designed at inception using a slightly modified version of the draft Evaluation framework developed to assess the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness<sup>14</sup> (Figure 1). Using this framework, Chapter 4 begins by discussing JDT's strategic development and relevance, then looks at JDT's inputs and activities (Chapter 4). Outputs are then assessed in Chapter 5, looking at the Paris Declaration principles, programme delivery, and the state-building agenda. Chapter 6 focuses on efficiency and analyses institutional matters over the Evaluation period. Drawing from Chapter 5 and 6, Chapter 7 concludes with recommendations and findings on JDT as a model for harmonisation in fragile states.

**Figure 1: Adapted programme logic for JDT**



14 David Booth and Alison Evans, *DAC Evaluation Network: Follow-up to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, An options paper* (May 2006)

## 4. Joint Donor Team Strategic Development and Portfolio

This Chapter discusses the relevance of JDT at the time of signing the MoU and at present. It gives an overview of JDT's strategic framework and its range of inputs and activities. It shows some important departures from the functions originally envisaged for JDT, some as a result of decisions amongst JDPs; other reflecting JDT's opportunistic approach and adjustment to the Southern Sudanese context.

### 4.1 Relevance of Joint Donor Team Mission

The key background documents for the Joint Donor Team remain the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK (followed by Denmark and Canada in subsequent years), as well as the Joint Donor Response to the Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication, released in November 2005.

In these documents, the JDT's mission is described as follows:

- Promote policies in support of sustainable peace, poverty reduction and the attainment of MDGs in Southern Sudan
- To support the MDTF-South and cooperate with the GoSS and other stakeholders in South-Sudan
- To manage programmes that cannot be implemented under the MDTF
- To encourage donor harmonisation in Sudan, as well as to act as a pilot for donor integration elsewhere.

There is a strong rationale to promote policies in support of sustainable peace, poverty reduction and the attainment of the MDGs in Southern Sudan. The GoSS started from scratch and has little capacity and yet, in the context of state building and post-conflict recovery, is expected to take on the tasks of public service delivery, slowly replacing international humanitarian assistance organisations that had been operating in the country throughout the conflict. JDPs also recognised that peace, development, and security are inter-related. Promoting donor harmonisation is particularly important given GoSS capacity constraints. Donors need to make sure that they do not put any extra strain on an already fragile governance situation.

While JDT's activities today are still broadly in line with the above objectives, the model for harmonisation that underpinned the initiative at the time of signing the MoU has not yet materialised. This model was straightforward. As JDPs planned to pool their resources under a WB-managed MDTF for Southern Sudan, it made sense to combine and form one seat on the permanent Oversight Committee. This



would not only allow strong donor coordination, but also save costs, as none of the JDPs had permanent representation in Juba. It is worth noting, however, that Norway, the UK and Netherlands have had representatives in South Sudan since early 2005. Having a permanent representation in Juba would also help build strong relationships with the host government, and provide a unique insight on contextual development.

#### **Box 6: MDTF-Southern Sudan**

The Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) are a means for donors to coordinate the reconstruction and development needs of both Northern and Southern Sudan. The MDTFs are funded by donor countries and managed by two technical secretariats, one for the MDTF-National, which focuses on war-affected areas of Northern states (based in Khartoum), and a second MDTF-Southern Sudan (based in Juba). MDTF-South (MDTF-S) focuses on rebuilding the Southern states of Sudan and providing capacity-building support to the newly-formed Government of Southern Sudan. The fund is administered by the World Bank from its office in Juba, in Southern Sudan

It is useful to compare the relative importance of the MDTF-Southern Sudan to other sources of income. For the GoSS, in 2006 capital expenditures were about USD 441 million, close to half of the budgeted amount. In 2007 the capital expenditures declined due to revenue shortfalls to about USD 192 million, about 38% of the original budget. During 2006 and 2007, disbursements from the MDTF-S for development projects in Southern Sudan were a total of USD 106.5 million. As a proportion of aggregate GoSS capital expenditures in 2006 and 2007 the MDTF-S contribution amounted to 17% of the total. The MDTF-S therefore made a significant contribution to the GoSS capital expenditures during these years. If the GoSS disbursement for MDTF-S projects (USD 110.5 million) is added then the contribution of the total MDTF-S programme to development expenditures in Southern Sudan is 34%.

MDTF-S priority clusters are: Rapid Impact Emergency Project (RIEP); Emergency Transport and Infrastructure Project (ETIP), Umbrella Health Project; Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project; Capacity Building, Institutional & HRs Development; Livestock & Fisheries Development; Rule of Law (Police and Prisons); Private Sector Development

Source: World Bank

In addition, there were strong expectations that JDPs would limit the use of bilateral initiatives. Joint JDP programmes were to be developed and managed by JDT instead. These programmes would seek to complement the MDTF and hence focus on sectors set out in the CPA but outside the MDTF framework (such as security sector reforms).

This model was in conformity with the Paris Declaration agenda. Pooling resources under a MDTF reduces transaction costs for government and ensures a single policy framework is used. On alignment, the MDTF priority sectors directly reflected the priorities set by the Sudan JAM. In addition, the MDTF procedures allowed it to be implemented through the government systems (public finances and procurement), with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) co-chairing the Oversight Committee (OC). This guaranteed in principle strong government ownership.



Reality took on a different direction, however, for two main reasons:

- Using a single aid instrument to support recovery and reconstruction in a post-conflict environment has proved unrealistic. The MDTF has been slow to start and some assumptions made under JAM, such as expectations that humanitarian assistance would decline gradually, have proved wrong. Activities related to capacity building and institutional strengthening have been prioritised over quick start/impact programmes, leaving gaps in the peace dividend/service delivery.
- Projects financed outside the MDTF have proliferated, in part because of MDTF's slow start. The number of JDP bilateral projects initiated from Khartoum has increased, as no agreement on possible joint funding mechanisms was concluded.

On the first point, despite improved delivery in 2008, MDTF fell well behind its targets for the first Phase of the JAM (2006-2008). In 2005, the Sudan Consortium committed USD 355 million dollars to MDTF-S Phase 1, up to the end of 2007. At 31 March 2008, only USD 110 million had actually been spent, although USD 235 million was committed to approved projects.

On the second point, half of JDP development cooperation in effect takes place outside the JDT's mandate. A consolidated analysis of JDP spending prepared in 2008 (JDP Expenditures, 2008, JDT) shows that overall JDP expenditure totaled USD 281m in 2007, with USD 110m going towards humanitarian assistance. Outside of humanitarian assistance, JDP devoted the following proportions of its total funding envelope:

- 55.1% of its spending to the MDTF-S,
- 25.8% to bilateral projects (excluding bilateral humanitarian spending),
- 16% to the Strategic Partnership Arrangement (SPA), and
- 3% to Capacity Building Trust Fund (CBTF).

In conclusion, JDT mission to promote pro-poor policies and encourage donor harmonisation is still highly relevant to the context of Southern Sudan today. Yet the JDT's role and responsibilities do not reflect its original mandate. Donor integration, as described in the MoU and JRD, has not materialised, not least because MDTF performance itself has been low (further explained in Chapter 5.) and because the assumption that JDPs would "easily" work through their respective institutional constraints and incentives to integrate has proved unrealistic (further examined in Chapter 6).

The proliferation of JDP bilateral projects outside JDT's remit has reduced JDT's ability to take on full responsibility for "development cooperation in Southern Sudan on behalf of all participants", as stated in the MoU. It has also reduced its leverage on donor integration. Attempts to revise the MoU were subsequently made by inserting the word "certain" to the MoU Article 1 "JDT will manage [certain] development cooperation programmes funded by the Participants which are outside the scope of the MDTF". This was never finalised, however. Significant time was also spent on discussing options for pooled funds and re-defining JDT's objectives.

## 4.2 Strategic Development

The main strategic documents used by JDT since its launch in 2006 are: the MoU, the JRD (including the draft Result Matrix in appendix), and the 2007 and 2008 workplans.

The JDT had no consolidated workplan to support its activities in 2006. Instead, the JDT worked toward performance objectives, as set out in the MoU and the The Joint Donor Respons Document (JRD). These objectives were a combination of possible inputs, outputs and outcomes for each of JDT's main functions, namely promoting policy dialogue; donor coordination; technical support to the MDTF Secretariat; Monitoring and Reporting and Advisory Role to Capitals; programme management; and achieving outcomes in key sectors.

The priority sectors were those selected in JRD – basic health and HIV/AIDS; Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and peace-building; and Public Finance Management (PFM). But consultation in 2006 also took place across a wide range of sectors– some outside the scope of JDT priorities. This was essential for JDT to gain a rapid understanding of the challenges and needs in Southern Sudan and build relationships with government officials, the international community, but also civil society.

Recognising the need to frame JDT's mandate within specific deliverables, the SMB agreed in 2006 that a Multi-Annual Strategic Plan should be used to identify sectors and/or areas of intervention and identify types of possible joint instruments or mechanisms. Thus, a broader Joint Donor Assistance Strategy (JDAS) was submitted in May 2007, initially including the contribution the JDT would make to this strategy. Indeed, JDT was asked to contribute towards the drafting process.

The JDAS sought to reconfirm the overall mission and guiding principles for the JDT and proposed a strategic framework based on three priority objectives:

- To support the operationalisation and implementation of the CPA;
- To support the development of a public sector which can deliver and is accountable to the people; and,
- To promote the effectiveness of aid in line with best practice principles, particularly in the post-conflict, fragile state setting of Southern Sudan.

The JDAS was actually never approved, being deemed too ambitious by SMB. But the time spent by JDT on developing the JDAS meant that the development of its own more limited work plan for 2007 was delayed. Several stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation felt that the JDT's involvement in the JDAS was an unnecessary deviation from what should have been more succinct objectives of a JDT workplan.

When the JDT workplan was finally submitted in May 2007, it emphasized a shift towards public sector reforms and, as the year evolved, lesser focus on security sector reforms. 2008 consolidated the new objectives under three clusters: Cluster A (GoSS planning, budgeting and public sector reform); Cluster B (Basic Service Delivery); and Cluster C (Governance – rule of law, accountability, and democracy).

Not having a three-year workplan has left some corporate issues unresolved (see Chapter 6), Yet even the annual JDT's workplans have been deficient in several respects; the outcomes are too broad to be useful and the resources and responsibilities assigned to each outcome are not clearly allocated.

The preference of the SMB to "refine and focus" the JDT workplan during the year (ostensibly to seize opportunities for influence and impact where they arose) itself created confusion and a lack of clear direction for the Team. For example, at the time of setting its broad objectives (end May 2006), JDT had not anticipated that the government would take an early lead in developing three-year sectoral strategies through the BSWG process. The team nonetheless identified this process as an important entry point to work with the government and other stakeholders, including other donors. This opportunistic approach has proved essential to raise JDT's profile in its first year in office. As a result of this, the narrow focus on PFM initially put forward as a priority sector was forfeited (in part because a full time adviser could not be found) to allow for a wider range of interventions on Public Sector Reforms.

The reduced emphasis on SSR in the 2007 JDT workplan highlights a broader issue over the engagement of the various donor partners. The SMB decided that JDPs in Khartoum were best placed to engage in SSR through their bilateral programmes<sup>15</sup>. Their policies varied too much for a common approach, though the JDT would still retain a role in supporting disarmament, demobilization, and especially reintegration..

There has been no consensus either on the type of engagement needed with NGOs. In 2007, the SMB agreed that activities would primarily focus on building up the relevant government mechanisms and institutions<sup>16</sup>, with reduced emphasis on the demand side of governance. This in effect put an end to a proposal for a JDT-managed civil society fund.

### 4.3 Activities

As well as setting up the office, JDT was expected to meet its broad objectives through a number of core functions. These were technical support to the MDTF; programme management; policy dialogue; advisory support in key sectors; donor coordination; and monitoring, reporting and advisory roles to capitals. This section provides an overview of the activities pursued over the Evaluation period.

#### **Technical support to the MDTF secretariat**

Support to the MDTF has been central to the JDT's work. The Joint Donor Response Document (JRD, 2005) details how the JDT is expected to carry out its mission: *"The JDT will be responsible for Development Cooperation in Southern Sudan on behalf of the participating Governments and will promote donor effectiveness particularly through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF)."* This is to be done by *"working closely with the GoSS and the Secretariat of the MDTF to make it an effective channel for donor resources and only using bilateral alternatives as a last*

---

<sup>15</sup> This decision came on the heels of a joint donor security sector needs assessment, which JDT had commissioned in January 2007.

<sup>16</sup> Workplan 2007, executive summary, page 3

resort.” JDT responsibilities towards the MDTF were further identified as:

- The JDT would closely monitor the MDTF (South).
- The Head of the JDT would have the mandate to agree to proposals as a member of the Oversight Committee. However, tranche release decisions will be referred to capitals for decision.
- The JDT would help the GoSS and the MDTF Secretariat with the detailed project and sector work that is needed to implement components of the [poverty eradication] strategy.

The table below is taken from the JDAS 2007-2009, which was prepared after the JDT’s first year of operation. Although the JDAS was not fully endorsed, this is the most comprehensive available statement of how the team sees its mandate with regard to the MDTF and sets a framework for considering how it has interpreted that mandate.

<b>JDT WAYS OF WORKING IN SUPPORT OF THE MDTF</b>	
Entry point	Ways the JDT can make a difference
Oversight Committee	Ensuring well-focused agendas & well-chaired meetings; effective mechanisms for follow-up on agreed actions; good participation in meetings (GoSS, donor, civil society representation); Co-ordination with EC & UN to agree policy positions wherever appropriate; Ensuring JDP policy positions and recommendations well co-ordinated and presented; Supporting work towards greater predictability of JDP financing. Ensuring linkages with MDTF-N agenda (via co-ordination between the Co-Chairs).
MDTF Technical Secretariat	Support to Head of Secretariat & team: managing all key MDTF processes, decision-making, managing key relationship with GoSS. Participation in project missions (key sectors) and portfolio-wide missions. Membership of Technical Working Group. Collaborate to ensure the right data are being produced for OC, GoSS and other stakeholders. Work with Secretariat to ensure coherence between Secretariat and Monitoring Agent.
GoSS – policy level	Policy dialogue with full range of GoSS ministers & senior officials regarding MDTF performance, ensuring concerns are fed back into OC and other mechanisms as appropriate; Supporting GoSS to embed MDTF into planning and budgeting processes (BSWGs). Helping ensure that MDTF forms part of broader policy/prioritisation process. Advice to GoSS on MDTF as requested. Ensuring that GoSS views on MDTF performance are fed to JDP capitals, and WB/MDTF, where appropriate
MoFEP	Ongoing partnership with MoFEP in support of GoSS-led policy and decision-making processes for the MDTF. Contribute to technical work to ensure MDTF links with BSWG and budget processes

MDTF programmes	Support to project design processes (IPPs & FPPs), either at a general level (provision of technical advice and comments through OC), or in areas where the JDT has advisory capacity, via a more in-depth engagement in project preparation process. Participation in project implementation mechanisms in key sectors.
WB and UN systems	Advocacy role: relaying of concerns for lobbying by HQs. Assessment of steps taken by WB & UN to improve procedures.
Media & public relations	Ensuring MDTF has good PR strategy. Ensuring PR strategy includes JDP countries. Incorporation of messages on the MDTF into the JDT's own Communications Strategy.
Other (non-MDTF development partners)	Advocacy to encourage other donors to contribute to the MDTF, explain MDTF function and modalities, encourage better co-ordination of development assistance in support of MDTF.

Source: JDAS 2007-09, Final Draft presented April 2007

The JDT's role in the OC for MDTF-S has been central to its work. After five meetings of an Interim Oversight Committee, in May 2006 the Norwegian Ambassador to Sudan handed the Co-Chair position to the Head of the Joint Donor Office, marking the first meeting of the MDTF OC. The Head of the Joint Donor Office sits on that committee as Co-Chair, with the GoSS Minister of Finance and Economic Planning as Chairman. The OC is responsible for "exercising programmatic and allocation responsibility for MDTF operations ..." and "provide guidance on all matters that affect the efficiency, effectiveness and economic and financial sustainability of the MDTF".

JDT also assisted the MDTF Technical Secretariat, especially in the first year when it had limited initial capacity in Juba. This Secretariat is managed and staffed by the World Bank to work jointly with government to "receive and review proposals ... and undertake technical appraisals"; and to "report ... against agreed benchmarks to the Oversight Committee". JDT also took on a representative role, discussing MDTF progress with NGOs and the Council of Ministers.

### **Programme management**

The potential management of bilateral programmes by JDT was an important topic throughout the years 2006, 2007 and still is today. For example, during the JDAS discussions, it was agreed that "post-bilateral" (pooled) programmes would in principle be managed by JDT. For bilateral programmes that were to continue beyond the end of 2006, it was agreed that "the bilateral offices would retain administrative control but JDT should take policy and monitoring responsibility in Juba." JDT advisers have involved their JDP counterparts in their work and, on some occasions, have used JDT's presence on the ground to monitor, and provide advice to, their bilateral programmes within the various funds.

The possibility of shared management responsibilities between JDPs and JDT was discussed for the Basic Services Fund (BSF, see Box 7). JDT has hopes to take on the full management of the fund by 2007, but because of limited in-house capacity

and the controversial status of the BSF as a pooled fund among donors, the handover did not take place. At the time of this Evaluation, shared management responsibilities between JDP and JDT was still not formalised. JDT is an observer at the Steering Committee (alongside DFID), though staff constraints have prevented regular attendance.

#### **Box 7: Basic Services Fund**

In late 2004, DFID initiated a study and related consultations around the development of a £10 million fund to support the delivery of basic services in Southern Sudan through NGOs. The resultant two-year BSF was initially intended to bridge the gap until the MDTF became operational. The BSF was launched in January 2006. DFID has committed over £17 million to the programme. The purpose of the programme is to assist the GoSS with the provision of basic services, via NGOs, to the most under-served populations in Southern Sudan. Basic services are defined as primary education, primary health care and basic water, sanitation, and hygiene education.

Project proposals are assessed on a competitive basis and are approved by a Steering Committee, chaired by the Ministry of Finance. The Committee is open to representation by GoSS line ministries, though attendance is often poor. The first round for proposals, in January 2006, attracted over 113 proposals of which six were selected for funding. The total allocation of funds in this first round was around £8 million. A BSF II has now been confirmed.

The JDAS initiative also envisaged a 'pooled fund' to support civil society initiatives that would work on advocacy and promote accountability (such as elections, budget). With the collapse of the JDAS, and in the absence of such pooled funds, the JDT retains full management responsibility for a Technical Assistance fund, with an annual budget of USD500,000 and a Small Scale Support Fund, with a budget of USD200,000. Both Funds are managed in house according to the JDT financial procedures and the host donor requirements.

The Technical Assistance Fund was created to cater for immediate short-term capacity development inputs to meet emerging issues of the GoSS or semi-public institutions. The Fund was designed to complement in an ad-hoc manner GoSS own funds as well as the CBTF. The JDT may also utilize the fund to undertake analyses, reviews and studies. The fund seeks to make effective use of a combination of expertise from the partner countries, the sub-region, and the Southern Sudanese Diaspora. Various GoSS Ministries benefitted from assistance through, for example, the provision of short term consultancies. Studies and reports have also been financed under this support; for example, instruments review for NGOs and preparation of the second phase of the CBTF. The TA Fund provided support to four projects in 2007 which were to be completed in 2008; it also has made one firm commitment and five provisional commitments to projects in 2008.

The Small Scale Support Fund was created at the beginning of the JDT, mirroring similar schemes by some JDP donors around the world. Local organizations are eligible to submit proposals to the JDT. Priority is given to indigenous organizations in order to promote capacity building within civil society in Southern Sudan. Selected projects cover a range of states and thematic areas (Basic Services, Good Governance, and Poverty Reduction). A selection panel consisting of a representa-

tive from each Policy Cluster, plus the Head of Operational Management and the PO Corporate Affairs, makes a final selection of projects. The projects are then submitted to IMAC (Inter-Ministerial Appraisal Committee) at the MoFEP for approval.

In the first year, the Small Scale Support Fund did not become operational since there was a lack of guidelines and systems for disbursements. By April 2008, 96 applications had been received of which 60 were eligible; 15 shortlisted and 9 selected in May 2008. By the end of the second quarter 2008, a further 7 projects were selected. Three projects were finished.

### **Policy dialogue and sector work**

JDT has been quite successful in establishing a close relationship with the GoSS. The team was pro-active throughout the evaluation period, taking forward policy dialogue, directly with government officials, through the MDTF, or within the government-donor BSWGs established in 2006.

Since the GoSS lacks physical infrastructure and adequate meeting space, the JDT's office has regularly provided space for the GoSS to meet with the JDT and other key stakeholders. As a result, the building in Juba has become a landmark and a place where government and donor officials often meet.

The JDT has also built direct relationships with key Ministries, such as MoFEP, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labour, Public Services and Human Resource Development (MLPSHRD). It was able to engage at the highest level of government. JDT has maintained regular policy dialogue with the Ministry of Presidential Affairs and took part in all the Governors Forum meetings starting in 2006 onwards. Other government institutions that have worked with JDT include the Anti-Corruption Commission. In addition, the JDT head of office delivered key-note address before the Council of Ministers in 2007.

JDT has also supported and played an important facilitating role in the GoSS-Donor Quarterly Forum. Doubtless, the JDT has won the trust of Sudanese counterparts. The salient question, however, is the extent to which such a dialogue has been constructive and has helped the GoSS take the lead on development and policy work issues. This is further explored in Chapter 5.

At sector level, JDT advisers have worked through the MDTF, directly with Ministries, and through the BSWGs. Under the MDTF its work has been confined to the Police and Prison project, and from 2007, the Health Umbrella Project, with additional but reduced involvement in Census, Currency, Core fiduciary and Capacity Building. It has worked with six BSWGs co-chairing four of them (Accountability, Health, Rule of Law, Social and Humanitarian Affairs). It participated in the Public Administration BSWG (strategic planning and budgeting process) and in 2008 also became the co-chair for this BSWG.

The JDT's involvement in the health sector came late due to the absence of an adviser. Activities picked up in 2007, when the JDT began to co-chair the Health



and HIV/AIDS BSWG and worked closely with the World Bank on the MDTF Health Umbrella. It was noted that the health adviser did not participate in the BSWG discussion in 2007, but was present in 2008 for most of the process.

JDT has had no direct engagement in the education sector – which the EC leads – although it gave support to joint sectoral reviews in 2007 and 2008. Both reviews (with JDP education experts from four out of six HQs on the team) clearly recommended a stepping up of JDT engagement in this sector, but there was little follow-up from SMB.

### **Donor coordination**

As representative of five, then six bilateral donors, JDT has positioned itself relatively quickly as a lead player in the emerging donor landscape. As well as co-chairing four BSWGs, the JDT has regularly hosted high-levels meetings with agencies that have a permanent representation in Juba, including the UN, EC, and the World Bank. The JDT has also held talks bilaterally with key donors, in particular USAID, and in some occasions participated in World Bank-led and EC-led joint donor missions. Also a degree of useful coordination took place between JDT clusters and MDTF clusters; while the EC focussed on education, JDT focused on health, and USAID led on infrastructure.

Donor coordination within JDPs has mostly been carried out behind-the-scenes through JDT's corporate activities and during SMB and AG meetings. This is discussed in more depth in Chapter 5.

Pooled funds outside MDTF were also a major focus of JDT's support for donor coordination with boundary partners. Corresponding activities are described as follows:

**Capacity Building Trust Fond (CBTF):** The CBTF has operated since 2005, supported by the UK, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden, the EC and Italy, and administered by UNICEF. Originally conceived as a temporary mechanism to support the SPLM transition to government it was given a very flexible mandate, including broadly defined government capacity building, support to SPLM operating expenses, and quick start private sector development projects. In practice the bulk of its finance has supported government capacity building and more recently, support to the PSR process – particularly during 2007. The JDT represented JDPs on the CBTF steering committee from the outset.

**Strategic Partnership Arrangement (SPA):** The SPA is a pooled funding mechanism, administered by the UNDP and co-financed by the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands. The SPA focuses specifically on medium term capacity building of Governance and Rule of Law. It principally funds UNDP projects only, including the Local Government Recovery Programme in Southern Sudan. The SPA has been extended for a period of 14 months until March 2009, during which a new framework will be developed. Despite the absence of a formal mandate for representation (in part because SPA management decisions until recently took place in Khartoum), the JDT engaged in the SPA from the outset and remained a consistent focus of the



Governance and Rule of Law team throughout the evaluation period.

The **Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF)** for Sudan is a pooled funding mechanism for humanitarian activities in Sudan; first established in 2005 as a pilot project and fully implemented and operational since 2006. Only humanitarian projects included in the UN and Partners Work Plan for Sudan (the Work Plan) are eligible for CHF funding. The main objective of the CHF is to provide early and predictable funding and to support the timely allocation and disbursement of donor resources to the most critical humanitarian needs of Sudan under the direction of the Humanitarian Coordinator. The JDT has had very little involvement in this fund.

**Sudan Recovery Fund for Southern Sudan (SRF-SS)** is a new funding mechanism launched in the second half of 2008. A joint partnership of the GoSS, the UN, and donor partners, the SRF-SS aims to facilitate a transition from humanitarian to recovery assistance through wide ranging support that offers quick recovery impacts and demonstrates peace dividends. A Steering Committee has been formed to oversee the work of the SRF-SS. Chaired by the GoSS, the Steering Committee comprises representatives of the GoSS, development partners, UN and NGO communities. A Technical Secretariat has been established to facilitate the work of the Steering Committee, which will be tasked with reviewing proposal submissions and making recommendations to the Steering Committee for funding. The JDT played an advisory role in the design of the SRF. As well as co-chairing the MDTF and holding one of the three donor seats, JDT co-chairs the SRF, with DFID retaining a seat in its own right.

#### **Dialogue with NGOs**

An important aspect of JDT's work has been to connect with NGOs. NGOs were not included in either the MoU or the mandate of the JDT, despite being important service delivery agents during both humanitarian and recovery periods. A first series of meetings was held with NGOs through the NGO forum in 2006. This continued in 2007, with JDT also providing funding for a survey on NGO perspectives and experiences regarding access to funding mechanisms. The JDT also supported a series of workshops for NGOs building on the network of contacts it had established with indigenous NGOs through the Small-Scale Support Scheme. It lobbied for NGO participation in BSWGs.

#### **Monitoring, reporting and advisory roles to capitals**

With joint donor funding expected to be the backbone of donor harmonization under JDT, it was initially assumed that monitoring and reporting outside these programmes would be minimal. According to the MoU, the principle focus was to be on monitoring and reporting on the "delivery of humanitarian assistance and other aspects of the local situation"; and, on advising capitals on decision-making with respect to humanitarian assistance.

JDT was involved in a host of activities related to individual and collective donor matters. Much time has, for example been spent on organizing JDP field visits in Southern Sudan. This, combined with the time-consuming process of drafting JDAS, meant that JDT did not meet its reporting requirements in its first year of operation.

Reporting became more regular, however, from 2007. Corporate issues are discussed in greater length in Chapter 5.

#### 4.4 Risks

Risks to the JDT initiative itself that were identified at the time of signing of the MoU included internal threats (poor retention and insufficient appointment of staff; logistical delays to JDT) and external threats (lack of commitment by all parties to the CPA; rising insecurity; corruption; and humanitarian crisis). The failure of donor harmonization was also seen as a potential risk.

The depth of the risk analysis by the JDT improved significantly as the work plans became more mature and detailed. The JDT identified detailed risks at cluster level, including their possible impact and related mitigation strategies. Risk mitigation strategies for internal threats principally relied on closer working relationships between SMB, AG and JDT. Assessing and reducing the greater external political and security risks has linked the JDT closely with individual embassies in Khartoum and capitals abroad, as well as with delegations in New York. In describing its role in mitigating these risks, the JDT stated that they needed to “lobby, strengthen, support, monitor closely, coordinate, improve....etc”.

In conclusion, assumptions that were made at the time of drafting the MoU, with regard to aid delivery and the Government of Southern Sudan’s agenda, did not materialise. As a result, the JDT had to adjust its range of activities to match the reality of the South Sudan context, while responding to the demands of Donor Partners. There was a missed opportunity, after JDT invested considerable efforts drafting a multi-annual strategic plan, which SMB did not approve.

## 5. Joint Donor Team Outputs and Delivery

This chapter focuses on the effectiveness question. The first section briefly looks at ways JDT outputs have been monitored and measured over the review period. The second section assesses JDT's contribution with respect to applying the Paris Declaration principles. The third section assesses JDT's contribution to programme delivery, including MDTF. The final section looks at JDT's contribution to the wider goals of poverty reduction and state-building and its adherence with the OECD-DAC principles of international engagement in Fragile States or situations. The analysis draws heavily on the stakeholder survey in which key stakeholders were asked to express their level of satisfaction on the performance of JDT with respect to key outputs.

### 5.1 Measuring Outputs

Although JDT has reported on its activities on a regular basis since early 2007, measuring progress towards its targets has remained challenging. This is in part because JDT works closely with JDPs and other donors, hence making it difficult to attribute specific outcomes to JDT, and in part because it took some time for JDT to develop an M&E system that captures JDT/JDP contributions in an appropriate manner. In addition, the change in strategic directions has made it difficult to monitor progress from one year to the next.

The result matrix used in the first year of operation was succinct and focused on broad government goals, with little thinking on possible entry points for JDT. As a result, the SMB suggested that: “the matrix could benefit from a clearer focus on outcomes and on more specific interventions (activities, programmes, policy work) the JDT will engage in to influence the outcome. It should form part of the planning process with a focus on 2007”.<sup>17</sup>

Accordingly, the result matrix for 2007 incorporated more detailed objectives and targets, laid out intervention strategies and related activities, and factored in human resource requirements and JDP advisory and programmatic inputs. The result matrix was used to report against 2007 activities in the JDT annual report.

The matrix improved again in 2008 to become a comprehensive logical framework that links inputs, outputs, and outcomes. This matrix allows result monitoring for each cluster at three levels: (1) GoSS outcomes to which JDT/JDP assistance is contributing; (2) the measurable output of JDT/JDP assistance; and (3) JDT action

---

<sup>17</sup> SMB Minutes, September 2006

that contributes to GoSS objectives and role of the JDP in achieving these objectives. Nevertheless, JDT input/action remains difficult to quantify. There is still no clear statement of resources allocated to a given output or responsibilities allocated for a given action. JDT had initially envisaged working with the GoSS to strengthen its monitoring and evaluation framework; this priority was dropped in the ensuing years.

JDT has, since 2007, been keen to explore a synergy between JDT and the various donor partner activities. The extent this has been successful, or properly captured, in the annual reports remains unclear, however. The table below gives an indication of JDPs activities in Southern Sudan per sector.

**Table 2: JDP activities in Southern Sudan per sector**

	Public Admin	Rule of Law	Security	Health	Social and Humanitarian	Accountability
Canada	X	X	X		X	
Denmark					X	
UK	X	X	X	X	X	
Netherlands		X		X	X	
Sweden				X	X	
Norway	X			X	X	X

**5.2 JDT’s Contribution to the Paris Declaration Agenda**

Tables 3, 4 and 5 summarise the mid-term evaluation’s findings with respect to JDT’s contribution to the Paris Declaration agenda for the first three aid effectiveness principles, respectively namely ownership, alignment, harmonisation. In each table, we first introduce the results of the 2008 OECD-DAC Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration for Sudan. 2008 was the first year that Sudan took part in the Survey; both GoNU and GoSS participated. We then make an evaluative judgment as to whether JDT’s contribution to PD principles has been low, moderate or high, based on the results of the online survey and additional evidence gathered during the field visit and follow-up interviews.

**JDT’s contribution to ownership**

As explained in the 2008 OECD-DAC survey, promoting ownership in Sudan as a whole involves two levels of interventions, one being concerned with the country’s ability to coordinate the efforts of development actors and the other being concerned with supporting the country’s ability to exercise effective leadership over its development policies and strategies. The OECD-DAC survey rates ownership in Sudan as low.

In Southern Sudan, about 76% of stakeholders that took part in the web survey agree that there is a formalized process for dialogue to support aid coordination. Views as to whether the government is pro-active and/or in the driving seat are mixed, although more than 70% of respondents think that weaknesses in the coordination of aid are being addressed. Perceptions about Southern Sudan’s leadership over its development strategies vary, although more than half of re-

spondents (54.9%) agree that weaknesses are being addressed in budget planning and execution – an essential step towards making poverty reduction strategies operational.

On average, non-JDP/JDT respondents (Government officials, other donors, and civil society) tended to paint a more positive picture of the level of ownership in Southern Sudan than JDT/JDP respondents. A much larger proportion of JDT/JDP respondents (many based outside Juba) felt unable to comment. This indicates a complex and fluid situation, in which development policies and strategies, and to support them, aid inflows, have come with both positive and negative developments.

**Table 3: JDT's contribution to ownership in Southern Sudan**

OECD-DAC Survey (2008)	Web-survey Results	Evaluative Judgment
<p>Rating – LOW.</p> <p><u>Main indicator:</u> Partners have operational development strategies (link strategic priorities with Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (MDTF))</p> <p><u>Challenge:</u> coordination North and South</p> <p><u>Priority actions:</u> At GoSS level, prepare national development strategy</p>	<p><u>Context</u></p> <p>1) 70.6% agree that weaknesses are being addressed in the coordination of aid</p> <p>2) 76.5% agree that there is a formalised process for dialogue</p> <p>3) Mixed views as to whether the government is pro-active and/or in the driving seat.</p> <p>4) 54.9% agree that weaknesses are being addressed in budget planning and execution.</p> <p><u>Ownership of development strategy</u></p> <p>1) 64.7% agree that the JDT has helped to strengthen government capacity in Budget Planning.</p> <p>2) 66.5% agree that the JDT has contributed to improving effective planning and allocation of resources by GoSS.</p> <p><u>Ownership of aid</u></p> <p>2) 80% agree that the JDT has helped to strengthen government capacity in aid coordination</p>	<p>JDT – value added: HIGH</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• JDT's support to the GoSS in making BSWGs operational and developing an aid strategy highly effective</li> <li>• Presence of JDT advisory staff essential in establishing close working relationships with GOSS on these issues.</li> <li>• JDP direct inputs remained limited.</li> <li>• JDT contribution highly visible</li> </ul>

JDT's value-added in promoting ownership is rated as high. Firstly, 80% of all respondents agree that JDT has helped the GoSS to take the lead in aid coordination. One of JDT's early achievements was its support to the GoSS in developing an aid strategy. JDT provided advice and support to MoFEP and acted as a co-ordination point for development partners. The GoSS Aid Strategy was endorsed by the Council of Ministers in November 2006. JDT continued to play an active role in the ensuing year, when the GoSS received a joint response from donors. As a result, the Aid Coordination Unit in MOFEP regards JDT as a key interlocutor. Donor mapping is another area where JDT's input has been significant, helped by contributions from JDP partners.

Secondly, JDT has made a visible contribution to supporting Southern Sudan's ability to exercise effective leadership over its development policies and strategies. About two-thirds of stakeholders think that the JDT has helped to strengthen government capacity in budget planning. Similarly, 62.5% of respondents agree that the JDT has contributed to improving effective planning and allocation of resources by GoSS. From the onset, JDT worked closely with the MoFEP on its annual Budget Sector Planning process.

JDT not only provided encouragement and support for the development of the GoSS spending framework, but also actively lobbied GoSS at the highest levels in late 2007 on the need for it to develop a clear set of spending priorities focusing on pro-poor spending and basic services, JDT also helped the GoSS with the drafting of the 2007 and 2008 JAM reviews and its presentation of progress to date, challenges and ways forward, for the second and third Sudan Consortium. In early 2008, JDT temporary economist was partially seconded to MoFEP to lead the production of the forthcoming JAM review and contribute to the GoSS Future Priorities paper.

The presence of JDT advisory staff in Juba was instrumental in establishing close relationships with the GoSS to work on these issues. The Team was able to gain an in-depth understanding of government processes through their representation in five BSWGs. BSWGs, to which development partners (and more recently INGOs) have been invited to participate, are at the core of GoSS's efforts to make development strategies more effective. They have a number of functions:

- To develop Budget Sector Plans on an annual basis;
- To monitor expenditure outturns and review annual sectoral performance;
- To guide the prioritisation of donor aid at the sectoral level.

Importantly, JDT helped to make BSWGs more effective by encouraging greater and wider participation in BSWGs. The JDT also contributed to closer inter-ministerial relationships, in particular between the Ministry of Labour and Public Service and MoFEP, hence consolidating the institutional arrangements behind the planning and budgeting process. JDTs' input into BSWGs remained meanwhile limited.

### **JDT's contribution to donor alignment**

Results of the OECD-DAC survey show a low level of donor alignment to policies and systems in Sudan as a whole. The survey concludes that, whereas aid to Sudan is largely aligned with national priorities, the lack of institutional capacity hinders the use of country systems and leads to duplications in aid management. The web-survey did not include specific indicators on the perceived level of donor alignment to policies and systems in Southern Sudan, although a small majority of respondents (51%) agree that weaknesses in PFM are being addressed. As with GoNU, the focus of donor support in Southern Sudan has been to make use of, and build the capacity of, national systems for PFM and procurement.

JDT's added-value in promoting donor alignment to GoSS policies is rated as high and that of promoting donor alignment to GoSS systems as moderate. A total 66% of respondents think that the JDT has helped to strengthen donor alignment with GoSS policies.

The JDT played a significant role in promoting policy dialogue between donors and GoSS on public sector reforms and PFM. When it became clear in 2007 that GoSS would have difficulty meeting its commitment to fund MDTF on the agreed 2:1 ratio, a concerted effort was made, at the JDT's suggestion, to analyze the situation and agree actions to address it. A High Level Technical Mission on Fiscal Issues, with representatives from the World Bank, the African Development Bank, DFID, and USAID, was formed as a result. With JDT support, the Review addressed two highly critical issues: the level and management of Southern Sudan's revenues from the sale of oil and the control of public expenditure, in particular government payrolls. That the GoSS accepted the principal recommendations of the June 2007 High Level Technical Mission on Fiscal Issues, is an important measure of the strength of the relationship between Government and its donor partners, including JDT, given the sensitivity of these issues.

**Table 4: JDT's contribution to donor alignment**

OECD-DAC Survey (2008)	Web-survey Results	Evaluative Judgment
<p>Rating – LOW.</p> <p><u>Selected Indicators:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Reliable country systems (PFM and Procurement)</li> <li>2. Aid flows are aligned on national priorities (reported on government budget)</li> <li>3. Strengthen capacity by coordinated support</li> <li>4. Use of country PFM systems</li> <li>5. Use of country procurement systems</li> <li>6. Strengthen capacity by avoiding PIUs</li> </ol> <p><u>Challenge:</u></p> <p>Low capacity of country systems</p> <p><u>Priority Actions:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Build capacity for PFM country systems;</li> <li>2. Better estimation of budget inflows;</li> <li>3. Better tracking of donor support</li> </ol>	<p><u>Alignment to policies and systems</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 66.9% agree that the JDT has helped to strengthen donor alignment with GoSS policies.</li> <li>2. 51% agree that the JDT has helped to strengthen donor alignment with GoSS systems</li> </ol> <p>Between 17.6% and 23.5% unable to comment</p>	<p>JDT value-added: MODERATE TO HIGH</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• JDT has played a key role in facilitating policy dialogue (and with it alignment) between donors and GoSS</li> <li>• Its influence on on-budget aid reporting has remained limited.</li> <li>• MDTF is aligned to country priorities and systems</li> <li>• OC has been slow in resolving issues around procurement.</li> <li>• JDT has not provided direct support for PFM capacity building.</li> <li>• JDT has positively influenced coordinated donor Technical Assistance through advisory inputs into CBTF</li> </ul>

The recent launch of Public Sector Reform donor working group has been another of JDT's measurable outcomes. Through this, the JDT, the World Bank and USAID, have supported GoSS in designing and delivering a PSR/PFM roadmap. A donor coordinator, funded from the Technical Assistance Fund, was embedded in the Ministry of Labour and Public Service full time between January and May 2008.

JDT has also encouraged donor alignment to GoSS policies in other priority clusters, principally (but not exclusively) through its participation (and co-chair) in BSWGs.



The quality of dialogue between government and donors has nonetheless varied across sectors. For example, relations between donors and the Ministry of Health have sometimes been strained and communication has been poor, as indicated by a recent policy decision regarding primary health care salaries that was not shared with donors. Although policy dialogue in the health sector has been at times challenging, the JDT has meanwhile made good use of its close partnership with the World Bank under the MDTF Health Umbrella to work with the Ministry of Health on policy, covering the establishment of a national health care, and more recently health financing<sup>18</sup>. No health sector-wide strategy has been developed yet.

Donor alignment with GoSS policies has also improved as a result of JDT's facilitation between main stakeholders. Under the JRD, the JDT was tasked to make "a major contribution to policy dialogue with the GoSS on issues of governance, poverty reduction and service delivery, in close collaboration with the other main development partners". JDT's work in this respect has been very process oriented. From the outset, JDT became a key facilitator between government and donors on a range of national and sector policies; supported by its Juba office and the work of full-time advisers. Both donor and government attendance in BSWGs has improved under its facilitation. JDT has also encouraged NGOs to become more involved. That the GoSS endorsed the latter's participation in BSWGs in 2008 was an important step towards closer donor alignment within GoSS priorities. The majority of donor-funded projects in Southern Sudan are indeed implemented through NGOs.

The lack of "on-budget" aid remains the main challenge to donor alignment. Despite a formalised process for dialogue and broad support for JAM priorities, donors have in fact done little to coordinate their projects within and across sectors. Although aid is largely aligned with national priorities (notably through the MDTF), only a small proportion of aid is known to the government. Preliminary analysis produced by the GoSS during the Third Sudan Consortium (2008) shows that the reporting of donor projects has improved. A total 339 projects were reported for 2008, against 177 projects in 2007, bringing the total value of funding to USD 746m. While the increased reporting of donor projects, mostly as a result of NGOs participation in BSWGs, is an important advancement, the proliferation of project continues to make aid co-ordination difficult. In particular, the GoSS has raised concerns that most of the projects listed in the mapping have not been submitted to IMAC. IMAC is central to the GoSS' aid management strategy. Yet, to date, the IMAC has only appraised 37 projects, just a fraction of the projects reported. JDT has encouraged JDPs to submit their projects to IMAC, but few have done so.

On the issue of strengthening of GoSS systems, there was less of a consensus overall about the performance of JDT. This highlights the issue of capacity within the government where there will always be a 'lag' between policy and building the appropriate mechanisms for implementation, a point echoed throughout this report. Over 50% of respondents think that the JDT has helped to strengthen donor alignment with GoSS systems; 25.5% disagreed and another 23.5% felt unable to comment.

---

18 The JDT is currently commissioning a study on health financing to explore policy options in respect of removing health user fees.



JDT's contribution to donor alignment to Southern Sudan's systems has principally taken place through the MDTF. MDTF is indeed the only aid delivery mechanism in Southern Sudan which is 'on-budget' and requires the direct involvement of government line agencies from project selection to implementation. As co-chair of the MDTF OC, JDT worked closely with the GoSS, the Technical Secretariat, and other donor members of the OC to find ways to support GoSS's limited technical capacity, without compromising either Government's ownership of the programme or the principles of good management and fiduciary control. Despite these efforts, building capacity has taken time. For example, there was some criticism of the OC (and by extension JDT as co-chair) over delays in contracting a Procurement Agent. The MDTF review, submitted in January 2008, found that the agent had been in breach of the Terms of Reference. Although the situation has now been resolved, the two year lapse indicates that OC had not responded quickly enough. JDT co-chair of the OC was nonetheless essential in keeping the momentum going.

In the absence of a PFM specialist, JDT's direct contribution to strengthening PFM systems in Southern Sudan has remained limited, although the Team played a key role in ensuring a coordinated donor response to public sector reforms and PFM through its support to joint donor missions and its co-chairing of the Accountability BSWGs. The accountability BSWG is primarily concerned with Financial Accountability rather than Governance per se, its main members being the MOFEP, the Anti-Corruption Commission and the Statistics Commission and the SSRDF.

Another JDT contribution to donor alignment in Southern Sudan has been through its involvement in the CBTF. The CBTF allows for a coordinated donor response to the government's technical assistance needs. Specifically, the JDT provided assistance for the revision of operational guidelines of CBTF (I). JDT has also played a key role in preparing the concept note for the second phase of the CBTF including funding. The performance of this fund is summarized in Box 8

#### **Box 8: Performance CBTF**

Total spending by the end of 2007 was almost US \$ 15m, a successful start. The first year of the CBTF saw significant progress in the establishment and development of GoSS functions, including the production and presentation of 2005 GoSS financial statements. By December the original Financial Management Agent (FMA) budget allocation had been fully utilized. A further six-month extension was agreed to allow for the contracting of the FMA for the second phase of the CBTF. The CBTF has been a highly effective financing mechanism for GoSS in the critical emerging areas of public service reform, public financial management and civil service capacity building. As GoSS strategies have developed in these areas, CBTF has provided rapid, flexible financing to support essential reforms, while providing capacity building through training to government officials. This has proved instrumental in maintaining the GoSS's momentum.

#### **JDT's contribution to donor harmonisation**

The OECD-DAC survey rates donor coordination in Sudan as a whole as moderate. The survey notes limitations both with regard to the use of common arrangements and the conduct of joint missions and shared analysis. The same applies to Southern Sudan.

**Table 5: JDT’s contribution to donor harmonisation**

PD Survey (2008)	Web-survey Results	Evaluative Judgment
<p>Rating – MODERATE</p> <p><u>Indicators:</u></p> <p>1. Use of Common arrangements or procedures – percent of aid provided as programme-based approach</p> <p>2. Encouraged share analysis – percent of (a) field missions and/or (b) country analytic work, including diagnostic reviews that are joint</p> <p><u>Challenges:</u></p> <p>Lack of government capacity</p> <p><u>Priority Actions:</u></p> <p>Increase use of PBAs</p>	<p><u>JDP Harmonisation</u></p> <p>1. 82.6% agree that the JDT helped strengthen donor coordination among the Joint Donor Partners</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 67.4% through shared analysis</li> <li>- 27.9% through joint donor mission</li> <li>- 35.4% through joint programming</li> <li>- 89% through strengthening of partnership working</li> </ul> <p>Between 14% and 26% unable to comment.</p> <p><u>Harmonisation JDPs/non-JDPs</u></p> <p>1. 54.2% agree that the JDT has helped strengthen donor coordination among other donors through shared analysis.</p> <p>2. 23.4% through joint donor missions</p> <p>3. 25.6% through joint programming</p> <p>4. 55.3% through strengthened partnership working</p> <p>Between 25% and 34% unable to comment.</p>	<p><u>JDT added-value: MODERATE</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Despite competing agendas and proliferation of bilateral projects, JDT highly valued as a one-stop-shop for donor co-ordination and for leading the way towards greater alignment.</li> <li>• Shared analysis is where JDT’s contribution has been the greatest.</li> <li>• More efforts required to promote joint donor mission and joint programming</li> </ul> <p><u>JDT added-value: MODERATE</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• JDT’s work with UN agencies and WB less visible. Evaluators nonetheless think that JDT has effectively promoted donor coordination with WB and UN agencies, by keeping the issue high on the agenda.</li> <li>• JDT’s made a limited, albeit positive, contribution to the development and delivery of pooled programmes outside MDTF</li> </ul>

JDT’s added-value in promoting donor harmonisation in Southern Sudan is rated as moderate. Its contribution to donor harmonisation can be measured at two different levels: amongst JDPs and more widely with JDT’s boundary partners, principally multilateral organisations.

More than 80% of stakeholders think that JDT has helped strengthen partnership among JDPs, demonstrating a “united front” in representing all JDPs under one banner. That (until recently<sup>19</sup>) no JDP member had advisors based in Juba has helped JDT in its representative role, both as co-chair of the MDTF OC and active participant in BSWGs. As discussed further in Chapter 6. JDT has nonetheless found it difficult to “harmonise the harmonisers” both with regard to sharing analysis and with regard to using common arrangements. However, the evaluation notes some recent positive developments in both areas.

19 DFID at the time of the evaluation mission has stationed a governance advisor from Khartoum in the JDO who will work on issues related to the JDT cluster on governance and the rule of law. He has been described as an ‘associate’ to the JDT. Some JDPs consider this very controversial.

JDT's advisory role to capitals has been increasingly conducive to shared analysis, as JDT's monitoring and reporting activities gained in strength over the years. As well as producing monthly, quarterly, and annual reports on its activities and more broadly developments in Southern Sudan, the JDT has produced and commissioned a number of briefs and analysis on specific issues for JDPs. This has contributed to a shared understanding of the context. Yet, despite JDT's efforts, JDPs have stopped short uniting behind a single one-policy framework to back the GoSS, as it was initially envisaged in the MoU. Attempts to do so in the Security Sector have failed, and there is little evidence that JDT/JDPs share a common vision in other sectors, including health.

On SSR, the JDT-commissioned Joint Donor Security Sector Needs Assessment Report<sup>20</sup> concludes: "Whilst important gaps in support remain, the most pressing need is for improved coordination, to include all aspects of the security sector, including DDR, SPLA transformation and elements currently labeled 'Rule of law' and community security. Without such coordination, a coherent and complementary approach to supporting the improved delivery of security and justice in southern Sudan will not be achieved". It further notes: "Most fundamentally, there is a need for a common policy framework to be agreed by the JDT partners as a platform for engagement in Southern Sudan and a shared view on the JDT role in delivery. The partners also need to agree on a shared conceptual understanding of the nature and scope of SSR ... this concept should be based on the OECD DAC guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance". This recommended approach was consequently not agreed by JDPs.

JDT's success in encouraging JDPs to combine donor missions has also been limited. For example, JDT supported 39 separate missions between May and December 2007, implying heavy transaction costs for the office as well as for the Sudanese counterparts. A set of guidelines regarding incoming missions was finally approved by the SMB in October 2007.

On using common arrangements, the JDT has not been able to curb the increase in JDPs bilateral programmes. Some JDPs have used their own bilateral projects in pursuit of their own particular area of interest, especially on governance and rule of law. This is contrary to the principles of harmonisation and alignment laid out in the MoU. JDP harmonisation through joint programming has recently strengthened, with JDT's support. For example, the number of JDP partners supporting the SPA with UNDP has increased from three to four (with Sweden joining the UK, Netherlands, and Denmark). The decision by the Netherlands to co-fund the BSF in its second phase is also a positive development.

The survey reveals a mixed response over JDT's contribution to encouraging donor harmonisation outside its own group. A third of respondents felt unable to comment to the question: "Has the JDT helped strengthen donor coordination among other donors?". Promoting shared analysis and partnership is where JDT is seen to have made a positive impact. Both JDP/JDT and non-JDP/JDT respondents agree here.

---

<sup>20</sup> Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2007

JDT has made good use of its office facilities to convene meetings between donors and has also used TA to support key studies.

JDT has also visibly added value to donor harmonisation with boundary partners through partnership working within the MDTF, and to a lesser extent, other pooled funds. Under the MDTF, difficulties between the World Bank and the UN over the terms of Grant Agreements between them were identified as a major obstacle. The JDT became an effective channel for communication and influencing to address this issue. JDT regularly informed JDPs of the situation on the ground and provided briefings on how intervention from the capitals might help to overcome difficulties. As well as helping to resolve procedural disagreements between the headquarters of the WB and UN agencies, JDT as co-chair of the OC lobbied the World Bank to strengthen the Technical Secretariat, and in late 2006, JDT, with DFID, made the case for changes to World Bank procedures. The JDT subsequently participated in Implementation Support Mission by the World Bank in May 2007. The mission identified a range of operational measures to improve the speed of implementation under the Bank's new procedures, many of which were taken on board.

As member of the board of the MDTF – Police and Prison Reform Project, the JDT also helped to improve collaboration between UNDP, UNMIS, UNODC and the Police and Prisons service in implementation of JDP-supported projects.

Specific examples of JDT's contribution to improving joint donor programming outside the MDTF (and CBTF) include:

- The JDT conducted a feasibility study on continuation of the BSF under JDT management, submitting proposals to the SMB in April 2008. It also drafted the concept note for BSF II.
- Under SRF, JDT has provided feedback to the UN in Juba on successive rounds of papers and the associated strategic framework. It continues to play a role in the operationalizing the SRF.
- Under SPA, JDT has prepared input to the UNDP management review of the SPA comprehensive review and participated in the SPA annual Steering Committee meeting held in Khartoum in December 2007.

Finally, a third of all respondents felt unable to comment as to whether JDT had contributed to the use of results-oriented frameworks and helped reinforce mutual accountability. Progress in these two areas have overall been slow, with the OECD-DAC survey ranking managing for results as low and mutual accountability as low to moderate for Sudan as a whole. The lack of statistical data is a particular concern.

In conclusion, the donor landscape in Southern Sudan remains complex. It also needs to be seen within the wider political context. While the GoSS' ability to set the agenda (through BSWGs) is considered quite high, it has also been keen to cultivate bilateral relationships with donors, notably the US and Norway, on issues of primary interest, notably SSR and defence. In other words, while MoFEP takes a strong lead on donor coordination, the government as a whole is inclined to let donors lead on development, while focusing on priorities related to the consolidation of its power and defence of its territory.

### 5.3 Joint Donor Team's Contribution to Programme Delivery

JDPs provide the largest financial contribution to the MDTF, and more than 80% of all respondents agree that the JDT has helped to improve the delivery of the Fund. There was slightly less enthusiasm on this point from non-JDP/JDT respondents, with some pointing out that it was either too early to make such a judgement, or that JDT had put a disproportional amount of attention on the MDTF.

The slow start of the MDTF has dented JDT's contribution to programme delivery over the evaluation period. MDTF-S performance is summarised in Box 9. Disbursements under MDTF were below targets in 2006 and less so in 2007 as a result of low government capacity and a wide range of operational issues, some already discussed in section 5.2. A significant proportion of the OC's time was spent addressing these issues. Elsewhere, JDT claims that its support to MDTF Technical Secretariat through its participation in its Technical Working Group and Monitoring Group, has helped re-prioritise the MDTF pipeline and strengthen MDTF management. However, JDT advisers have paid less policy attention to the individual projects funded under MDTF, and progress is still slow here. This partly reflects the fact that the JDT has only had specialist advisers in two sectors: Health and Governance/Rule of Law. These two advisers played a role in technical appraisal of projects submitted through the MDTF. Outside those sectors, however, JDT has not been equipped to provide detailed technical comments on the Initial and Final Project Proposals.

In conclusion, the JDT's influence on MDTF procedures has remained limited. More specifically, JDT did not have the resources or the clear mandate it would have needed to influence a situation in which responsibilities are divided between GoSS line ministries, the Technical Secretariat and the Procurement and Monitoring Agents; and where questions of efficiency and value for money have not, so far, been given priority. In some cases projects have been approved despite reservations on quality simply to speed up implementation.<sup>21</sup>

Looking ahead, JDT has given substantial support to the preparation of an MDTF Strategic Framework Paper 2008-2011. The team has also facilitated discussion around the advantages and disadvantages of different funding mechanisms and the need for a second funding facility – a South Sudan Recovery Fund – to support quick action programmes outside the scope of the MDTF.

---

21 An example cited in the mid-term evaluation of JDT was the Police and Prisons Project where the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs had advised against approval but the MDTF Oversight Committee nevertheless approved it hoping that shortcomings would be ironed out during implementation.

### Box 9: MDTF-S performance

The MDTFs for Sudan became effective with the signature of the first Grant Agreement between the World Bank and a donor in August 2005. During the first year of operation progress in generating projects and committing funds to implement them was slow. The World Bank MDTF Technical Secretariats drew strong criticism for under-estimating the scale of the task, for not providing enough experienced staff and for applying procurement procedures inflexibly. The fund was not meeting its primary objective of quick start and impact.

A detailed critical review of progress at the end of 2006 reported that: "Project development is moving into an implementation phase, one year and seven months after the Sudan MDTFs were created and one year after the MDTF-S became operational. The average time from inception, to approval of the Initial Project Proposal (IPP), approval of the Final Project Proposal (FPP) and meeting the conditions of effectiveness and disbursement appears to be a year to 18 months, with the exception of the Rapid Impact Emergency Project. This figure is an estimate, as most projects are not yet disbursing." (Scanteam, Review of Post Crisis Multi Donor Trust Funds, February 2007)

The follow-up review in December 2007 found the situation had improved: "The overall technical performance of the MDTF-S has improved since mid-2006. Phase One disbursements have reached 40 percent at the end of the second quarter of 2007, compared to 15 percent at the same time in 2006. Projects financed by the MDTF are gaining critical momentum and beginning to show tangible results on the ground, particularly in the areas of education, health and infrastructure where projects have moved into the implementation phase." (Scanteam, Review Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Funds, Phase 1, December 2007)

To make this improvement a series of obstacles had to be overcome, most of them procedural and operational. This included in 2006 a strengthening of Technical Secretariat, the strengthening of GoSS institutions, and the signing of a UN-World Bank General Framework. From 2007, procurement delays were also reduced and results from early projects established.

Nevertheless, performance across MDTF clusters has been mixed. To 31 March 2008, achievements were limited to some supplies of drugs and textbooks, some teacher training and the construction/maintenance of about 700 km of road. The rehabilitation of schools, which is the main priority in the MDTF education sector, has yet to start, after the first round of bids fell through.

JDT's contribution to the performance of other multilateral programmes has been less visible. Depending on the programmes, between a third and two-thirds of respondents felt unable to comment. Some 70% of JDP/JDT respondents felt, however, that their impact on the CBTF was strongest (contrasting with 52% of non-JDP/JDT views). Impact on the Basic Services Fund was also fairly positively reviewed by all. The JDT's relatively minor role in the Sudan Recovery Fund, SPA and CHF was noted by all respondents. JDT's co-chairing of the BSWG on social and humanitarian affairs has helped to influence the CHF delivery to some extent. The performance to date of the BSF and SPA are summarised in Boxes 10 and 11.

### Box 10: Performance Basic Services Fund

The BSF has performed relatively well. According to the most recent review (2008), it was expected largely to meet its targets. Impact has also been significant. In relation to its size, the BSF has made a substantial contribution to real needs; for example, it met 4% of the JAM targets for schools by 2007. BSF supports basic service delivery in three ways: through rehabilitation work (schools, clinics, and boreholes); through training (teachers, medical staff, and government); and, through support for day to day operations. The key success for BSF has been its ability to link relief with development, by concomitantly providing rapid service delivery and capacity building for the GoSS and the country. BSF's main weakness is that the fund remains very supply driven.

At the time of the 2008 review, two major concerns were voiced: affordability and sustainability. Finding the right exit strategies remains challenging. Affordability is also an issue and it was recommended that "DFID should work in consultation with the other donors and the GoSS to extend the timeframe for and expand the scope of the Basic Services Fund to ensure continuity of existing service delivery until the government has sufficient capacity to take over". JDT's ability to influence programme delivery may remain limited in the near future. The BSF II is now confirmed and will last 20 months. Although the JDT will take a more active and structured role in liaising with the secretariat in the second phase, DFID will continue formally to administer the programme.

BSF outputs are summarized in the table below:

	<b>NGOs Working</b>	<b>Principal Services</b>	<b>Estimated Beneficiaries</b>
Education	4	20 primary schools built 800 teachers trained	4,480
Health	8	14 health centres built 32 health posts built Medical staff and supplies Training	1 million
Water	7	227 boreholes installed	227,000
Sanitation	6	795 latrines built Hygiene & sanitation training	7,950



#### **Box 11: Performance Strategic Partnership Agreement**

A total of 17 projects have been actively supported through the Strategic Partnership framework (8 in the North, and 9 in the South). Total SP expenditures in 2007 and the first half of 2008 amounted to US\$ 23.4 million, out of which US\$8.4m was spent in the North and US\$ 15m was spent in the South.

Considerable progress has been made in working towards the outcomes of the UNDP Bridging Programme on Governance and Rule of Law. Implementation capacities of national counterparts have been strengthened, and so has procurement. Importantly, cooperation with GoNU and GoSS has been enhanced, especially in the project formulation and approval phase. The SC has agreed to extend the SP from 1 January 2008 to 31 March 2009.

In Southern Sudan, SP projects have focused on capacity building and awareness raising for institutions and aspects related to the rule of law; support to Presidency, States and Local Government Recovery; and support for the MoFEP in the establishment of a robust Government Planning & Budgeting system.

According to the most recent review, projects funded under the partnership got off the ground much quicker than other jointly funded initiatives. The SP has proved to be a very valid complementary funding mechanism of the MDTF. It has also proven a valid concept for donor coordination and joint working between UNDP and its funding partners. It was reported that SP partners are increasingly moving towards a more pool-fund and less earmarked funding approach.

#### **5.4 Joint Donor Team's Contribution to State Building**

State-building is at the core of JDT's mandate to promote policies in support of sustainable peace, poverty reduction and the attainment of the MDGs in Southern Sudan. JDT objectives in state-building were twofold:

1. Effective government institutions at national and state level capable of managing human, natural, economic and financial resources;
2. Legitimate government institutions at national and state level that uphold human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law in line with CPA, the Constitution of Southern Sudan and the JAM Framework.

State-building is also at the core of the OECD/DAC Fragile States principles. The Fragile States principles complement and go beyond the Paris Declaration principles in two ways. First, they seek to identify specific issues that arise for improving aid effectiveness in fragile situations. Second, they emphasise the importance of the wider agenda of state-building, encompassing the role and significance of non-aid instruments of engagement, whole of government approaches, and policy coherence in the political, security, and development spheres.

The ToR supporting this mid-term evaluation puts a particular focus on OECD/DAC sustainability criteria, and with it JDT's contribution to strengthening the will and the ability of GoSS to fulfil its core functions. Attribution remains an issue, however, so is the lack of reliable information and the highly complex and fluid environment of Southern Sudan. In this section, we seek to respond to this question by assessing JDT's contribution to capacity building in the main priority sectors and its adherence to the OECD-DAC Fragile States principles.



### **JDT's contribution to capacity building**

JDT's success in helping strengthen government capacity in priority areas is very difficult to gauge, as shown by the percentage of the web-survey respondents that felt unable to comment (see Table 2.3 Appendix 3).

According to the web-survey, more than 75% of respondents consider public sector management reform as JDT's first or second largest contribution to capacity building in Southern Sudan. As discussed in the previous section, much of JDT's work in this area has focused on promoting shared analysis between donors and GoSS. Overall, budget planning is where most JDT and non-JDT/JDP respondents (64.7%) agree that JDT has helped to improve government capacity.

With donor support (including JDT), budget planning has improved significantly over the evaluation period. Evidence shows that the Budget Sector Planning exercise has improved from year to year. Budget Sector Plans have also improved in content, with better alignment to budget ceilings and increased use of verifiable objectives. The 2008 Budget Sector Planning, completed in December 2007, led to what JDT describes as the GoSS first credible budget for the year ahead. The 2008 Budget Sector Plans were the first to be developed within a three-year Medium Term Expenditure Framework.

The recent retrenchment study commissioned to Adam Smith International (with support from JDT) is also expected to guide the GoSS's programme of reforms. But the overall picture remains complex and challenges are numerous, as indicated by the large proportion of respondents (25.5%) that felt unable to comment on whether JDT had strengthened GoSS in the areas of public sector management. In particular, the GoSS overspend in salary budget (100% in 2006) has not resolved issues around the civil service payroll and the payment of regular salaries to teachers, health workers and other civil servants.

About 50% of the respondents agree that the JDT has helped strengthened government capacity in the health sector (30% felt unable to respond), with health ranking second in the JDT's overall contribution. JDT contributed to capacity building in the health sector through its policy work and through its MDTF representation. Under the MDTF, results by May 2008 indicate that USD 18 million of basic pharmaceuticals have been delivered to the Ministry of Health for further distribution; 1.1 million malaria bed nets, of which 600,000, were also distributed to households. JDT's contribution to bringing the Ministry of Health and NGOs together under the BSWG umbrella is also expected to strengthen state capacity in overseeing progress in this sector: health remains under-budgeted, which means that INGOs still run 86% of primary health care centres and pay for 75% of the health staff. NGOs are now active participants in the Health BSWGs; an NGO Health Forum has also become operational.

No respondents thought that JDT had some influence (direct or indirect) in the education sector. In 2007, the JDT reported problems encountered in this sector to the capitals (see box 9 – MDTF performance). But whether any JDPs have stepped in to help resolve these issues remains unclear.

Our survey opinions over the contribution of JDT towards governance are fairly evenly spread, with about 50% agreeing that an important contribution has been made towards capacity building in the sector, while governance ranked third in the JDT's overall contributions. A total 29.4% felt unable to respond. Outside MDTF, JDT's work on governance has been primarily through the BSWG where it has been an alternate co-chair of the Rule of Law working group and a participant in the Security Sector working group. As previously discussed, the JDT also provided input into the Review of the UNDP SPA and redesign of the Local Governance Recovery Programme. Security sector reforms are where JDT has made the least contribution, according to 50% of respondents.

Box 12 summarise recent progress made by the GoSS in governance. One of the most visible JDT contributions (outside its work on the MDTF police and prison reform project) has been through its involvement in the Census Advisory Group. The census had been postponed three times due to capacity constraints, shortfall in funding and more recently due to various concerns by the GoSS. Nevertheless, JDT supported USAID-led Joint Donor Statement to convince the GoSS to continue its involvement. Although the GoSS has stated that it may not accept the results, the census will, for example, be crucial to the Southern Sudan Fiscal and Financial Allocation & Monitoring Commission since they will take the lead in determining an equitable allocation formula for the States in Southern Sudan. On elections, the JDT participates in the Southern Sudan Elections Group. In the absence of an election law, the JDT together with the embassy representatives was able to map the political/democracy context as part of the electoral preparatory work.

#### **Box 12: Governance progress in Southern Sudan**

Broken down into its constituent components, highlighted achievements to date include:

##### **Support to the Presidency**

All Directors-General and Directors in the Ministry of Presidential Affairs have been appointed, and substantial infrastructure provided (office units, furnished with IT and communications equipment). A 3-year strategic plan for the Office of the President is completed, plus a revised Communications and Public Relations strategy for the Office for 2007-2008. The Presidency communications function has been strengthened through a daily news bulletin and media briefings as well as on the radio.

##### **Local government recovery**

A draft Local Government Policy and draft Act has been developed. Planning Units have been established in all counties and Planning Unit staff and local government administrators trained in county planning, financial/budget management and local administration. Under the guidance of the Local Government Board, county level planning Units have been established in all 78 counties with County Executive Committees assuming oversight functions to systematize recurrent annual planning and budgeting.

### **Judiciary of Southern Sudan**

Work is underway to develop the formulation of judicial bills. Seventeen judges and legal counsel have been trained in Continuing Legal Education at the Law Development Centre in Uganda, and judiciary has been equipped. The Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission has been assisted with essential equipment, and Human Rights monitors trained in substantive human rights issues and computer skills.

### **Access to justice**

Training and awareness-raising of local stakeholders (civil society and government) has taken place in Aweil, Bentiu, Bor, Juba, Malakal, Wau, and Yei. A Justice and Confidence Centre (JCC) has been established in Juba, and the Southern Sudan Law Society Legal Aid Centre in Yei has been supported. New human rights monitors for the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission have been trained, and a Customary Law Steering Committee has been formed at Juba level comprising the UN Mission in Sudan, World Vision and UNDP and chaired by the Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development. In several states Civil Society Organizations, traditional chiefs, and government officials have been trained on rule of law issues and human rights.

### **Police**

A significant number of prison officers have been trained as trainers, and former combatants have been demobilized into the Prison Service as officers and prison guards. The Southern Sudan Police Service has been supported through physical infrastructure development and rehabilitation support and technical and legal advisory support has been provided to the Minister of Internal Affairs. A Draft Police Code of Conduct has been developed. Approximately 1000 personnel have been trained.

In conclusion, progress has been made in establishing the structures of government at regional and state level, though huge challenges remain in building capacity to ensure these structures become effective and accountable. Sustainability also remains an issue. International technical assistance, particularly in MoFEP, tends to be more capacity provision than capacity building. Despite the effective use of the CBTF and other donor-funded Technical Assistance mechanisms, capacity building is yet not institutionalized across government departments in a systematic manner. In addition, basic services is still very limited and rumours of corruption within the GoSS have undermined public confidence. The Southern Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission has struggled to uphold its mandate because Parliament has not passed 'enabling' legislation giving it the right to conduct investigations, let alone prosecute.

Another challenge is that the execution rates of GoSS pro-poor investment have been extremely low, although they have increased over time, largely because of block transfers to the states. This has had a negative impact on Southern Sudan's progress relative to MDGs, outlined in Chapter 2. Another way of looking at this issue is from the perspective of the JAM targets. Here too GoSS expenditure deviate from planned spending, with infrastructure receiving more in the 2005-2007 period than anticipated while only one-third of the JAM needs for basic social services were funded. Overall there was a significant shortfall in resources available for JAM priorities, due to lower revenues and less donor funding than anticipated when the JAM was developed. The new spending framework developed by the GoSS for JAM Phase II should nonetheless help. The GoSS six top expenditure priorities for 2008 – 2011 are:

- **Security:** to develop an efficient and effective armed forces, to safeguard security and implement the CPA.
- **Roads:** to rehabilitate road infrastructure, to promote socio-economic and private sector development.
- **Primary health care:** to provide primary health care to improve the health status of the people of Southern Sudan.
- **Basic education:** to provide equitable access to basic education.
- **Water:** to increase access to safe water and sanitation.
- Production: **to improve rural livelihoods and income.**

### **Adherence with Fragile States principles**

As stated in Chapter 1, the JDT needs to be tested against the Paris Declaration commitments and analysed within a broader framework informed by the OECD/DAC 'Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations' (April 2007). Although the Principles do not include a direct definition, they refer to 'countries with problems of weak governance and conflict'. They also stress the difference between countries (i) in post-conflict/crisis or political transition, (ii) facing deteriorating governance environments, (iii) demonstrating gradual improvement, and (iv) facing prolonged crises or impasse. Similarly, there is a need to differentiate between types of constraints – capacity, political will and legitimacy.

Concern about aid and effective engagement in fragile and conflict-affected situations fundamentally relates to situations where one or more of the assumptions about national government capacity, objectives, effective control and legitimacy do not hold. There is a multi-layered conflict environment in the Sudan that can be simplified into four main categories:

1. The impact of long-standing structural inequalities, basically the socio-economic history of the conflict;
2. The failures in providing good governance and upholding human rights, basically the institutional background of the conflict;
3. The practical manifestations of widespread insecurity in the various parts of the Sudan and its local, national, regional and international aspects.
4. The dynamics of clashing identities (Arabo-Islamic vs. African-Christian and, with Darfur, African-Arab) and agendas of political power that have played a key role in shaping the conflict environment.

It could be argued that in many respects the Sudan state apparatus is far from fragile. For more than two decades the government had had a strong grip on power and centralized wealth. Yet on issues of governance there are marked weaknesses: the lack of democratic institutions and a relatively small Khartoum-based elite have led to political marginalization and poor representation for the vast majority of the population. Benefits from oil wealth have not been equitably spread across the country; fragility thus can also be attributed to lack of political will. The creation of the GoSS may challenge northern dominance, but it is not itself an elected institution. In this regard, both GoNU and GoSS are likely to be contested, just as all governments have been since independence in 1956.

Another dimension of Sudan's fragility is the state's monopoly of violence. While

being contested by armed groups and insurgencies, the Khartoum government has responded by arming competing groups and militias. The state monopoly of violence is thus conceded to competing factions, increasing the potential for further state fragility. This has extended beyond Sudan's borders; the conflict in northern Uganda, for example, between the government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) – itself at times supported by Khartoum – has further exacerbated and prolonging the conflict in Sudan.

The institutions of a modern, civil state are being built almost from scratch by the GoSS, and fragility here is perhaps most acute. The reach and efficiency of state institutions in Southern Sudan has always been very limited and the exact role of traditional tribal authorities and community-based organizations vis-à-vis elected local representatives is still largely unresolved. The SPLM is trying to transform its military structure into a civilian, modern form of government; previous systems of governance have relied both on traditional authorities and military administration.

Southern Sudan polity is itself fragile. Pending elections, seats in both the assembly and the GoSS are divided in a fixed proportion between the SPLM (70%), the NCP (15%), and "other Southern political forces" (15%). The relationship between autonomous Southern Sudan and the neighbouring areas of Blue Nile State, Nuba Mountains/Southern Kordofan, and Abyei has yet to be definitively determined, although for the time being these are effectively part of the North.

In understanding fragility in Sudan one should also take into account the interrelationship of the various dimensions outlined above. Sudan evinces all the four types of fragile state indicators mentioned by the Principles: post-conflict; deteriorating governance; improving situation; and prolonged crisis.

JDT has responded to the challenges of state-building in Southern Sudan through specific intervention strategies including policy dialogue, census preparation, donor coordination, MDTF support and the monitoring and supervision of a number of bilateral and multi-donor programmes (including support to the UNDP governance programme).

Table 6 provides a summary of JDT's adherence to the Fragile States principles. One of the main conclusions of this exercise is the inherent challenge stemming from the fact that the JDT restricts itself to development cooperation. Given the important linkages with decisions being made from the centre, JDT has largely depended on diplomatic representation in Khartoum to put pressure on the GoNU to accelerate aspects of CPA crucial to Southern Sudan. Expectations from the Ustein Group were that, provided they showed a united face, JDPs would be in a better position to put pressure on the SPLM to move away from armed rebellion to promote peace and development. But the lack of a joint diplomatic and developmental approach, and JDT's disconnection with embassies in Khartoum, has not always allowed this to happen.

This division between politics and aid derives from the difficulty of merging the JDT's six donor countries' political relationships with Sudan. Yet aid to Sudan cannot

avoid politics, and a theme throughout the Evaluation is the extent to which the separation may create unforeseen problems.

For instance, one area of concern may be the fact that among Juba-based agencies there has been a focus on building the Southern Sudan state, with much less attention given to building the overarching relationship between the GoSS and the national government, a coherence issue outlined as a central plank of the CPA. There remain some Institutional divisions and differences in perspectives between those working with development aid, those engaged in humanitarian efforts and those focusing on security issues; the linkages between these pertain to elements of fragility recognised in the OECD Principles.<sup>22</sup>

**Table 6: JDT’s adherence to OECD/DAC principles with respect to Fragile States**

Principles <sup>22</sup>	Successfully addressed in JDT portfolio?
Basics	
Take context as the starting point	<b>Partial</b> The original concept was strong, aligned with context analysis presented in the JAM, and adhered to wishes expressed by GoSS. BUT the lack of a common policy framework meant that partners failed to agree on a shared conceptual understanding of the nature and scope of Security Sector Reform, recognised as perhaps the most important sector in the CPA. The propensity of donor members to take this and other political matters on bilateral channels has tended to ‘demote’ JDT to solely development matters.
Do no harm	<b>Good</b> Although the joint representative function of JDT could have been stronger, there is no evidence that the JDT incurred harm either politically or developmentally
Focus on state-building as the central objective	<b>Partial</b> JDT has built a close working relationship with GoSS, but the GoSS as a whole has been inclined to let donors lead on development while it focuses on security issues. Meanwhile the plethora of aid projects (including those of JDPs) – and the lack of ownership by GoSS – has to some extent undermined efforts to strengthen the government’s management of aid. State capacity has increased in budget planning, but there are differences among the quality and results of all Budget Sector Working Groups.
Prioritise prevention	<b>Poor</b> The lack of a common JDT country strategy means that no clear agreement is reached over strategic priorities to mitigate key symptoms of fragility

<sup>22</sup> OECD, Principles for good international engagement in fragile states & situations, April 2007.

Basics	
Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives	<b>Partial</b> The implicit and commissioned analysis work of JDT recognises the inter-relationship of political, security and development strands. However, little work has been done that outlines the political economy of Southern Sudan and how this might determine medium-term donor priorities. More attention has been paid to internal risk analysis of JDT (pertaining to its governance) than to external political/security threats.
Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies	<b>Fair</b> JDT was tasked to make “a major contribution to policy dialogue with the GoSS on issues of governance, poverty reduction and service delivery”. Yet it has had only two specialist advisors – health and governance/RoL. This, combined with the slow performance of MDTF, has meant less attention given to individual projects under MDTF. Skill levels in JDT were inadequate to the task of providing technical support to project proposals..
Practicalities	
Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts	<b>Partial</b> JDT has built direct relationships with a number of key GoSS ministries and has been a useful interface between INGOs and GoSS. However, the influence of JDT could have been greater with a more coherent joint political/development position of partners.
Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors	<b>Partial</b> The JDT coordination mechanism suffers from two levels of contradiction: - (i) JDPs tend to prioritize their overall relation to Sudan and South Sudan in a wider context of global interests (e.g. their own policy on fragile States or the Horn of Africa); this can sometimes contradict donor harmonization as the leading principle; (ii) Having a single point of contact can be an advantage, but the GoSS has consistently demonstrated its preference for also maintaining bilateral relationships with donor countries.
Act fast ... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance	<b>Good</b> JDT is now in its 3rd year and sufficient commitment has been given to continue the process into a new phase
Avoid pockets of exclusion	<b>Good</b> In principle, JDT was wide open to pursue an agenda appropriate to needs. If this has not happened, it is because of technical and staff constraints

In conclusion, the commitment of the new government to develop the country and provide security and basic services for its people is not in question. It will, of course, depend on sustaining the peace and building a capable and accountable government. Whatever the outcome of the referendum on self-determination to be held in 2011, in the short term, at least, Southern Sudan remains a fragile region within the much larger fragile state of Sudan. Further violent conflict is always threatening,



especially as the south holds the majority of Sudan's oil. Sustainable peace is further undermined by the continuing failure of the NCP and SPLM to resolve key issues around CPA implementation. Military expenditure is still about 40% of GoSS budget.

### **Cross-cutting issues**

No specific mainstreaming activities (gender, environment, HIV/AIDS) have been initiated by the JDT since its mandate does not include management of development programmes. These cross-cutting issues are covered by the JAM's 'Sudan Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication', the priorities of which are funded through the MDTF-S and other funds. The JDT has some influence over priorities through being co-chair of the MDTF, and it supports and provides advice to Sectoral Ministries which are committed to the MDGs such as education and health. It has also raised awareness about these topics in reports which it commissioned such as the retrenchment study by Adam Smith Institute where gender sensitivity is an issue in civil service recruitment.

In conclusion, the JDT has become a key interlocutor for the Government, multilateral agencies, and International NGOs over the years. Its contribution to policy dialogue and government processes has also been important. This has had a positive impact on promoting country ownership and strengthening donor alignment and harmonisation.

- JDT's value-added has been principally linked to the presence and availability of its advisers in Juba. The Team's permanent presence as co-chair of the MDTF Oversight Committee (as opposed to a system based on a rotating representation) has proved an important entry point to sustained dialogue with the Government. Access to quick funding has also helped JDT fill technical assistance gaps.
- But the proliferation of projects, including bilateral projects financed by JDT's Donor Partners, has continued to make aid coordination in Southern Sudan difficult.
- In addition, competing donor approaches to the "make unity attractive" agenda and the disconnection between political and development issues have limited JDT's ability to contribute to state building in a coherent and sustainable manner.



## 6. Joint Donor Team as a Pilot Model for Harmonisation

This chapter focuses on efficiency issues. This leads to a review of strengths and weaknesses from the workings of the JDT to date. In response to the ToR's main evaluation question: "how effective is the JDT as a working-model for joint donor engagement in a fragile state context?", it then draws together the findings from Chapters 4 and 5 to identify lessons and recommendations for action by JDPs.

### 6.1 Institutional Analysis

As an experimental institutional arrangement, it is important to look at how donors work and relate to each other within the JDT, something defined initially in the MoU and further developed in the Joint Response Document (JRD).

#### **A partnership never clearly defined**

A significant aspect of JDT as a pilot initiative is the way in which Donor Partners were expected to work together and relate to each other. Although the MOU places the initiative closer to a legal agreement, little in the arrangements prepared Donor Partners to work in a partnership.

Yet the nature of the relationship between donors was never clearly defined. In the JRD the parties are described as 'partners', a term prominently used in the JDAS and other later documents. A partnership is usually defined as a working relationship between organisations based upon individuals with shared values; it entails mutual trust, and often would have a network of engagement and channels of communication.<sup>23</sup> But partnership arrangements can range from an informal grouping or agreement to work together towards a common end, to a legally binding agreement. The MoU places the JDT closer to a legal agreement, but despite the sobriquet of partnership, nothing in the institutional arrangements describes how this might be instituted.

The JDT concept originated with development ministers from the so-called Utstein group. It was assumed that shared objectives and the provisions of the MoU and JRD, in combination with a Host Donor's administrative and financial systems, would provide a sufficient basis for an effective and efficient cooperation. Expectations were that JDPs would be prepared to give up part of their mandate to the JDT. To

---

<sup>23</sup> A large body of literature has developed around partnerships and partnership working. See for example: Watkins, Francis and Csaky, Corinna (2003). *Partnerships, Volume 1 – Literature Review*. Edinburgh Resource Centre for DFID Evaluation Department.; Lowndes, V. & Skelcher, C. (1998). *The Dynamics of Multi-Organizational Partnerships: An Analysis of Changing Modes of Governance*. Public Administration, Volume 76 (2).

drive this forward without a continuing high degree of political ownership, the concept was to rely, perhaps too heavily, on effective management, sound governance and shared strategy for success.

#### **Box 12: The Utstein Group**

Formed in 1999, the 'Utstein Group' is a group of Ministers responsible for Development Co-operation, working in a concerted way to drive the development agenda forward, focusing on implementing the international consensus. The 'core group' consists of the respective Ministers of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. The Utstein Group principles approved in 2002 were as follows:

**Participation:** Ministers belonging to the Utstein core group are strongly committed to the reform agenda and are prepared to use their national and international (political) leverage to help implement that agenda effectively with a wide spectrum of actors. On specific issues this means:

**Coherence:** The Utstein Group strongly promotes coherence of international policy at large (e.g. conflict management), trade policy and other relevant areas with development objectives.

**Co-ordination:** The Utstein Group is prepared to lower the individual flags in order to improve effectiveness through eg harmonising procedures and indicators and fostering ownership of the recipient country.

**Strengthening the multilateral system:** The Utstein Group seeks to strengthen the multilateral system, e.g. by using the leverage of Board and Executive Council membership to improve synergy within the international development architecture through interagency co-operation and enhanced focus on the central development goals (seven pledges)

**Partnership with the recipient countries:** The Utstein Group demands from recipient countries to put their own house in order by combating corruption, strengthening democracy and good governance, preventing conflicts and implementing poverty-reducing policies.

**Untying of aid:** The Utstein Group actively supports the process of untying development assistance. This will imply increased efficiency, improved quality and more value for scarce funds.

**Debt relief:** The Utstein Group pursues speedy implementation of the HIPC initiative and will actively monitor its poverty focus.

**ODA:** The Utstein Group seeks to increase international ODA flows by striving to reach the UN target of 0.7% of GNI, respectively – for those countries already having crossed that threshold – to sustain and enhance the ODA effort working towards 1.0% of GNI.

#### **Governance arrangements did not respond to realities on the ground and held back progress by the JDT**

Without exception, all JDPs and JDT staff acknowledge that the governance arrangements within JDT have been inadequate, leading to poor performance.<sup>24</sup> The original idea of having the Host Donor take executive responsibility was quickly transformed into joint management through a SMB made up of senior officials of the partner development agencies based in national capitals. This group, which met periodically, was to be complemented by an Advisory Group (AG) in Khartoum, comprising diplomatic representatives of the partners, who would advise on the changing context in Sudan. The design assumed a high degree of independence and autonomy of the JDT and a light-touch oversight by the SMB and AG. It was

<sup>24</sup> See Managerial Audit Summary Conclusion 3.1

implicit that the JDT in Southern Sudan was to act independently of donor programmes in the rest of Sudan.

The underlying assumptions were flawed in several respects. First, there was the question of unity. In the aftermath of the CPA the agreed policy for Sudan was encapsulated in the phrase 'Making Unity Attractive' – in other words, the donors would need to deal with Sudan as a federal state and avoid actions that might suggest Southern Sudan was being treated as a separate entity. This would imply a high degree of inter-relationship between programmes in the whole of Sudan and those in Southern Sudan. In turn, it would require a closer relationship between donor representatives in Khartoum and the JDT. Yet management from the partner's headquarters was too remote to adapt efficiently to this situation.

Secondly, some JDPs, drawing from experience of fragile states elsewhere in the world, felt security sector reform and conflict/political analysis were a prerequisite to effective development. The UK in particular felt that the arrangements for the JDT were inadequate to achieve the desired joined-up approach; they thus promulgated a closer link with the British Embassy and DFID office in Khartoum, especially after the joint donors scaled back engagement of the JDT in the SSR process.

The close proximity of JDP representatives in Khartoum led the AG to wrest the management initiative from the SMB and impose a more hands-on style of interaction with the JDT. The Joint Donor Assistance Strategy process became a catalyst to highlight these weaknesses which were subsequently documented in the management audit.<sup>25</sup>

The JDT staff, without exception, perceive the governance structure as a serious impediment to progress. Recent discussions in the SMB have resulted in an agreement in principle to maintain this and the AG as two entities originally defined in the MoU. At the time of this Evaluation, terms of reference were being drafted to establish clear roles and responsibilities for the SMB, AG and their respective relationship with the host donor and JDT. The role of the Host Donor has been evolving positively and most operational problems in administrative and financial matters have been resolved. It is expected that the new governance structure will include a delegated authority or partial transfer of management to the Dutch Ambassador in Khartoum in order to facilitate the role of Host Donor.

But the relationship and respective roles of the Khartoum representations and the JDT has still not been addressed and needs to be clarified within the AG's mandate. Agreement has been difficult because of the differing levels of delegation and decentralisation among donor partners. The new governance structure, once agreed and implemented, will be an important test to see whether the partnership can be enhanced and whether the JDT will benefit in terms of direction and management.

### **Shared goals were undermined by disagreement over a common strategy**

---

<sup>25</sup> Managerial Audit of the Joint Donor Office in Juba (Sudan), Inspection and Evaluation Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, October 2007.

The donor partners were united behind the goals of the JDT as phrased in the MoU and Joint Donor Response Document. But neither of those documents sets out an implementation strategy for the JDT. As described in Chapter 4, the JDT was tasked to prepare a multi-annual strategic plan. At that time most of the donors did not have a country strategy for Sudan, even less a clear statement of objectives or an agreed joint donor position on policy for Southern Sudan. Although this absence galvanized the drawing up of the multi-annual action plan, it also became a critical factor in a lack of constructive engagement by the JDP in Khartoum.

The status of country strategies varies from donor to donor. All strategies differ in the extent that Southern Sudan is included or not in a national strategy for Sudan – a differentiation that affects funding allocations for the country as a whole and for the South. Without a joint common strategy for Sudan as a whole, there was no obvious ‘home’ for – or, indeed, strong incentive to develop – a JDT common development strategy for the South.

The lack of a joint donor strategy has been commented on frequently in order to explain a variety of issues treated in this report such as the JDT’s lack of direction; an absence of priorities for the JDT; and the malfunctioning of the partnership. The JDAS was an attempt to define a common strategy and to revalidate the mandate of the JDT as set out in the Joint Response Document and MoU. Based on the JRD, the JDT attempted to prepare a work plan but there was never agreement among the donors about the nature of the work of the JDT. Instead, every donor told the JDT its own views on the matter. No overall agreement was reached among the parties.

The strategy vacuum has affected the JDT in making progress towards harmonization and effectiveness. The team has been operating in the politically complex and sensitive environment of Southern Sudan with direct interactions at a high political level. The team is supposed to act on behalf of six JDPs and show a “face of unity” towards the outside world with support from their respective partners irrespective of location or status. Yet the nature and impact of this support has been constrained by the absence of a joint strategy.

This absence of a common strategy was, paradoxically, both a driving force for the drafting of a multi-annual strategic plan and a critical factor in a lack of constructive engagement by the Donor Partners that could have ensured its successful outcome.

### **Shortfalls in staffing undermined JDT performance**

Staff shortage has been a main reason for the JDT’s limited performance and impact, highlighted by the majority of survey interviewees. For an overview of JDT staffing, see table 7. The JDT never enjoyed the intended complement of professional staff. Southern Sudan is acknowledged as a difficult development context and it has proven hard to recruit staff for longer periods. This is not unique to the JDT; other agencies have experienced similar problems.

The humanitarian affairs adviser and the adviser on governance and rule of law were in place shortly after the start-up in 2006, but the security sector adviser left

after less than six months. The health adviser started in November 2006. A candidate for the PFM advisory position was selected in October 2006 but was never recruited. Thus the staff complement for 2006 was inadequate to take on the bulk of policy work.

Staffing requirements changed with new sector priorities in 2007, and the head of office, the governance adviser and the health adviser were expected to cover policy work in public sector reforms, basic services and governance, rule of law and security.

JDT staff capacity in terms of level of experience was also not adequate. Key staff lacked sufficient experience, perhaps being more suitable for project supervisory work rather than policy and strategic level tasks.<sup>26</sup> Several interviewees from the capitals suggested that inadequate staffing is a symptom of a lack of political will and leadership – some simply concluded that Juba was just not important to donors.

An underlying problem has been the method of recruitment. Posts are assigned to specific countries for recruitment but the pool of potential recruits has been limited to members of the respective civil services (mainly from ministries and aid organizations) in the partner countries. This approach has not resulted in the recruitment of the best available skills and expertise. There are differences of opinion on whether the JDT should consist of nationals from the JDPs or whether international merit-based recruitment should take place irrespective of nationalities. Differing incentives (monetary, R&R and other) among the JDP have been mentioned frequently as an impediment to recruiting the right staff.

At the same time, the relatively long stay of some JDT advisers and the resulting continuity in their support to, and relationships with, GoSS and other stakeholders, is recognised as a key success factor in JDT's influence in Southern Sudan.

---

<sup>26</sup> See Management Audit page 6; and MTE interviews with sector specialists in Juba.

**Table 7: Overview of JDT Staffing March 2006 – July 2008**

	2006			2007				2008		
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3
Head from 18/3/06	[Red bar]									
Humanitarian Affairs Adv. (Dep Hd)	[Red bar]									
Governance Advisor (TL, Gov, RoL)	[Red bar]									
Health Advisor (Ag. TL Basic services)	[Red bar]									
PFM Advisor	[Red bar]									
SSR Advisor	[Red bar]									
Policy Officer 1 <i>Public sector &amp; aid effectiveness</i>	[Yellow bar]									
Policy Officer 2 <i>Corporate affairs &amp; humanitarian</i>	[Yellow bar]									
Policy Officer 3 <i>(temporary duty from Canada)</i>	[Yellow bar]									
Head, Operational management	[Green bar]									

### Style and approach vary among the partners

Diversity in resources within such a partnership could be seen as an advantage. JDT partners have widely varying approaches: in resources being committed to Sudan; in the extent of decentralised working from their headquarters; in the nature of engagement in policy with GoNU or GoSS; and in their wider global or regional interests. Table 9 highlights some of these differences, especially regarding the staff presence in Khartoum and overall size of the aid programme to Sudan. The asymmetry has nevertheless fuelled tensions among partners in how to judge the performance of the JDT. For some, the JDT has been extravagantly over-resourced; for others, it has been inadequately equipped either to manage bilateral projects or to engage in substantive policy development with GoSS.

That partners had different managerial systems and different levels of delegation was acknowledged as a risk before the launch of the initiative. Identifying and fixing all problems upfront was seen as unrealistic, and it was hence decided to start the initiative and deal with potential problems as they came along. Yet, competing agendas within each agency have added to another layer of complexity. For example, HQs and the embassies in Khartoum vied for the control of JDT.

### Communications

Communication has been a problem from the beginning and this was partly a result of the inadequate governance structure. In general, communication channels were not formalized and information was often ad hoc, late, partial or not relevant.

Communication problems reflect the different JDP structures and delegations which each require their own reporting lines. All JDPs have representation through their respective embassies in Khartoum, except for Sweden, which has been operating from its Embassy in Cairo, and Denmark<sup>27</sup> which until recently worked from its Embassy in Addis Ababa. In addition, the Netherlands and Norway have political representation in Juba<sup>28</sup> and the British Embassy is in the process of setting up an office in Juba with a representative. Not all Khartoum embassies have development and/or humanitarian staff and differ distinctly in numbers, levels and status of staff. At times there is no strict division between political and development approaches for an embassy; the political, developmental and humanitarian dimensions may be treated as one common area. These various arrangements and set-ups affect communication and reporting lines among capitals, Khartoum and Juba but also affect the representation and functioning of the AG and the SMB.

Reporting issues tend to be presented from the perspective of the partners in Khartoum or at headquarters, for whom reports from the JDT were a necessary requirement to enable the SMB to take decisions. It is less clear how the reporting takes place downwards, from Khartoum to the JDT. Moreover, partners often request information from their own seconded staff rather than from the relevant person or cluster leader. This practice has led to internal fragmentation and an uneven sharing of information.

These vertical and at times informal communication channels have reinforced existing differences in communication flows among JDPs and undermined the principle of joined approaches as well as the JDT team morale.<sup>29</sup> However, the communications between JDT and SMB and between JDT and AG appear to be slowly improving, as all interviewees confirmed, and the Khartoum representations of HQ and the capitals are more positive about the frequency, relevance and systematic reporting of the JDT.

Still, though, the expectations of the partners about what kind of information should be shared for what kind of purpose remain unclear. Norway, for example, has quite a clear division between developmental and political representation. The consulate in Juba reports directly to Oslo, not through Khartoum.<sup>30</sup> The consulate decided recently to appoint a junior professional “development” staff member on local terms to act, among other tasks, as a liaison between the Consulate, the embassy in Khartoum and the JDT. This person is located in the Norwegian Consulate-General.

## **Management**

Management of the JDT has been highlighted as an issue of concern by the JDP and led to the decision to conduct a managerial audit which examined systems in detail. Informants from within the GoSS and development partners in Juba generally hold very positive views about the JDT and its management. By contrast, some partners see the Head of Office mandate of getting the office up and running, while developing and implementing the JDT programme was perhaps as too ambitious.

---

27 Denmark and Sweden. It is expected that Swedish Ambassador will reside in Khartoum as of September 2008.

28 The status of the representation differs among these; Norway has a Consulate-General. Some posts are not full-time.

29 See the criticism of the SMB putting too much emphasis on frequent and detailed reports from the JDT in the Managerial Audit page 9.

30 Interview Juba with one representative, 06/08.2008.

Some interviewees further suggested that the Head of Office should have been a high level diplomat and the managerial audit concluded that the post should be at junior ambassadorial or senior civil service level.

### **Overall assessment**

The conception and implementation of the JDT failed to recognise the importance of creating the necessary conditions for a partnership to flourish. A positive focus on the harmonization goals of the JDT left the question of strategy unresolved and neither the partners nor the JDT were able to reconcile differing policy positions on, for example, security sector reform, or to agree on how the JDP should engage with the JDT. This led to a breakdown in the intended governance process and increasing micromanagement by the JDP representatives in Khartoum.

In view of JDP achievements, as described in Chapter 4, a key question is the extent to which the initiative was cost-effective. The budget for 2008 amounted to €2.1m, with €1.1m going to the Juba Office to cover local salaries and other operating costs, and the remaining €1m going to the host country to cover HR and estate management. This budget does not include international staff salaries, a significant contribution in kind from the JDP employing agencies. Nevertheless, this investment seems good value for money when compared with what Donor Partners would have had to spend to open bilateral offices in Juba.

There is in fact scope to invest greater resources into the initiative, particularly in staff numbers and quality. For example, staff shortage has been seen as a major constraint to JDT's ability to influence MDTF performance across sectors. This same lack of capacity has in fact been used by JDPs as a reason for not starting "post-bilateral programmes" under the management of JDT. The implementation of such programmes would have enhanced JDT's credibility and shown that the JDPs are committed to joint working. JDPs have continued their own bilateral programmes instead, although arguably, harmonization has occurred more widely, with JDPs support for the MDTF and other pooled funds administered by UN agencies.

Table 8 shows the response to questions about the partnership in a survey of key respondents. The results, which come from a broad range of respondents, suggest, somewhat contrary to the interviews during the mid-term Evaluation, that a majority of respondents (though fewer than half) consider there is a high level of trust among the JDPs and that the JDPs share the same objectives and values. Interestingly, for an initiative that was intended to promote greater harmonization, over 50 percent of respondents do not think the JDP bilateral programmes are well harmonised.



**Table 8: Survey response to questions about the joint donor partnership**

Sample Size n=47 % response	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't know
There is a high level of trust among the Joint Donor Partners	6.4	42.6	31.9	0	19.1
The Joint Donor Partners share the same objectives and values	4.3	55.3	27.7	2.1	10.6
The bilateral programmes of the Joint Donor Partners are well harmonised with each other	0	19.1	42.6	10.6	27.7

Responses were received from members of the JDT, representatives of the JDP, representatives of other donor partners and of NGOs and the GoSS, though caution should be expressed over the small sample size. On the issue of trust among JDPs, JDP/JDT respondents were fairly positive (61%), contrasting with non-JDP/JDT respondents (28%). Likewise, other donors were less positive about shared objectives among the JDPs. Views over the harmonization of bilateral programmes of the JDPs were quite negative from both groups. There were too few responses from the GoSS for separate analysis.

In outlining the shortcomings of the JDT one should not neglect its central purpose: to present a unified and coordinated approach by international donors while minimizing transactional and political costs that often occur when a plethora of donors deal independently with a transitional or weak government. We have seen, however, that despite its own capacity constraints, the GoSS has still to a large extent preferred to develop bilateral relations with some of the key donor countries. An interesting 'counterfactual' question is whether this is symptomatic of the inherent weakness of JDT, and whether a much stronger display of unity among donors would have changed the bilateral propensities of the emerging government.

**Table 9 Comparative Features of the Joint Donor Partners in Sudan**

Canada	Denmark	Netherlands	Norway	Sweden	United Kingdom
Approved country strategy?					
Yes (updated annually)		4 year multi-annual plan. New draft (2008-11) recently completed	2008-11	2008	2008
Development staff in Khartoum <sup>31</sup>					
1	6 (1 HOO, 2 international, 3 national).	Integrated Embassy, about 11 on policy of which 2 dedicated to development.	1 Diplomat, 1 national	2 (1 Counsellor; 1 First Secretary).	1 HOO; 8 advisory (+ 5 shared inputs UK or DRC-based); 4 programme/deputy programme.
Representation in Juba					
None	None	Political Officer half-time	Consular office	None	Political Officer; Associate DFID Governance Advisor
Total Net ODA to Sudan (2006) <sup>32</sup> USD million					
79.3	33.66	96.08	106.57	47.53	215.55
Total value of bilateral commitments <sup>33</sup>					
CAN\$ 29.5 million	USD 3 million	7.2 million + USD 1.5m	NOK 120.1 million + USD 600,000	0	UK£28.9 million

In conclusion, JDT has shown that joint donor initiative can operate in a challenging aid environment. The establishment of a joint donor office and availability of full-time advisers in Juba have contributed to sustained and coordinated policy dialogue in Southern Sudan. The initiative has been welcomed by the recipient government as a good model to reduce transaction costs in its dealing with bilateral donors.

- Although programme management can remain bilateral, access to small strategic funding is important for leverage and credibility purposes. Adequate staffing resources also matter greatly.
- Despite being like-minded, Donor Partners have inherited from different ways of working. Yet working in a highly-fluid environment like Southern Sudan calls for a pragmatic and flexible approach, as well as quick and consensual decision-making. Institutional constraints therefore need to be identified at an early stage.

31 Data collected during interviews in Khartoum

32 OECD DAC Statistics, Table 2a Net ODA, current prices (data extracted 21/08/08)

33 Abstracted from JDT analysis of donor mapping 2008

Roles and responsibilities within the governance structure, the level of delegation and rules of engagement are better being discussed upfront.

- As well as identifying the country's needs, through joint assessment missions, a shared understanding of the political context is important. A coherent approach to engagement is unlikely otherwise. All political dimensions – domestic, regional, and global -and their links with the respective strategies of Donor Partners will be key determinants in the success of the initiative.

## 6.2 Final Recommendations

The resources available to JDT should be compatible to its mandate. Operating in fragile states is labour-intensive. There is a need to invest greater resources both in staff numbers and quality.

- As staffing issues are resolved, JDT's mandate needs to be revised appropriately to match the new donor landscape in Southern Sudan:
  - JDT should be given a stronger role in monitoring the bilateral (and post-bilateral) programmes of Donor Partners. This will help reduce transaction costs as well as ensure greater coherence amidst its donor activities.
  - JDT's advisory role in pooled funds managed by UN agencies should be formalized.
  - JDT's work with NGOs should also be fully acknowledged and encouraged.
- Similarly, the JDT governance structure needs to be redesigned to match the context of Southern Sudan. The recently-drafted Terms of Reference should ensure that clear roles and responsibilities for SMB, AG, and their respective relationship with the Host Donor and Team are established.
- The SMB should promote strategic direction on political and development policies in Southern Sudan while also outlining modalities of a donor integration model as represented by the JDT.
  - The AG should remain in an advisory role with respect to JDT. Its key role should be in promoting the coherence of participant's political and development programmes in Southern Sudan, and the coordination between this and national policy.

Renewed engagement and commitment from Donor Partners is required to reinforce the Team in its delivery of objectives, outcomes and impact. It is important that Donor Partners strengthen their partnership by clarifying their 'rules of engagement' for the next stage of work for the JDT.

- Rules of engagement should be clarified with regard to joint donor mission and political and development presence in Juba
- With the support of JDT, Donor Partners should commit to greater complementarity and synergy of their activities within and across sectors.
- Early consultations should be sought when developing new projects. Joint donor mission should be organized in priority sectors.

In the absence of a joint strategy for Sudan or South Sudan, Donor Partners should at least agree on key strategic priorities for the JDT over the next stage, on the basis of a shared analysis and common understanding of the South Sudanese context.

- Context analysis, rather than the availability of advisers and/or bilateral interests,

should dictate the choice of sector priorities

- Clear political and developmental Benchmarks should be agreed upon to support the period leading to the 2011 referendum – which is the year JDT mandate expires.

# Appendixes





# APPENDIX 1

## Terms of Reference Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, Sudan

### 1 Background

In January 2005, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed a Comprehensive Peace Memorandum of Understanding (CPA) to resolve the long standing North-South conflict in the country. The international community has played an important role in realisation of the CPA. To support the efforts of the parties to the peace agreement, the Governments of Netherland, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to establish a Joint Donor Team (JDT) for South Sudan, with Netherlands taking up the role of Host Donor for the team. Denmark joined this partnership in December 2005 and Canada in May 2007. The main mission of JDT is to:

1. Promote policies in support of sustainable peace, poverty reduction and the attainment of Millennium Development goals in South-Sudan
2. To support the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), and cooperate with the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and other stakeholders in South-Sudan
3. To manage programs which cannot be implemented under the MDTF
4. To encourage donor harmonisation in Sudan, as well as to act as a pilot for donor integration elsewhere.


The MoU states that “the co-operation will jointly be reviewed two years after this MoU went into force or so much earlier as the participants agree upon. The forms and proceedings of the review will be decided upon at a Meeting of the SMB”. At the SMB Meeting in The Hague on the 10th of October it was decided that a review should be carried out during 2008. It was suggested that the review would be external.

The JDT operates from the Joint Donor Office (JDO) which was opened in May 2006 in Juba, South Sudan. The construction costs and the operation costs of the office have been jointly borne by the participating donors, directly with grants from the respective donors. The Netherlands Government is the Host Donor and the JDT operates according to the procedures of the Netherlands. The office is granted a diplomatic status as a sub-office of the Netherlands Embassy in Khartoum. JDT however does not play any role in the political relations between the Donors and the Sudanese Government, as these are handled through the respective Embassies of the participating donors.

The JDT operates in a tough post-conflict transition environment. The policy environment is characterised by, poor governance, corruption, fragile societal relations,

primitive economic and physical infrastructure, and weak mechanisms for establishing legitimate power and authority. There is an absence of a locally anchored strategy for nation building, and likelihood of the emergence of a credible strategy in the immediate future is low, given the capacity constraints facing the GoSS. JDT main role in this fragile environment is to function as a catalyst in the realisation of the objectives stated in the MoU.

It is important to emphasise, that JDT has not had any operative role in financial disbursement of aid to the GoSS. The two channels for aid-disbursement are the multi-donor funds such as the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) managed by the World Bank, and the Funds managed by UN organisations. In addition, the aid is disbursed through bilateral initiatives of the participating donors. The head of the JDT, however participates in the Oversight Mechanisms for the multi-donor funds, and therefore has a channel to influence the management of these funds. As regards the bilateral channel, the original MoU signed between the Donor Governments expresses a strong expectation that use of independent bilateral initiatives outside the scope of the JDT will be limited to exceptions. However these initiatives have been increasing in importance since the establishment of JDT and the MoU has been amended to accommodate this development. The multiplicity of aid-channels and modalities further complicate the operational environment of the JDT. Figure 1 gives an overview of the structure of disbursement and governance of aid to South Sudan.



The JDO is now in its second year of operation. Since 2007 JDO's work has been guided by annual plans and report approved by the SMB.. Priority Sectors for 2008 according to the current Annual Plan include assistance to Capacity Development at GoSS, Delivery of Public Services (Health, Education), and good Governance.



## 2 Purpose of the Evaluation

The importance of JDT goes beyond its contributions in South Sudan. As per the MoU, the JDT is not only seen as a catalyst for stimulating progress in South Sudan, but also as a pilot initiative for donor integration elsewhere. Keeping in view the objectives outlined in MoU, the purpose of this evaluation is:

To assess the contributions of the JDT to promote policies in support of sustainable peace, poverty reduction and the attainment of Millennium Development goals in South-Sudan **and** to assess JDT as a working-model for harmonised donor engagement in a fragile state environment.

This is primarily a formative evaluation, and it shall contribute to learning. The dual-purpose of the evaluation implies two user groups. In the context of South Sudan the main users would be JDT and its boundary partners (GoSS, Multilateral Funds). The assessment of the JDT model will also inform the participating donor governments and international donor community in general with respect to the design of joint-initiatives for working in fragile state environment.

## 3 Evaluation questions

Two main questions posed in this evaluation are:

1. What has been the value-added of the JDT in South Sudan?
2. How effective is the JDT as a working-model for joint donor engagement in a fragile state context?

In answering these questions, the issues to be investigated will include<sup>34</sup> but not necessarily limited to:

- What work has been developed in relation to existing MOU, incl. the Joint Response Document (JRD), and to what extent are MOU and JRD still valid documents?
- What are the outputs, short-term outcomes and possible long-term impacts on the ground of the JDT work: hard facts, quantitative and qualitative shall be documented?
- To what extent is the JDT contributing to strengthening the will and the ability of the GoSS to fulfil the core functions<sup>35</sup> to reduce poverty, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of its population?
- What are the stakeholders' perceptions of what has been done by JDT?
- Which lessons have been learned regarding the joint elements of JDT operations?

The evaluation shall identify the strengths and the weaknesses, and provide recommendations to improve current operations and future programming of the JDT initiative both in Sudan, and as a working model for joint donor engagement in fragile state environment.

---

<sup>34</sup> Some of these issues were identified at the SMB Meeting on the 10<sup>th</sup> October 2007

<sup>35</sup> Included herein are functions such ensuring security and justice, mobilising revenues, establishing an enabling environment for basic service delivery, improved economic performance and employment generation.

## 4 Scope of the evaluation

To the answer the evaluation questions the consultants shall outline:

- The program logic for JDT in consultation with the respective donors participating in JDT
- The judgement criterion and corresponding qualitative and quantitative indicators to answer the evaluation questions
- The bench-marks to be used for assessment of JDT results.

A Managerial Audit of the JDT was conducted in October 2007, by the Inspection and Evaluation Unit (ISB), The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague. The evaluation team can draw on this study wherever relevant.

To achieve the purpose of this evaluation, the judgemental criterion for value-added shall in particular focus on the developmental outcomes of JDP outputs. The judgemental criterion shall be informed by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness<sup>36</sup>, and the OECD guidelines for engagement in fragile situations<sup>37</sup>. Of particular importance in this context is JDTs performance as a tool for harmonised donor engagement in the fragile policy environment of South Sudan. The bench-marks for assessments and drawing lessons from the JDT pilot shall be comparable to the fragile situation that characterises South-Sudan.

The tender shall make a preliminary proposal for the judgemental criterion and the bench-marks in the technical proposal. The evaluation will focus on the time period from the establishment of JDT to the present.

## 5 Evaluation criteria

The evaluation shall make use of following four criteria – relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. The evaluation will assess:

- The **relevance** of the JDT plans and operations with respect to the needs to achieve sustainable peace, poverty reduction and the attainment of Millennium Development goals in the fragile environment in South-Sudan. Where possible, assess to what extent the activities have mainstreamed cross-cutting issues such as gender, good governance and environment.
- The **effectiveness** of the JDT activities in terms of current and perceived results with respect to the achievement of JDT objectives. The assessment shall be comparative across the boundary partners for JDT, namely the GoSS, the multi-donor trust funds including the fund managed by the World Bank, and the actors involved in the bilateral-aid interventions. Both intended and unintended results should be identified as far as possible.
- To what extent JDT is **efficient**, i.e. to what extent the JDT model is converting the available resources in a low-cost manner into intended results. Suggest any lower-cost options that can achieve relevant, effective and sustainable results, and satisfy the necessary requirements as laid down in Netherlands Governments Financial Management Regulations.
- The **sustainability** of the achievements of the JDT; in other words assess the

---

<sup>36</sup> Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the indicators for monitoring its progress are available on [http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3343,en\\_21571361\\_39494699\\_39503692\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3343,en_21571361_39494699_39503692_1_1_1_1,00.html).

<sup>37</sup> See "Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations", OECD, available on <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf>

extent to which results of JDT will be preserved over time in the absence of JDT inputs. Of particular importance is an assessment of the contribution of JDT to strengthening the will and the ability of the GoSS to fulfil the core functions to reduce poverty, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of its population. In cases where capacity is lacking identify how the JDT mechanisms can be supplemented by specific provisions for developing and strengthening capacity of the GoSS.

## 6 Evaluation Team

All members of the evaluation team are expected to have relevant academic qualifications and evaluation experience. In addition, it is desirable that the evaluation team covers the following competencies:

Competence	Team Leader	At least one member
Academic	Higher relevant degree	
Discipline	Relevant discipline	
Evaluation	Leading multi disciplinary evaluations	
Development Cooperation	Yes	
Country/region		Post conflict transition state
Language fluency		
English	Written, Reading, Spoken	
Norwegian/Swedish/ Danish		Reading – Any one language
Dutch		Reading

The composition of the evaluation team should as far as possible reflect a balance between international, and local consultants with work experience from the case country.

## 7 Budget and Deliverables

The project is **budgeted** with a maximum input of **20 person weeks**. The budget estimate includes the time to be used during the workshops and field-visits, including compensation for travel time used in intercontinental travel (maximum 7 hrs. per intercontinental journey). The deliverables in the consultancy consist of the following outputs:

- **Inception Report** not exceeding 15 pages shall be prepared and discussed with the reference group before final approval by EVAL.
- One work-in-progress reporting **seminar**.
- **Draft Final Report** for feedback from the reference group and stakeholders. The feedback will include comments on structure, facts, content, and conclusions.
- **Final Evaluation Report**.
- **Seminar for dissemination** of the final report. Direct travel-cost related to dissemination in the case countries if any, will be covered separately on need

basis, and are not included in the budget.

All presentations and reports (to be prepared in accordance with EVAL's guidelines given in Annex A-3 Guidelines for Reports of this document) are to be submitted in electronic form in accordance with the deadlines set in the time-schedule specified under Section 2 Administrative Conditions in Part 1 Tender specification of this document. EVAL retains the sole rights with respect to all distribution, dissemination and publication of the deliverables.

## APPENDIX 2

# Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Sudan

### Current Status MDGs

#### 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.

*The ultimate goal is to halve between 1990 and 2015 the proportion of people suffering from hunger.*

*Specific targets are:*

*(i) Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day.*

*(ii) Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.*

The national average for underweight prevalence in 2006 was 31 per cent ranging between 21 per cent in Khartoum and 42.9 per cent in Unity State. Achieving the MDG target of reducing the underweight prevalence among children to 18 per cent in 2015 in North Sudan will require an average annual rate of reduction of 5.7 per cent between 2006 and 2015 as compared to the AARR of 4.7 per cent achieved between 2000 and 2006. In Southern Sudan, the AARR required to reach the MDG target of 21 per cent will require an AARR of 3.4 per cent between 2006 and 2015.

#### 2. Achieve universal primary education

*Target: Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling.*

Despite important progress in the last few years, both North and Southern Sudan are not likely to achieve universal primary education by 2015, with the southern states being much further from this objective than the northern ones.

In the North, according to the Mid Term Evaluation of Education for All (EFA) report issued by the Ministry of General Education (MoGE), Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) in basic education has reached 64.3 percent in 2006 against a target of 72.5 percent.

#### 3. Promote gender equality and empower women

*The third MDG is to eliminate gender disparity in basic and secondary education by 2015.*

For comparative purposes, note that important progress has been achieved in Northern states. However, with 57.2 percent GER for girls versus 71.2 percent for boys in basic education, the gap is still considerable. In Southern Sudan, the gender gap, although has been narrowing, is still large. On the secondary education front, GERs are very low across the country. However in the north, GER stands at around 26 percent for both boys and girls.

## Current Status MDGs

### 4. Reduce child mortality

*The target of the 4th MDG is to reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children*

Though some states of Sudan have made progress in reducing the under-five mortality rate (U5MR), nationally the progress is not on track to meet the MDG target. Meeting the MDG target in regard to U5MR in North Sudan will require an average annual rate of reduction of 9.6 per cent between 2006 and 2015 and the corresponding number for Southern Sudan is 5.3 percent. The national average for U5MR in 2006 was 112 per 1,000 live births ranging between 63 in Gezira State and 192 in Western Equatoria

### 5. Improve maternal health

*Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality between 2006 and 2015.*

Since both North and Southern Sudan have an estimated maternal mortality ratio (MMR) of above 550, Sudan can be classified as a country with very high MMR. The estimated average MMR for Sudan as a whole estimated in 2006 (with a reference period 13 years before the survey) was 1,107 per 100,000 live births, ranging from 94 in Northern States to 2,327 per 100,000 live births in Western Equatoria (among the very highest rates recorded anywhere). There has been some progress with regard to the percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel. Meeting this MDG target in North Sudan will require an average annual rate of increase of 2.9 per cent between 2006 and 2015 while in Southern Sudan it will require an average increase of 12.7 per cent. Nationally, the percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel was only 49.2 per cent in 2006 ranging between 19.9 per cent in Northern Bahr El Ghazal to 98.2 per cent in N. Sudan.

### 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

*Targets:*

*Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS.*

*Halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases.*

Sudan has the highest absolute number of people living with HIV in the Middle East and North Africa region with more than half a million (522,720 as per 2008 UNGASS report) people estimated to be infected. There are severe limitations in data on HIV in Sudan, although UNAIDS estimates adult prevalence at 1.6 percent with higher rates found among at-risk population groups such as refugees and sex workers. The percentage of women who knew two of the most effective ways of preventing HIV transmission was also fairly low (8 per cent), ranging from 36 per cent in Central Equatoria State to 0.9 per cent in Sinnar and West Darfur States. Malaria is endemic to all of Southern Sudan and parts of Northern Sudan and is a major cause of morbidity and mortality, particularly among children. There has been some progress in expanding coverage of effective interventions. In 2006, 28 per cent of under-five children slept under an insecticide-treated net, compared to just 2 per cent in 2000. Similarly, in North Sudan it is estimated that 68 per cent of children with fever received an anti-malaria medication in 2006, compared to 23 percent in 2000. With regard to tuberculosis (TB), annual incidence is estimated by WHO to be 242 per 100,000 and coverage of effective treatment (DOTS) is officially reported to be 91 percent of the population, although only 30% of cases are estimated to be detected.

## Current Status MDGs

### 7. Ensure environmental sustainability

#### Targets:

*Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes; reverse loss of environmental resources.*

*Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation.*

*Achieve significant improvement in lives of at least 100million slum dwellers, by 2020.*

With the levels of 1990 taken as the base, no progress has been achieved in regard to the overall coverage of improved drinking water sources and sanitary means of excreta disposal.

There has been some progress in regard rural water supply which was offset by decline in urban water supply coverage. Achieving the MDG target of increasing the coverage of improved sources of drinking water to 85 per cent of the population in North Sudan by 2015 will require an average annual rate of increase in coverage of 4.2 per cent between 2006 and 2015. Achieving the MDG target of increasing the coverage of improved sources of drinking water to 64 per cent of the population in Southern Sudan will require an AARI in coverage of 3.2 per cent between 2006 and 2015.

Achieving the MDG target of increasing the coverage of improved sanitation facilities to 82 per cent in North Sudan by 2015 will require an AARI in coverage of 8.3 per cent between 2006 and 2015 while increasing the coverage of improved sanitation facilities to 58 per cent in Southern Sudan by 2015 will require an AARI in coverage of 27.7 per cent between 2006 and 2015. Nationally 56.1 per cent of the household members were found to be using an improved source of drinking water in 2006, ranging from 80.7 in Sinnar State and 80.3 in in northern Sudan.

Significant progress has been made since 2005 to achieve targets of the MDG in the infrastructural sector:

- More than 2,000 km of roads opened since 2005
- More than 8,000 km of road demined since 2005.
- Juba Hospital renovated
- GoSS buildings and the Southern Sudan Parliament rehabilitated
- Water supply repairs underway for Juba town

Source: Third Sudan Consortium – Joint Staff Assessment Report

## APPENDIX 3

### Survey Monkey Results for Evaluation of Joint Donor Team (JDT), Juba, Sudan

**Table 1.1**

Employer of respondent	%
Development diplomatic staff of one of the Joint Donor Partners	43.1%
Another development organisation	25.5%
Government of Southern Sudan	3.9%
Non-Governmental Organisation (nat/int)	17.6%
Permanent or temporary staff/consultant to the JDT	9.8%
<b>Total</b>	<b>51</b>

**Table 1.2**

Where are you based?	%
Juba	52.7%
Khartoum	12.7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>Other</b>	<b>34.5%</b>

**Table 2.1**

The Government of Southern Sudan's coordination of Aid	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Unable to Comment
	%	%	%	%	%
There is a formalised process for dialogue	11.8%	64.7%	11.8%	0.0%	11.8%
The government is pro-active	5.9%	41.2%	35.3%	3.9%	13.7%
The government is NOT in the driving seat	6.0%	32.0%	32.0%	8.0%	22.0%



**Table 2.2**

With regards to capacity development	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Unable to Comment
	%	%	%	%	%
Weaknesses are being ADDRESSED in public financial management	0.0%	51.0%	19.6%	9.8%	19.6%
Weaknesses are being NEGLECTED in budget planning and execution	2.0%	23.5%	49.0%	5.9%	19.6%
Weaknesses are being ADDRESSED in the coordination of aid	3.9%	66.7%	9.8%	2.0%	17.6%

**Table 2.3**

Has the JDT helped to strengthen government capacity in the following areas...	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Unable to Comment
	%	%	%	%	%
Public Sector Management	0.0%	52.9%	21.6%	0.0%	25.5%
Education	0.0%	13.7%	43.1%	2.0%	41.2%
Health	10.0%	40.0%	18.0%	2.0%	30.0%
Governance	3.9%	45.1%	19.6%	2.0%	29.4%
Rule of Law	3.9%	39.2%	23.5%	2.0%	31.4%
Accountability	0.0%	51.0%	21.6%	0.0%	27.5%
Budget Planning	13.7%	51.0%	13.7%	0.0%	21.6%
Coordination of Aid (in the capacity of donor mapping)	10.0%	70.0%	8.0%	2.0%	10.0%
<i>Other</i>					

**Table 2.4**

Do you agree or disagree with the following...	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Unable to Comment
	%	%	%	%	%
The JDT has helped to Strengthen donor alignment with GoSS POLICIES	7.8%	58.8%	13.7%	2.0%	17.6%
The JDT has helped to strengthen donor alignment with GoSS SYSTEMS	3.9%	47.1%	25.5%	0.0%	23.5%

**Table 3.1**

Has the JDT helped strengthen donor coordination among the Joint Donor Partners?	%
Yes	82.6%
No	17.4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>46</b>

**Table 3.2**

If 'Yes' do you feel that the JDT has helped strengthen donor coordination among the Joint Donor Partners through the following means?	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Unable to Comment
	%	%	%	%	%
Through shared analysis	9.3%	58.1%	16.3%	2.3%	14.0%
Through joint donor missions	0.0%	27.9%	37.2%	11.6%	23.3%
Through joint programming	2.4%	33.3%	31.0%	7.1%	26.2%
Through strengthening of partnership working	11.6%	67.4%	2.3%	2.3%	16.3%
<i>Other</i>					

**Table 3.3**

Has the JDT helped strengthen donor coordination among other donors who are not one of the core partners? (e.g. bilaterals, multilaterals, funds, UN)	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Unable to Comment
	%	%	%	%	%
Through shared analysis	4.3%	48.9%	19.1%	2.1%	25.5%
Through joint donor missions	0.0%	23.4%	36.2%	6.4%	34.0%
Through joint programming	4.3%	21.3%	38.3%	2.1%	34.0%
Through strengthened partnership working	10.6%	44.7%	17.0%	2.1%	25.5%
<i>Other</i>					
Especially regarding MDTF Through proactive participation in coordination fora. The MDTF and the above mentioned SPA are examples where the JDT on the ground has had a major impact on donor coordination and harmonization. This role has been undervalued by the Embassies and DFID in Khartoum and in the capitals					
"Joint programming" = establishing Sudan Recovery Fund					

**Table 3.4**

Do you agree with the following statements?	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Unable to Comment
	%	%	%	%	%
The JDT has contributed to improving effective planning and allocation of resources by GoSS	8.3%	54.2%	16.7%	2.1%	18.8%
The JDT has contributed to the use of results-oriented frameworks	0.0%	38.3%	25.5%	0.0%	36.2%
The JDT has helped to reinforce mutual accountability	2.1%	45.8%	20.8%	0.0%	31.3%

**Table 3.5**

Has the JDT helped to improve the delivery of any of the following programmes?	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Unable to Comment
	%	%	%	%	%
Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTF)	22.9%	58.3%	4.2%	4.2%	10.4%
Capacity Building Trust Fund (CBTF)	14.6%	45.8%	4.2%	2.1%	33.3%
Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF)	6.3%	18.8%	16.7%	6.3%	52.1%
Basic Services Fund (BSF)	6.4%	29.8%	12.8%	4.3%	46.8%
Strategic Partnership Arrangement (SPA)	4.2%	18.8%	10.4%	0.0%	66.7%
Sudan Recovery Fund (SRF)	8.3%	22.9%	8.3%	8.3%	52.1%

**Table 3.6**

Do you agree with the following statements?	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Unable to Comment
	%	%	%	%	%
The JDT has contributed to better quality of aid	8.3%	54.2%	29.2%	2.1%	6.3%
The JDT provides an effective model for integration of donor programmes	10.4%	45.8%	25.0%	6.3%	12.5%
The JDT is an effective way of harmonising donor programmes in a post conflict, fragile state setting	10.4%	39.6%	22.9%	10.4%	16.7%

**Table 4.1**

Order of sectors according to the greatest contribution by the JDT	1. Greatest contribution	2	3	4	5	6	7. Least contribution
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Security Sector Reform	0.0%	3.6%	7.1%	3.6%	21.4%	14.3%	50.0%
Governance	18.8%	21.9%	15.6%	25.0%	12.5%	3.1%	3.1%
Rule of Law	7.4%	25.9%	14.8%	25.9%	11.1%	7.4%	7.4%
Health	27.6%	10.3%	27.6%	6.9%	3.4%	13.8%	10.3%
Accountability	17.9%	7.1%	28.6%	10.7%	7.1%	14.3%	14.3%
Public Sector Management Reform	54.8%	25.8%	3.2%	6.5%	6.5%	0.0%	3.2%
Humanitarian Affairs	3.8%	11.5%	3.8%	7.7%	23.1%	30.8%	19.2%

**Table 4.2**

Partnership working and the Joint Donors	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Unable to Comment	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	n
There is a high level of trust among the Joint Donor Partners	6.4%	42.6%	31.9%	0.0%	19.1%	47
The Joint Donor Partners share the same objectives and values	4.3%	55.3%	27.7%	2.1%	10.6%	47
The bilateral programmes of the Joint Donor Partners are well harmonised with each other	0.0%	19.1%	42.6%	10.6%	27.7%	47

## APPENDIX 4

### List of Interviewees

#### People interviewed in Sudan

Name	Institution/Role
Ajawin, James Tipo Akol	DG Capacity Building Unit, Min of Labour, Public Service & Human Resource Development, GoSS
Ahluwalia, Sanjeev S.	Senior Public Sector Specialist, World Bank
Ali, George	Deputy Director for Partner relations, Ministry of Education, GoSS
Anestad, Malfrid	Humanitarian Advisor and Deputy Head of Office JDT, Juba
Baxter, Johnny	DFID, Khartoum, Deputy Head
Baller, Carola	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands, Political Officer, Khartoum/Juba
Bhurtel, Shyam K.	Senior Governance Advisor/Team Leader, UNDP
Biongding Deng, Luka	Minister of Presidential Affairs, GoSS
Blood, Daniel	Second Secretary, CIDA, Khartoum
Carpy, Jim	DFID, Head of Operations, Khartoum
Clarke, Laurence	Manager Southern Sudan Program and Juba Office, World Bank
Cockburn, Eleanor	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, ODI Fellow, Juba
Crowley, Peter	Director, UNICEF, Southern Sudan, Juba
Dandan, Chris	USAID, Juba
Davies, Fiona	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Advisor, Juba
Dibba, Momodou	Programme Manager, UNDP South Sudan
Einarsdotter, Helga	Adviser, Royal Norwegian Consulate General, Juba
Fleuret, Patrick	Mission Director, USAID, Juba
Foster, Kate	IRC, Juba
Frisby, Charles	Programme Manager, Norwegian People's Aid Sudan Programme, Juba
Gaere, Liz	Head of Office, JDT, Juba
Gebre, Getahun	Senior Operations Officer, Human Development, Juba
Gressly, David	Head of UN-MIS/UNRCHO, Juba
Ferdinand von Habsburg-Lothringen	Technical Advisor Peace and Development Strategic Advisory Team, UNDP, Juba

<b>Name</b>	<b>Institution/Role</b>
Hart, Tom	ODI fellow, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Juba
Hayden Smith, Tim	PACT
Herring, Benght	Head Basic Services Team, JDT
Johansen, Heidi	Consul of Norway, Juba
Khan, Shamima	Former Head World Bank, Juba
Kolaas, Jan	Area Manager, Norwegian Refugee Council,
Kumar, Anil	Programme Specialist, Governance Unit, UNDP, Juba
Laan, van der Corina	Deputy Head of Mission, Royal Netherlands Embassy, Khartoum
Lang, Catriona	Head of Mission, DFID Khartoum
Lelliot, David	FCO, Juba
Lewis, Chris	Sector Specialist, Tear Fund, Juba
Louwes, Klazien	Team leader, Basic Services Fund, Juba
Dr Olivia	Director General, Health Systems & Planning Ministry of Health, GoSS
Dr Baba	Director General External Assistance and Coordination, GoSS
Oldmeadow, Emily	Head EC Juba
Mabiour, Moses	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Head of Aid-Coordination, GoSS
Mahiuddin, Abu Zafor	Faculty member, BRAC Southern Sudan
Meirik, Peter	Embassy of Sweden, Khartoum
Monywiir, Arop Kuol	Under-Secretary, Ministry of Health, GoSS
Moore, Steve	Malaria Consortium
Pechaczek, Marisia	JDT, Governance and Rule of Law advisor
Phillips, Melissa	NGO Secretariat, NGO Forum
Riak, Pauline	Commissioner, Southern Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission, GoSS
Sadiki, Anselme	Programme Specialist, Southern Sudan
Seif Leleu	World Vision
Sisto, Otim	DG Planning, Ministry of Education, GoSS
Sorensen, Karin	Embassy of Denmark, Head of Office , Khartoum
Taylor, Richard	Policy Officer, JDT
Thu, Linda	Norwegian People's Aid, Acting Head and Development Programme Manager
Tisa, Agrey	Undersecretary, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, GoSS
Thorkildsen, Fritjof	Ambassador of Norway, Khartoum
Thompson, Graham	DFID, Security Advisor, Khartoum
Vrey, Wally,	Head of UN-DDR
Watba, Utem,	Director of Development Partners, Ministry of Education, GoSS

<b>Name</b>	<b>Institution/Role</b>
Wildig, Zoe	Embassy of Denmark, Khartoum, Counselor
Yankey, Frederick	Senior Financial Management Specialist, World Bank
Young, Nigel	HSP Programme Representative Humanitarian Department, OXFAM
Jerome, Dr Mark Zangabeyo	Under Secretary, Ministry of Labour, Public Service & Human Resource Development GoSS

### People interviewed over the phone (per organisation)

<b>Name</b>	<b>Function</b>
Laurent Charette	Director Sudan Programme, CIDA
Christina Green	Senior Development Officer Sudan, CIDA
David Ross	Senior Development Officer Sudan, CIDA
Birger Frederikson	Africa Department, MFA Denmark
Anders Karlsen	Africa Department, MFA Denmark
Irma van Dueren	Coordinator Sudan, Peace Building and Stabilisation Unit, MFA Netherlands
Lisette den Breems	Senior Policy Advisor Sudan, Peace Building and Stabilisation Unit, MFA Netherlands
Anna Schilizzi	Policy Advisor Sudan, Peace Building and Stabilisation Unit, MFA Netherlands
Wepke Kingma	Former Director of the Africa Department, MFA Netherlands
Jos van Aggelen	Former member of the Management Audit Team, MFA Netherlands
Anne Strand	Former Africa Department, MFA Norway
Elin Eikeland	Africa Department, MFA Norway
Hans-Jacob Frydenlund	Director Africa Department, MFA Norway
Sissel Hodne Steen	Former NORAD advisor at the Norwegian Embassy in Khartoum
Stein Erik Horjen	Peace, Gender and Democracy Department, NORAD
Jane Haycock	Head, Sudan Unit FCO/DFID
Helen Faulkner	Sudan Unit FCO/DFID
David Fish	Director Sub-Saharan Africa, DFID
Roger Wilson	Former member of Management Audit Team, DFID
Per Karlsson	Former Africa Department, MFA Sweden
Michael Fruhling	Africa Department, MFA Sweden
Hanna Sundberg	Africa Department, SIDA
Sarah Pantuliano	Sudan Watcher, ODI London
Hilde Frafjord Johanson	Former Minister of International Development, Norway
Agnes van Ardenne	Former Minister of International Development, the Netherlands





## EVALUATION REPORTS

- 5.95 Integration of Environmental Concerns into Norwegian Bilateral Development Assistance: Policies and Performance
- 1.96 NORAD's Support of the Remote Area Development Programme (RADP) in Botswana
- 2.96 Norwegian Development Aid Experiences. A Review of Evaluation Studies 1986-92
- 3.96 The Norwegian People's Aid Mine Clearance Project in Cambodia
- 4.96 Democratic Global Civil Governance Report of the 1995 Benchmark Survey of NGOs
- 5.96 Evaluation of the Yearbook "Human Rights in Developing Countries"
- 1.97 Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Prevent and Control HIV/AIDS «Kultursjokk og Korrektiv» – Evaluering av UD/NORADs Studiereiser for Lærere
- 3.97 Evaluation of Decentralisation and Development
- 4.97 Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique
- 5.97 Aid to Basic Education in Africa – Opportunities and Constraints
- 6.97 Norwegian Church Aid's Humanitarian and Peace-Making Work in Mali
- 7.97 Aid as a Tool for Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy: What can Norway do?
- 8.97 Evaluation of the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala
- 9.97 Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Worldview International Foundation
- 10.97 Review of Norwegian Assistance to IPS
- 11.97 Evaluation of Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance to the Sudan
- 12.97 Cooperation for Health Development WHO's Support to Programmes at Country Level
- 1.98 "Twinning for Development". Institutional Cooperation between Public Institutions in Norway and the South
- 2.98 Institutional Cooperation between Sokoine and Norwegian Agricultural Universities
- 3.98 Development through Institutions? Institutional Development Promoted by Norwegian Private Companies and Consulting Firms
- 4.98 Development through Institutions? Institutional Development Promoted by Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations
- 5.98 Development through Institutions? Institutional Development in Norwegian Bilateral Assistance. Synthesis Report
- 6.98 Managing Good Fortune – Macroeconomic Management and the Role of Aid in Botswana
- 7.98 The World Bank and Poverty in Africa
- 8.98 Evaluation of the Norwegian Program for Indigenous Peoples
- 9.98 Evaluering av Informasjons støtten til RORGene
- 10.98 Strategy for Assistance to Children in Norwegian Development Cooperation
- 11.98 Norwegian Assistance to Countries in Conflict
- 12.98 Evaluation of the Development Cooperation between Norway and Nicaragua
- 13.98 UNICEF-komiteen i Norge
- 14.98 Relief Work in Complex Emergencies
- 1.99 WID/Gender Units and the Experience of Gender Mainstreaming in Multilateral Organisations
- 2.99 International Planned Parenthood Federation – Policy and Effectiveness at Country and Regional Levels
- 3.99 Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Psycho-Social Projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Caucasus
- 4.99 Evaluation of the Tanzania-Norway Development Cooperation 1994-1997
- 5.99 Building African Consulting Capacity
- 6.99 Aid and Conditionality
- 7.99 Policies and Strategies for Poverty Reduction in Norwegian Development Aid
- 8.99 Aid Coordination and Aid Effectiveness
- 9.99 Evaluation of the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF)
- 10.99 Evaluation of AWEPA, The Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa, and AEI, The African European Institute
- 1.00 Review of Norwegian Health-related Development Cooperation 1988-1997
- 2.00 Norwegian Support to the Education Sector. Overview of Policies and Trends 1988-1998
- 3.00 The Project "Training for Peace in Southern Africa"
- 4.00 En kartlegging av erfaringer med norsk bistand gjennom frivillige organisasjoner 1987-1999
- 5.00 Evaluation of the NUFU programme
- 6.00 Making Government Smaller and More Efficient. The Botswana Case
- 7.00 Evaluation of the Norwegian Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety Priorities, Organisation, Implementation
- 8.00 Evaluation of the Norwegian Mixed Credits Programme
- 9.00 "Norwegians? Who needs Norwegians?" Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway's Political Past in the Middle East
- 10.00 Taken for Granted? An Evaluation of Norway's Special Grant for the Environment
- 1.01 Evaluation of the Norwegian Human Rights Fund
- 2.01 Economic Impacts on the Least Developed Countries of the Elimination of Import Tariffs on their Products
- 3.01 Evaluation of the Public Support to the Norwegian NGOs Working in Nicaragua 1994-1999
- 3A.01 Evaluación del Apoyo Público a las ONGs Noruegas que Trabajan en Nicaragua 1994-1999
- 4.01 The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Cooperation on Poverty Reduction
- 5.01 Evaluation of Development Co-operation between Bangladesh and Norway, 1995-2000
- 6.01 Can democratisation prevent conflicts? Lessons from sub-Saharan Africa
- 7.01 Reconciliation Among Young People in the Balkans An Evaluation of the Post Pessimist Network
- 1.02 Evaluation of the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM)
- 2.02 Evaluation of the International Humanitarian Assistance of the Norwegian Red Cross
- 3.02 Evaluation of ACOPAM An ILO program for "Cooperative and Organizational Support to Grassroots Initiatives" in Western Africa 1978 - 1999
- 3A.02 Évaluation du programme ACOPAM Un programme du BIT sur l'« Appui associatif et coopératif aux initiatives de Développement à la Base » en Afrique de l'Ouest de 1978 à 1999
- 4.02 Legal Aid Against the Odds Evaluation of the Civil Rights Project (CRP) of the Norwegian Refugee Council in former Yugoslavia
- 1.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund)
- 2.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Education Trust Fund for African the World Bank
- 3.03 Evaluering av Bistandstorgets Evalueringnettverk
- 1.04 Towards Strategic Framework for Peace-building: Getting Their Act Together. Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of the Peace-building.
- 2.04 Norwegian Peace-building policies: Lessons Learnt and Challenges Ahead
- 3.04 Evaluation of CESAR's activities in the Middle East Funded by Norway
- 4.04 Evaluering av ordningen med støtte gjennom paraplyorganisasjoner. Eksemplifisert ved støtte til Norsk Misjons Bistandsnemda og Atlas-alliansen
- 5.04 Study of the impact of the work of FORUT in Sri Lanka: Building Civil Society
- 6.04 Study of the impact of the work of Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society
- 1.05 -Study: Study of the impact of the work of FORUT in Sri Lanka and Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society
- 1.05 -Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norad Fellowship Programme
- 2.05 -Evaluation: Women Can Do It – an evaluation of the WCDI programme in the Western Balkans
- 3.05 Gender and Development – a review of evaluation report 1997-2004
- 4.05 Evaluation of the Framework Agreement between the Government of Norway and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
- 5.05 Evaluation of the "Strategy for Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation (1997-2005)"
- 1.06 Inter-Ministerial Cooperation. An Effective Model for Capacity Development?
- 2.06 Evaluation of Fredskorpset
- 1.06 – Synthesis Report: Lessons from Evaluations of Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation
- 1.07 Evaluation of the Norwegian Petroleum-Related Assistance
- 1.07 – Synteserapport: Humanitær innsats ved naturkatastrofer: En syntese av evalueringsfunn
- 1.07 – Study: The Norwegian International Effort against Female Genital Mutilation
- 2.07 Evaluation of Norwegian Power-related Assistance
- 2.07 – Study Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in South America
- 3.07 Evaluation of the Effects of the using M-621 Cargo Trucks in Humanitarian Transport Operations
- 4.07 Evaluation of Norwegian Development Support to Zambia (1991 - 2005)
- 5.07 Evaluation of the Development Cooperation to Norwegian NGOs in Guatemala
- 1.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS)
- 1.08 Study: The challenge of Assessing Aid Impact: A review of Norwegian Evaluation Practise
- 1.08 Synthesis Study: On Best Practise and Innovative Approaches to Capacity Development in Low Income African Countries
- 2.08 Evaluation: Joint Evaluation of the Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (TFESSD)
- 2.08 Synthesis Study: Cash Transfers Contributing to Social Protection: A Synthesis of Evaluation Findings
- 2.08 Study: Anti- Corruption Approaches. A Literature Review
- 3.08 Evaluation: Mid-term Evaluation the EEA Grants
- 4.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian HIV/AIDS Responses
- 5.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Research and Development Activities in Conflict Prevention and Peace-building
- 6.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation in the Fisheries Sector
- 1.09 Evaluation: Joint Evaluation of Nepal's Education for All 2004-2009 Sector Programme

**Norad**

Norwegian Agency for  
Development Cooperation

Postal adress

P.O. Box 8034 Dep. NO-0030 OSLO

Visiting adress

Ruseløkkveien 26, Oslo, Norway

Tel: +47 22 24 20 30

Fax: +47 22 24 20 31

No. of Copies: 300

[postmottak@norad.no](mailto:postmottak@norad.no)

[www.norad.no](http://www.norad.no)

